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Introduction 
This thesis is primarily an attempt to explicate in detail 
Hutcheson's moral philosophy. Hutcheson is usually remembered as 
being the first to develop systematically a moral philosophy based 
on the notion of a moral sense; but his clear presentation of a 
moral sense theory is not the only aspect of his thought which is 
worth examining. In fact, Hutcheson's writings contain interesting 
views on a great variety of topics, both in moral philosophy and in 
areas related to it. Each of the following chapters of this thesis 
deals with some topic central to the study of ethics. 
The first topic that must be examined is Hutcheson's views on 
human nature, for Hutcheson wishes to argue that the origins of 
moral evaluation, and of the motive to virtuous actions, are to be 
found in human nature. He analyses human nature using primarily 
the categories of sensation, desires, and beliefs. One should note 
in particular the nature of sensations, which include both percep-
tions and feelings, and one should also note the relation between 
desires and beliefs. These aspects of his analysis of human nature 
have major implications for other aspects of his thought. 
The third chapter examines at length the moral sense. The 
moral sense has a variety of important aspects to it: it perceives 
moral ideas, it provides the grounds for justifying moral approval, 
it provides us with a type of pleasure and pain, and, in a rather 
indirect fashion, it influences our actions. The central question 
raised by a discussion of these topics is whether or not all of the 
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roles played by the moral sense are mutually compatible. There can 
be no simple statement of the concept of the rroral sense as it is 
found in Hutcheson's philosophy, but its very complexity can often 
hide its more questionable aspects. 
Chapter four examines Hutcheson's concept of benevolence. Even 
though it is the moral sense which perceives right and wrong, it is 
benevolence which motivates all morally right actions. But if 
benevolence is to be viewed as motivating at all, Hutcheson must 
first refute those who maintain that all human action is actually 
motivated by self-love. To consider his remarks on this topic is 
to consider a small part of one of the main questions debated by 
eighteenth century philosophers. 
In chapter five, one of the most important aspects of Hutcheson's 
thought is considered, namely, the question of how the moral sense 
can influence an agent towards being more virtuous. If all virtuous 
actions are motivated by benevolence, and if the moral sense does not 
cause benevolent desires, then how can the knowledge of good and evil 
provided by the moral sense motivate virtuous action? Hutcheson has 
a most ingenious answer to this problem. It leads him into viewing 
the scope of all endeavours to be virtuous as being confined to an 
agent's own personality, (though Hutcheson himself did not realize 
the full implications of this until he was writing his later works). 
Chapter six deals with Hutcheson's debate with the rationalists. 
In considering this debate, one must remember that the position which 
Hutcheson attributed to the early rationalists and of which he was 
critical, is completely different from the position which Price held 
and from which Price criticized Hutcheson. 
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The last chapter deals briefly with the development of Hutcheson's 
thought. It is there suggested that the substantial changes Hutcheson 
made to his theory by the time he came to write his later works, are 
the result of his realizing the implications of several aspects of 
his earlier thought. 
I think that there are primarilytwo things to be gained from 
this detailed examination of Hutcheson's works. Firstly, the attempt 
at a systematic presentation of a theory can itself sometimes make 
apparent the most important problems with that theory. In Hutcheson's 
case, for example, any attempt to explain the moral sense will encounter 
the question of whether his theory is a form of intuitionism, or some 
sort of emotivism. But it is precisely the compatibility of these 
two aspects of the moral sense which is one of the most important 
problems with his theory. This problem must become apparent during 
any thorough presentation of the moral sense theory. 
The second thing to be gained by a careful examination of 
Hutcheson's philosophy, is a greater understanding of British, and 
indeed European thought of the eighteenth century. Hutcheson was in 
the middle of most of the major debates which the moral philosophers 
of the eighteenth century thought important. He took issue with the 
psychological egoists over the question of what motivated human 
actions, he debated the role of reason with the rationalists, and he 
laid the foundations of the moral philosophy of the Scottish Enlighten-
ment with his moral sense theory. Understanding British moral 
philosophy of the eighteenth century is still important today for it 
is not at all clear that Anglo-American thought in this field has made 
much progress since then. 
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1. Introduction 
i. Hutcheson's Philosophical Writings 
Hutcheson expounds his philosophy in four books and in a published 
correspondence with Gilbert Burnet. His first book, published in 
Dublin in 1725, is entitled An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas 
of Beauty and Virtue in Two Treatises. The first treatise is entitled 
"Concerning Beauty, Order, HarIIDny, Design",
1 
and is a discussion of 
aesthetics; as such it mostly falls outside the scope of this thesis. 
The second treatise is entitled "Concerning Moral Good and Evil"; 
this treatise I will be dealing with and will refer to simply as the 
'Inquiry'. The subtitle to the first edition of this work makes it 
explicit that Hutcheson's purpose is to defend "the principles of the 
late Earl of Shaftesbury •.• against the Fable of the Bees. 112 There 
can be no question of the extensive influence of Shaftesbury on 
Hutcheson's early aesthetic and moral theories, but the imprecision 
and vagueness of most of Shaftesbury's ideas make tracing this 
influence inexact and difficult. Locke must also be mentioned as an 
important influence on Hutcheson; the nature of this influence is 
discussed in the next section below. The subtitle also mentions that 
Mandeville is criticized in the 'Inquiry', and throughout all of his 
works, it is clear that Hutcheson is criticizing Hobbes as well as 
Mandeville. Hutcheson objected strenuously to the claims that the 
actions of mankind are never influenced by benevolent feelings, and 
that IIDrality derives from enlightened self-interest. Four editions 
1. In this thesis, referred to as the '1st Inquiry'. 
2. Quoted in Jensen, p. 3. 
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of the 'Inquiry' were published in Hutcheson'·s lifetime; for the last 
of these he made extensive revisions to the text. Since this fourth 
edition dates from 1738, these revisions date from the same period as 
the writing of the 'System', and are of interest when considering the 
development of Hutcheson's philosophy. 
In the same year as he published the 'Inquiry', 1725, Hutcheson 
also became involved in a public correspondence with Gilbert Burnet. 
This correspondence deals with issues raised in the 'Inquiry', and in 
turn leads into the discussion in Hutcheson's next work. 3 
Hutcheson's second book, published in 1728, contained two nore 
treatises. The first, An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the 
Passions and Affections, is intended to supplement the brief discussion 
of human nature found in the 'Inquiry'; henceforth, this part of the 
book will be referred to as the 'Essay'. The second part of this 
book, entitled Illustrations on the Moral Sense and henceforth referred 
to as the 'Illustrations', was provoked by the correspondence with 
Burnet, and is primarily a clarification of Hutcheson's position vis-a-
vis the moral rationalist school. It is very important to notice that 
Bishop Butler's Fifteen Sermons had been published two years before 
in 1726. By the time he wrote his second book, Hutcheson had been 
deeply influenced by Butler, and made substantial changes in his 
theory in the light of this influence. However, the significance of 
these changes must not be over-estimated, for they are primarily in 
the form of additions to, rather than denials of, the earlier theory. 
Because of this, I have usually thought it permissible to present 
Hutcheson's theory as stated in his first two books as one theory, and 
3. Published in Peach, p. 195-247. Henceforth referred to as the 
'Correspondence'. 
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to postpone the discussion of the development of his thought until 
afterwards. 
While a professor at the University in Glasgow, Hutcheson 
published in Latin a student handbook on ethics, politics, natural law 
and economics. This was translated into English and published in 
1746 as A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy in Three Books. 
This work is of less interest than the rest of Hutcheson's writings, 
perhaps because of the audience it was written for; it is dedicated 
II th d • • • • II 4 To e Stu ents in Universities . I will have occasion to refer to 
it, but there is little in its discussion of ethics which is not found 
elsewhere in Hutcheson's works. This work will be referred to as the 
'Introduction'. 
Written before the 'Introduction•,
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but not published until 1755, 
was the System of Moral Philosophy, hereafter referred to as the 
'System'. This work is much more disjointed than his earlier works, 
as Hutcheson himself admits. In a letter of 1741 he says of the 
'System': " ... as to composing in order, I am quite bewildered, and 
am adding confusedly to a confused book all valuable remarks in a 
farrago, to refresh my memory in my class lectures on several subjects. 116 
The changes in his philosophy between the 'Essay' and the 'System' do 
not aJ.YK)unt to a major revision, except perhaps on one point, but rather 
to a series of corrections and afterthoughts superimposed on the earlier 
theory. I will remark on these changes in Chapter 7. 
4. In eighteenth century Scotland, the age of university students would 
correspond more closely with that of present day secondary school 
students than with university students. Thus Hurne attended Edinburgh 
University from the ages of eleven to fourteen, (cf. Messner, p.40-41), 
although Hutcheson did not start at Glasgow until he was seventeen: 
(cf. Scott, p.10). 
5. Cf. Scott, p.244-246. 
6. Quoted in Scott, p.114. 
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ii. Locke's Influence 
Hutcheson was greatly influenced by Locke; he accepted from 
Locke in its entirety the theory of ideas and the accompanying empiricist 
epistemology. That is to say, Hutcheson believed throughout his life 
(he never changed his mind on these points), that the mind is conscious 
7 of nothing save ideas; that all ideas are either simple or compound; 
8 
that the latter are compounds of the former; that there are no innate 
9 10 
ideas; and that all ideas in the mind are first received by the senses. 
These are unargued premises for Hutcheson; he simply accepts them as 
obvious. And he repeatedly uses them in his arguments, especially in 
his arguments against the rationalists. If these premises be considered 
false, then, although Hutcheson's theory may still be true, many of 
his supporting arguments are undermined. Also borrowed from Locke is 
the distinction between the external senses and reflection, and the 
· i· d' · · 11 primary-secondary qua ity 1st1nct1on. But one cannot be too careful 
in determining the exact nature of this influence; it is not at all 
clear, for example, whether reflection and the internal senses are the 
same thing;
12 
nor whether Hutcheson's discussion of concomitant ideas 
is not something different from Locke's notion of primary qualities.
13 
7. Essay, p.2-3; 1st Inquiry, p. 2-3. 
8. Ibid. 
9. Essay, p.3. Introduction, p.7. 
10. Essay, p.3. 
11. 1st Inquiry, p.5. 
12. Below, chapter 2, sec. i. 
13. Below, chapter 3, sec. ii. 
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To say that Hutcheson has chosen to imbed his moral theory in an 
empiricist framework is not, of course, to say that there is nothing 
of interest in Hutcheson's philosophy which can be judged separately 
from this background. His analysis of desires, his refutation of 
Hobbes, and much of his understanding of the relation between human 
nature and morality, for example, are independent of the theory of 
ideas, although Hutcheson often presents them in the terms of that 
theory. 
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2. Theory of Human Nature 
i. Sensation 
For Hutcheson, the nature of morality is primarily determined by 
the structure of human nature; thus his analysis of human nature is 
central to his moral philosophy. He discusses human nature in terms 
of four basic categories; the senses, the affections, reason, and 
pleasure and pain. These I will consider in turn. 
Like his theory of ideas, Hutcheson borrowed his theory of the 
senses from Locke; the two theories are, of course, closely connected. 
Locke distinguished between the external senses and reflection, the 
former giving us ideas about the material world, the latter ideas 
about the processes of our own minds. Hutcheson draws a similar 
distinction between the external and internal senses, but he discusses 
the internal senses at much greater lengths than Locke discusses re-
flection. 1 The external senses are the normal five senses of hearing, 
seeing, etc. The internal senses are the origins of our ideas of our 
own minds, such as our sense of pleasure and pain, and are the origin 
of ideas which tend to accompany our other ideas, such as our sense 
2 
of beauty, our moral sense, our sense of dignity, etc. An early 
formulation of the external - internal distinction emphasizes that 
the internal senses as the source of new ideas and impressions, and 
the internal senses as the source of awareness of our feelings (i.e. 
1. The internal senses have two aspects. In this section I discuss 
primarily the analogy between external and internal senses. The 
next section deals with the internal senses as sources of 
pleasure and pain. 
2. One corrunentator remarks that Hutcheson discovered new senses at 
the rate of one every four years. cf. Jensen, p. 40. 
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pleasure and pain), are equated by Hutcheson. Note the use of the 
phrases 'pleasure of beauty and harmony' and 'perception of beauty 
and harmony' in this quotation: 
"Since then there are such different powers of 
perception, where what are conunonly called the 
external senses are the same; since the most 
accurate knowledge of what the external senses 
discover, may often not give the pleasure of 
beauty or harmony, which yet one of good taste 
will enjoy at once without much knowledge; we 
may justly use another name for these higher 
and more delightful perceptions of beauty and 
harmony, and call the power of receiving such 
impressions, an internal sense: .•. " (1st Inquiry, 
p. 10-11) 
This equation of feeling pleasure and perceiving new ideas indicates 
that Hutcheson changes fundamentally the nature of Locke's reflective 
senses, so much so that 'reflection' is no longer an adequate term 
for them. Internal sensations have an emotive role which enables 
Hutcheson to add a sense of beauty, the moral sense, etc., to Locke's 
reflective perceptions of the workings of our minds. I will discuss 
in the next section the details of this emotive role of the internal 
senses, where I think it will become obvious that Hutcheson's new 
senses are more than reflective senses giving information about the 
processes of our own mind. But however much he expands the role of 
the internal senses, there remain two aspects of his discussion which 
indicate the origin of the conception in Lockian reflection; firstly, 
Hutcheson always retains the Lockian notion that we have ideas 
obtained by reflection of the workings of our own minds; and secondly, 
even if some of the internal senses seem to give us knowledge about 
more than our own minds, all internal senses are known themselves by 
reflection. That is, for example, although the moral sense may give 
us ideas of something other than the workings of our mind, all our 
11 
knowledge of our moral approval is by reflection. 3 
The length and complexity of Hutcheson's discussion of the 
various senses make it easy to lose track of just what a sense is, 
and hence of what Hutcheson is claiming when he attributes the origin 
of some idea to a particular sense. At one point he defines a sense 
as "a determination of the mind to receive any idea from the presence 
of an object which occurs to us, independent on our will." (Inquiry, 
p. 113). The phrase 'independent on our will' is important, for it 
indicates one of the factors common to all sense perception; to wit, 
that we are necessarily determined to perceive the ideas which we do. 
This is to say that a sensed idea immediately and independently of 
our volition arises in the mind in certain situations; in the case of 
the external senses, certain physical conditions necessarily result 
in our sensing ideas; in the case of the internal senses, the presence 
of one idea necessarily gives rise to some other idea. Hutcheson 
seems to think that this distinguishes the senses from reason and 
from passions and desires, (cf. 1st Inquiry, p. 11), but as Raphael 
4 
points out, we are as determined in our rational belief as we are 
in our sense perceptions. Hutcheson explicitly admits the necessity 
of rational beliefs, (and for him such beliefs are perceived by 
reason): "this may let us see that relations are not real qualities 
inherent in external natures but only ideas necessarily accompanying 
our perception of two objects at once and comparing them." 
(Illustrations, p. 142). If the mind necessarily perceives relations, 
then independence from our will cannot be used as a criterion for 
distinguishing sense from reason. Hutcheson could reply to this, 
3. Cf. below, chapter 3, sec. ii. 
4. Raphael, The Moral Sense, p. 19. 
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though he does not do so. Since for Hutcheson reason is the percep-
tion of the relation between two ideas, he could maintain that although 
whenpresentedwith two ideas we are detennined to see a certain rela-
tion, the mind must be active in so far as it must compare the two 
ideas before the relation can arise. But this is still not sufficient 
to distinguish reason from perception for Hutcheson, for just as one 
can exercise the will and not compare two ideas, one can exercise the 
will in the case of the internal senses by refusing to consider an 
idea which would give rise to an idea of that internal sense. This 
last point would not apply to the case of the internal senses reacting 
to an object actually present to the external senses, (which is the 
case Hutcheson seems to have in mind when he originally presents the 
criterion in the first Inquiry, p. 11), but it is applicable to those 
cases in which the internal senses react to an imagined object. The 
criterion must be applicable to all cases, including cases of imagin-
ing, if it is to be sufficient. 
The criterion is no more successful when used to distinguish 
perceptions from desires, for desires are also necessary in the sense 
that perceptions are. As I will discuss below, desires arise as the 
necessary result of having certain types of beliefs. 5 Thus it would 
seem difficult to use independence of our will as a criterion for 
distinguishing sense perception from the other activities of the mind. 
The only other factor which for Hutcheson is co:rnm::>n to all the 
senses is that they all provide us with new, simple, unanalysable 
ideas. Thus when he claims that a group of ideas derive from a sense, 
he is claiming two things; firstly, that some of the ideas are simple 
and unanalysable; and secondly, that some of the ideas necessarily 
5. Cf. below, chapter 2, sec. ii-d. 
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arise as they do. It is often useful to apply these two criteria to 
the relevant ideas whenever Hutcheson introduces a new sense. In 
particular, the former must be remembered with respect to the moral 
sense, for the fact that a sense must give us new simple ideas can 
often be lost in viewing the moral sense as a form of feeling or 
emotion. 
The other point that it is easy to lose sight of through 
Hutcheson's proliferation of senses, is the fundamental reason why 
Hutcheson thinks he requires all of them. His reasoning is this: 
given that we have moral, aesthetic and other similar ideas, and 
given Locke's theory of the origins of our ideas in the senses, then 
there must be senses which give us those ideas. If they are not 
compounds of ideas from the external senses, which does not look 
promising, and are not relations, which Hutcheson explicitly rejects, 
then there must be special senses which provide us with them. Thus 
this wide use of the term 'sense' is simply the direct result of 
trying to account for the origins of aesthetic and moral ideas and 
at the same time maintain that all our ideas originate in the senses. 
For example, Hutcheson argues "that this perception of moral good is 
not deriv'd from custom, education, example, or study. These give us 
no new ideas: ..• " (Inquiry, p. 128). And one might draw attention to 
the title of the treatise in which the internal senses are first 
explained: "An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and 
Virtue". 
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ii. The Affections 
a. The Internal Sensations 
The second aspect of human nature that must be considered is that 
which Hutcheson calls the affections. The eighteenth century was an 
era when British philosophers, especially those who were Scottish, 
prided themselves on their ability to write on philosophical topics 
in fluent, everyday English. It was not an era when philosophers 
consciously created technical languages and prided themselves on the 
consistent use of technical words. Hutcheson is by no means always 
consistent in his use of the word 'affection', nor of the other 
central words in the following discussi0n. But in spite of this, I 
shall use the words 'affections', 'passions', 'desires', etc. as 
technical terms. I will define them as clearly as possible from the 
passages in which Hutcheson is discussing them directly, and ignore 
the fact that he sometimes uses them loosely throughout the rest of 
his writings. All the following distinctions Hutcheson makes at some 
point or other, but his use of key terms is not always consistent 
with them when he is discussing other topics. 
The term 'affection' includes three things for Hutcheson: passions, 
desires, and certain internal sensations which today would probably be 
called feelings or emotions. (Only some of the internal sensations 
are classed by Hutcheson as affections, but I think that distinction 
unimportant, as I explain below.) Of these·, the internal sensations 
are categorially different from the other two: passions and desires 
motivate actions; sensations, including internal sensations, do not. 
(It should be noted, therefore, that Hutcheson uses the word 'passion' 
for a type of motivational impulse, which he distinguishes from 
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desires, and not for the emotions in general as one might expect. 
However, he often uses the word 'passionate' to denote the fact that 
a motivational impulse is accompanied by sensations or emotions. 6 ) 
This use of the word 'affection' to include two quite different 
things, (i.e. emotions and motivational impulses), is confusing, but 
it was common in the eighteenth century not to distinguish these, 
and Hutcheson thinks it best to conform to the cormnon usage of his 
day. The distinction and his reason for retaining the word 'affection' 
he puts thus: 
"If we could confine the word affection to these 
two, (i.e. desire and aversion), which are entirely 
distinct from all sensation, and directly incline 
the mind to action or voli ticn of motion, 
we should have less debate about the number or 
division of affections. But since, by universal 
custom, this name is applied to other modifications 
of the mind, such as joy, sorrow, despair, we may 
consider what universal distinction can be assigned 
between these modifications, and the several sens-
ations above mentioned; and we shall scarce find any 
other than this, that we call the direct immediate 
perception of pleasure or pain from the present 
object or event, the sensation: But we denote by 
the affection or passion some other perceptions of 
pleasure or pain, not directly raised by the presence 
or operation of the event or object, but by our 
reflection upon, or apprehension of their present or 
future existence; so that we expect or judge that 
the object or event will raise the direct sensation 
in us." (Essay, p. 27) 
This quotation shows that Hutcheson carefully distinguished those 
sensations which are included under the affections, and those sensations 
which are not. The latter are any sensations we receive from objects 
which are actually present to us when we receive the sensation; the 
former are sensations of pleasure or pain at the thought or idea of an 
6. Cf. below, chapter 2, sec. ii-b. 
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7 
object which is not just then present. This makes it apparent that 
those affections which are sensations are a sub-set of internal sens-
ations; affections are reactions to imagined or thought of objects, 
but internal sensations may be reactions either to imagined objects, 
or to objects which are actually present. Since the moral sense, for 
example, would appear to be able to react to both imagined actions 
(Hutcheson talks about our moral approval of actions in history and 
literature, for example), and to actions actually present, and since 
the moral sense must react, even in the case of actions which are 
currently witnessed, to a complex conception of the action and not 
to the action as perceived, the classification of only some internal 
sensations as affections is unimportant. Hence I will consistently 
use the term 'internal sensation' for all sensations which are re-
actions to other ideas, whether or not those other ideas are presently 
perceived by the external senses, or only thought of. The important 
point is that internal sensations are reactions to complex (and 
rational) conceptions; it is not important whether what is conceived 
of is actually present or only imagined. 
This aspect of the internal sensations - that they are reactions 
to our ideas, either when perceived or when they are later thought -
needs to be emphasized. Internal sensations do not arise without prior 
ideas in the mind; in this they differ from the external senses of 
hearing, seeing, etc. In fact, this is the criterion for distinguishing 
the external and internal senses. That some internal sensations arise 
7. It should be noted that in this quotation Hutcheson calls these 
sensations 'passions' as well as 'affections'; this is very 
confusing since he generally uses the word 'passion' to denote a 
form of motivational impulse which cannot possibly be a sensation. 
I discuss passions in this motivational sense below in the next 
section. 
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as the result of ideas already in the mind, and not as the result of 
external objects acting upon our organs, or the direct result of 
external sensations still present, is central to Hutcheson's theory 
of internal sensations. Since our conception of events and actions, 
and our beliefs about them, are established by our faculty of rea$on, 
the fact that some internal sensations are subsequent to these con-
ceptions and beliefs implies that some internal sensations presuppose 
rational activity. This, of course, is not to suggest that the in-
ternal senses are rational; the sense in which they are senses and 
not reason was discussed in the previous section. Briefly, the in-
ternal senses are senses in that they provide new simple ideas, and 
in that we are determined by our nature to sense the ideas which we 
do in fact sense. Some of these senses are the source of sensations 
or feelings which are about, or which arise in reaction to, beliefs 
that are rationally established. Thus although internal sensations 
are feelings or sensations, they can involve a rational element which 
is carefully defined. This point is important in understanding the 
role of reason in morality for Hutcheson, and for understanding the 
source of moral error. I will return to the topic again in Chapter 
3 on the moral sense. 
A second point raised by the long quotation from the 'Essay' 
above, is that internal sensations are always pleasant or painful. 
Hutcheson uses the words 'pleasure' and 'pain' not just in the limited 
sense of physical pleasure and pain, but in the wider sense, comrron 
amongst eighteenth century philosophers, of whatever is liked or not 
liked about sensations. The fact that internal sensations are pleasant 
and painful accounts for the emotive element in Hutcheson's theory of 
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internal sensations, for Hutcheson views all emotions as types of 
pleasure and pain. That Hutcheson wishes his theory of internal 
sensations to be an account of human emotions is clear from his 
examples: joy, sorrow, (Essay, p. 28), envy, fear, hope, etc. 
(Essay, p. 66). As a theory of human emotions, internal sensations 
are perhaps open to the objection that there is more to emotions 
than sensations of liking and disliking. But this ignores two 
aspects of the theory; firstly, that a sensation is always a reaction 
to specific ideas; which idea an internal sensation is connected with 
determines which emotion the sensation is. This is the criterion 
behind the classification of the emotions in Section III of the 
'Essay'. Secondly, the internal sensations are closely connected 
with desires and passions. It is in fact the desire and passion 
plus the accompanying internal sensation which are referred to as 
one emotion. The sorrow of hatred, for example, involves not only 
the sensation of unpleasantness at the thought of the success of 
someone not liked, it also involves the desire to hinder his success 
(Essay, p. 77). Hutcheson's theory that emotions are only sensations 
of pleasure or pain is not as simple or inadequate as might at first 
appear. It must be remembered that these feelings are inexorably 
confused with each other, with the thoughts and ideas which trigger 
them, and with desires and passionate impulses. These taken together 
are probably a more adequate description of human emotions than the 
internal sensations by themselves. Whether internal sensations plus 
passions and desires are adequate for an analysis of human emotions 
is an interesting question (to which I think the answer is that they 
are not), but the question falls outside the scope of this thesis. 
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I will not be dealing with Hutcheson's theory of the emotions except 
as it relates to the theory of the moral sense. 
One of the fundamental problems of Hutcheson's theory of the 
internal senses, is brought out by comparing what was said in the 
previous section about the internal senses as the source of new ideas, 
with the point now raised of their relation to pleasure and pain. 
If the internal senses are only sensations of pleasure and pain, then 
how are they the source of new simple ideas as I described previously? 
If they are not the source of new simple ideas, then why are they 
called 'senses'? And why are they postulated at all? If the internal 
senses are all only sensations of pleasure and pain, then, since 
more than one sense can react to a given object or event, how do we 
tell the sensations apart? How Hutcheson came to view emotions as 
internal sensations is partly explained by the fact that for him 
perceiving by the senses and feeling pleasure are the same sort of 
thing. This situation is exceedingly confusing, for it leaves one 
wondering whether the moral sense is a faculty which intuits moral 
ideas, or whether it is a faculty which feels moral emotions. It is 
both, a fact that causes problems which are discussed in Chapter 3 
below. Part of the reason that Hutcheson held these two views of 
the nature of the moral sense is to be found in the development of 
his thought. When he first used the moral sense to refute Hobbes 
and the egoists, he tended to emphasize the emotional aspect of the 
moral sense. When he later came to argue against the rationalists, 
he tended to emphasize the intuitive aspect of the moral sense. 
However, as can be seen from the long quotation earlier in this 
section, Hutcheson held both of these views of the moral sense 
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simultaneously, even if he tended to accent one aspect or the other as 
suited his purposes at the time. The development of Hutcheson's 
thought is discussed in more detail below in Chapter 7. 
The fact that the theory of internal sensations is partly a 
theory about human emotions or feelings, and partly a theory of the 
sources of some of our ideas, should be seen in the context of the 
analogy between the external and internal senses. Hutcheson seems to 
be saying that emotions and sense perceptions are the same sort of 
thing; and he seems to suggest that the only difference between them 
is that we see, for example, as a result of being confronted with an 
external world, whereas we have emotions as the result of being con-
fronted with beliefs and ideas. The equation of perception and 
feeling is fairly explicit in the following sort of passage, which is 
by no means rare in Hutcheson's writings: 
"All our ideas, ••• are received by some immediate 
powers of perception internal or external which 
we may call sense; by these too we have pleasure 
and pain. All perception is by the soul, not by 
the body, though some impressions on the bodily 
organs are the occasion of some of them; and in 
others the soul is determined to other sorts of 
feelings or sensations where no bodily impression 
is the immediate occasion .•.• a temper observed, 
a character, an affection, a state of a sensitive 
being, known or understood, may raise liking, 
approbation, sympathy, as naturally from the very 
constitution of the soul, as any bodily impression 
raises external sensations." (Illustrations, p. 135) 
This passage makes it clear that Hutcheson views feelings as the 
same sort of thing as the perceptions of the external senses, and 
that the only difference between them is that the latter are the 
result of "impressions on the bodily organs" and the former arise as 
the result of situations which are "known or.understood". Internal 
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sensations for Hutcheson are both emotions and the source of new 
intuited ideas; this ambiguity remains throughout Hutcheson's 
writings. 
b. The Passions 
Hutcheson's use of the word 'passion' is exceedingly confusing. 
This is basically because he uses it for three separate things. 
Firstly, he uses it for the internal sensations as I have described 
them above. Secondly, he uses it for any desire which is accompanied 
by internal sensations; these I will call 'violent desires', but 
Hutcheson often calls them 'passionate desires•. 8 Thirdly, he uses 
it for violent impulses which motivate and are accompanied by internal 
sensations, but are not violent desires. It is this last usage which 
I will adopt. But one should not be misled in reading the 'Essay', 
for it is mostly the second meaning which Hutcheson uses, except where 
he is explicitly discussing passions in the third sense. 9 The 
motivational aspects of passions in the third sense are also sometimes 
f d ' . ' '. . ' 10 re erre to as appetites or instincts . 
What these three uses of the word 'passion' have in common is 
the presence of internal sensations; in the first case by themselves, 
8. Throughout the rest of this thesis I will use the word 'violent' to 
indicate that a passion or desire is accompanied by internal sensa-
tions regardless of the magnitude of those sensations. I choose 
not to use the word 'passionate', which Hutcheson often uses, to 
avoid confusion with passions as motivational impulses. The word 
'emotional' would often be appropriate,· but it does not have the 
merits of obviously being a technical expression, or of being used 
by Hutcheson. Hutcheson uses the word 'violent' in, for example, 
Inquiry, p. 223, or p. 292 where "more violent or passionate" in 
the fourth edition replaces "stronger" in the second. 
9. Cf. Essay, p. 28-29, 61, 63-65, 91-93, 106. 
10. Essay, p. 91-93, 106. 
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in the second case accompanying desires, and in the third case as an 
integral part of passions or appetites. Hutcheson tends to call 
'passionate' any aspect of human nature which has strong sensations 
accompanying it, (hence, for example, passionate desires), but I 
think it more convenient to restrict the use of the word 'passion! 
to instincts or appetites. This usage may serve to make at least 
one point, that all instincts are for Hutcheson accompanied by strong 
sensations, i.e. are passionate. 
h d . . . h . 
11 f d . Hutc eson 1st1ngu1s es passions rom esires. Passions must 
be violent and particular. To say that they are necessarily violent, 
though they may vary in degree of violence, is to say that they are 
always accompanied by internal sensations or feelings. Passions, 
like desires, can motivate actions; Hutcheson variously refers to this 
aspect of them as a "strong brutal impulse of the will" (Essay, p. 28), 
as a "propensity of instinct to objects and actions" (Essay, p. 63) , 
or as an "instinct" or "appetite" (Essay, p. 91-93). Desires may 
be general in that a given desire may be a desire for the means to 
the satisfaction of several other desires. Thus having money is 
usually desired as a means to fulfilling a number of other desires. 
The passions can never be general in this sense; they are always 
particular and motivate us to action merely to satisfy the given 
passion. This relation between passions and motivation presupposes 
that the passions are directional; that is, that they motivate us 
towards particular types of behaviour. The passion of hunger, for 
example, drives us to seek and eat food; the passion of thirst drives 
11. Here and henceforth, 'passion' is used in the third sense, i.e. 
to refer to a violent instinct or appetite. 
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us to drink, etc. The fact that internal sensations always accompany 
the passions, (or are part of them, it is not clear which), is 
connected to the question of how the passions motivate. These 
internal sensations must be either pleasant or painful; those that 
accompany the passions are almost always the latter. The passions 
motivate by exciting us to remove this unpleasantness. It is diffi-
cult to see how a pleasant passion could motivate, except by exciting 
us to continue the pleasantness, but Hutcheson does not mention this. 
This structure, by which the pleasure or pain of the accompanying 
sensations is the motivating force in the case of the passions, is 
different from the motivating structure of desires. In the case of 
desires, the accompanying sensations are unnecessary, and indeed may 
not even be present. 
c. Desires 
Hutcheson sometimes equates affections with desires, and at one 
point says that desires are the only pure affections, (Essay, p. 60). 
But in many places he uses the word 'affection' as I have been using 
it, to include passions and some of the internal sensations as well 
as desires. Despite this confusion in terminology, there is a clear 
distinction between passions and desires for Hutcheson. Unlike the 
passions, desires are always quite distinct from any sensations which 
may or may not accompany them. Like the passions, however, desires 
motivate actions, and furthermore, they motivate because of their 
relationship to pleasure and pain. But in the case of desires, the 
pleasure or pain need not be present with the desire and usually is 
not: rather, knowledge of the pleasure or pain which will result upon 
the action is present, and is the cause of the desire. This is clear 
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from the passage in the 'Essay', for example, in which Hutcheson 
says that desire (and aversion) "seem to arise necessarily from a 
rational apprehension of (natural) good or evil, ••. " (Essay, p. 63). 
The belief about possible pleasure or pain which causes a desire 
need not be about the pleasure or pain of the person who has the 
desire; it could be about someone else's pleasure or pain: "The 
apprehension of (natural) good, either to ourselves or others, as 
attainable, raises desire: .•. " (Essay, p. 62). In the case of desires, 
it is beliefs about, or apprehension of, possible pleasures and pains, 
not the pleasures and pains themselves, that lead us on to action, 
to acquire or avoid an object or event as one could say that the 
passions motivate by unpleasantness pushing us towards certain actions, 
while desires draw us on by beliefs about anticipated pleasure, or 
possible pain to be avoided. Since for Hutcheson there is no innate 
knowledge of what will give us pleasure or pain, a desire necessarily 
presupposes that we have experienced a similar pleasure or pain 
before. With the passions there is no such presupposition, nor any 
belief about what will give us pleasure or pain. Thus there is a 
difference in type between passions and desires for Hutcheson. 
Ryle is mistaken when he claims that for Hutcheson passions and 
desires differ only in degree.
12 
For Hutcheson, desires presuppose 
beliefs about natural good and evil (i.e. pleasures and pains), 
passions do not. They also differ in that internal sensations are a 
necessary part of passions, whereas a desire is always distinct from 
accompanying sensations if there are any. In the following passage 
in the 'System', Hutcheson explains the difference between a desire, 
12. Ryle, p. 94. 
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any sensations which may accompany the desire, and the belief about 
possible good and evil which causes the desire, (the last of these is 
here called the 'motive' for the desire): 
"But the several selfish desires, terminating on 
particular objects, are generally attended with 
some uneasy turbulent sensations in very different 
degrees: yet these sensations are different from 
the act of the will (i.e., the desire) to which 
they are conjoined; and different too from the 
motives of desire. The motive is some good 
apprehended in an object or event, toward which 
good the desire tends; ••. " System, p. 41. 
Besides distinguishing desires from any accompanying pleasures 
and pains, Hutcheson also distinguishes the object of a desire from 
any pleasure or pain which may result from the satisfaction of the 
desire, (System, p. 41-42). The object of a desire is the event or 
state of affairs that the desire motivates us towards; it is not the 
pleasure or pain that we believe will result, even though the belief 
about the pleasure or pain is necessarily present and is what gives 
rise to the desire. In this context, Jensen finds it helpful to 
introduce G.E. Moore's suggestion that there are two senses of the 
13 
phrase that all desires exist "because of" some pleasure. A desire 
can be said to be because of some pleasure either if it is caused by 
that pleasure, or if that pleasure is the object of the desire. But 
this comparison with Moore is very misleading, for Moore and Hutcheson 
seem to have quite different notions of how pleasure can cause desires. 
For Moore, it is the actual pleasure which accompanies the thought of 
what is desired which he admits might be part of the cause of desires: 
"Suppose, for instance, I am desiring a glass of port 
wine .•.. The idea of the drinking causes a feeling 
of pleasure in my mind, which helps to produce that 
13. Jensen, p. 21. 
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state of incipient activity, which is called 'desire'. 
It is, therefore, because of a pleasure, which I 
already have ••• that I desire the wine, which I have 
not." 14 
From this actual pleasure which may cause a desire, Moore distinguishes 
the thought of possible pleasure to come which may be the object of 
desire. He says, "It is in fact only where the latter, the 'thought 
of a pleasure', is present that pleasure can be said to be the object 
f d . h . . .. is o esire, or t e motive to action. But this is not the distinction 
relevant to Hutcheson's discussion. Hutcheson distinguishes any 
pleasure which may accompany a desire from that desire, (Essay, p. 29; 
System, p. 41). Such pleasures, which for Moore are the cause of 
desires, are, on Hutcheson's theory, not always present, and are 
certainly not the cause of desires. What does cause desires for 
Hutcheson is the belief or thought about future pleasure, (Essay, 
p. 28, 62, 63; System, p. 4l)jbut that is what Moore distinguishes 
from the cause of desires and what he says must be present if pleasure 
is to be the object of desires. Furthermore, for Hutcheson the cause 
of desires, (i.e. the belief about possible pleasures and pains), is 
distinguished from the object; the object is that action, event, 
state of affairs, or thing, (Hutcheson nowhere makes it clear which 
. . . ) 16 h. h . d . d of these sorts of things is the obJect of desires , w ic is esire • 
I do not think Jensen is clear on how possible pleasure, rather than 
actual pleasure as on Moore's theory, causes desires for Hutcheson; 
14. Moore, p. 69. Moore's emphasis. 
15. Moore, p. 70. Moore's emphasis. 
16. Moore also goes on to make this distinction between the thing 
desired (e.g. the glass of port) and the. pleasure one thinks 
will accompany having that thing. 
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Jensen says, for example: "he (Hutcheson) returns constantly to a 
position, in agreement with Moore, that pleasure is not the object 
of desire, but is somehow the cause of it. 1117 
I think that there can be little question that for Hutcheson the 
belief about possible pleasure or pain (our own or someone else's)· 
actually causes the desire. This is in agreement with Kemp Smith's 
interpretation, for he says that "pleasure and pain, for Hume as for 
Hutcheson, are merely the efficient causes, not the objects or ends 
of action. 1118 Jensen, though is slightly hesitant for he "wonders 
nervously whether Hutcheson does not slip backwards at times into 
(psychological) hedonism, 1119 (i.e. the belief that pleasure is the 
object of all desires). And in one sense Hutcheson is a psychological 
hedonist: he is a psychological hedonist in that he believes that 
for every desire there must be an anticipation of pleasure, (it would 
seem that this is Moore's notion of psychological hedonism). But he 
is not a psychological hedonist if that requires the belief that the 
objects of all desires is the pleasure anticipated. If one makes 
allowances for Hutcheson's disposition for using his terminology 
17. Jensen, p. 21. My emphasis. 
18. Kemp Smith, p. 164. 
19. Jensen, p. 20. If one accepts Moore's distinction between ethical 
hedonism (i.e. the belief that only pleasure is of value) and 
psychological hedonism (i.e. the belief that pleasure is the 
motive for all human action), then presumably Jensen means psycho-
logical hedonism. This is clear from the next sentence of his 
text: "Does he (Hutcheson) not write at times as if he held that 
many of our desires are for pleasure?" Not so clear is whether 
or not Jensen is accusing Hutcheson of egoistical psychological 
hedonism. If he is, then he would be missing the point to 
Hutcheson's refutation of Hobbes, (see below, this section). 
Jensen himself has just finished discussing Hutcheson's refutation 
of the egoists, (p. 13-19), but he does not seem to consider this 
point when discussing whether Hutcheson slips back into hedonism, 
p. 20-23) . 
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loosely, I do not think there are many passages where he is confused 
over the objects of desires and the anticipated pleasures of their 
satisfaction. The matter is confusing because it is the beliefs 
about the possible pleasures of the object which causes desires, but 
these pleasures are not the objects of the desires. 
Perhaps it would be helpful to include here a list of all the 
. . . h d 20 different things which Hutcheson has dist1ngu1s e : 
desires 
pleasures or pains accompanying the desire 
beliefs about possible pleasures or pains (these cause 
the desire; Hutcheson calls them the 'motive' of the 
desire in the 'System') 
the pleasure of satisfying the desire (which is different 
from the pleasures of having the thing desired) 
the objects of desires. 
This question of psychological hedonism, that is, of whether 
pleasure is the object as opposed to the cause of desires, is import-
ant for it is closely connected with one of the central tenets of 
Hutcheson's philosophy. Hutcheson spent a great deal of his time 
arguing against the claim made by Hobbes and others that all desires 
are desires for our own pleasures. One of the arguments he uses 
against Hobbes is that the object of a desire and the pleasures of 
obtaining that object, are not the same thing. If Hutcheson fails to 
keep these two separate, then he is making the same error as his 
20. Cf. for example, System, p. 41-42. There Hutcheson distinguishes 
the belief about possible pleasure which causes the desire, (here 
called the 'motive': "The motive is some good apprehended in an 
object"), from the object, from the "feelings attending the desire 
itself", and from "the joy of success." 
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opponents. As I said, I think he does keep them separate, but that 
this is not always clear because he thinks that anticipation of 
pleasure is the motive or cause, but not the object, of desires. 
Hutcheson's refutation of the egoist requires another comment 
in this context, for it is clear that for Hutcheson it is not just 
beliefs about our own pleasures and pains which cause desires. He 
also claims that beliefs about the possible pleasures and pains of 
other people can cause desires. If they did not, then we would have 
no concern for the good of others, a position which Hutcheson emphat-
ically rejects. This claim that the pleasures and pains of one 
person can cause desires in another, is an empirical claim, and 
central to Hutcheson's concept of benevolence. The nature of benevo-
lence is discussed below in Chapter 4, but throughout the rest of the 
discussion of this section, it must be remembered that the phrase 
'beliefs about possible pleasures and pains' does not specify whose 
pleasures and pains are involved. 
Desires may be classified into four categories according to two 
criteria; they are either violent or calm, and either general or 
particular. They may be any combination or degree of these. 
h . . . 1 
21 h . th To say t at a desire is vio ent for Hutc eson, is to say at 
it is accompanied by some internal sensation or feeling; the desire, 
however, always remains distinct from these sensations. To say that 
a desire is calm is to say that there are no such accompanying 
sensations. If there is an accompanying sensation, it may be of any 
degree of violence. The use of the word violent in this connexion is 
21. Hutcheson tends to use the expression 'passionate desires', but, 
as I have noted above, to avoid confusion with the passions, I 
will use 'violent desires': Cf. above, section 2-ii-b. 
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not to presuppose that the sensation is extreme; it may or may not 
be. 
General desires are distinguished from particular desires by the 
fact that general desires presuppose other desires; particular desires 
do not. Thus a desire for the means to satisfy several particular 
desires is a general desire. If I want to be wealthy because I know 
it will buy me a house, a car, food, clothes, and social prestige, all 
of which I believe I will find pleasant, then my desire for wealth is 
a general desire. On the other hand, my desire for social prestige, 
for example, just because I think it would be pleasant, is a particular 
desire. A general desire need not be the desire for the means that 
will satisfy several wants; it may also be a desire which takes into 
account, weighs and considers, a number of subordinate desires all 
tending in the same direction. Thus the general desire of self-love 
is not just the desire for the means to satisfying other desires. 
Rather it is a general desire to maximize the satisfaction of a number 
of competing and often contradictory desires, some of which may have 
to go unsatisfied. Thus a general desire can sometimes involve the 
non-satisfaction of one of the very desires it presupposes. Desires 
may vary, of course, in their degree of generality; general self-love 
and general benevolence are the most general. 
General desires, according to Hutcheson, arise naturally when 
one reflects on one's particular desires. But since not everyone 
is so given to reflecting, a person may have particular desires 
without any corresponding general desires: 
"In like manner our publick desires may be 
distinguished into the general calm desire 
of the happiness of others, or aversion to 
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their misery upon reflection; and the particular 
affections or passions of love, congratulation, 
compassion, natural affection. These particular 
affections are found in many tempers, where, 
through want of reflection, the general calm 
desires are not found; nay, the former may be 
opposite to the latter, where they are found in 
the same temper." (Essay, p. 30) 
Perhaps it should be noted here that the 'Inquiry' is not at all 
clear on the distinction between particular and general desires, but 
that the 'Essay' is explicit on this point, as in the above quote. 
This probably reflects the influence of Butler on Hutcheson's thinking, 
a point which is discussed below in Chapter 7. 
A general desire may be either calm or violent. Hutcheson hopes 
that both general self-love and general benevolence will be calm, and 
he generally assumes that they always are. But there is nothing in 
his theory which entails this, and it seems to me that both general 
self-love and general benevolence can be, and sometimes are, accompanied 
by strong feelings. Some general desires are often violent; the desire 
for wealth is a possible example. On the other hand, even the desire 
for money may in some people be quite calm. Particular desires may 
also be either calm or violent. My desire to see a Rembrandt in the 
Scottish National Gallery may not be accompanied by any feelings of 
pleasure or pain, (that is, the desire may not be so accompanied, not 
the actual seeing the painting). My desire to see Paris, however, 
may be accompanied by quite intense feelings. 
I include here a table of the various categories of the affections, 
and a list of the criteria for the distinctions. This is partly to 
serve as a surmnary of this section, and partly to make comparison with 
. 22 Hurne easier. 
22. Similar tables for Hurne, slightly different from each other, can 
be found in Kemp Smith, p. 168, and Arda!, p. 10-11. 
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affections: internal sensations or feelings 
passions always violent and particular 




internal sensations: feelings generally; always either pleasant or 
painful 
passions: do not presuppose beliefs about natural good or evil (i.e. 
about what will be pleasant or painful) 
desires: presuppose a belief about natural good or evil 
calm: not accompanied by internal sensations 
violent: accompanied by internal sensations 
general: presuppose other desires 
particular: do not presuppose other desires 
d. Desire and Motivation 
Since for Hutcheson, passions and desires motivate human actions, 
and are the only things which motivate human actions, some remarks on 
his theory of motivation are called for here. 
Perhaps in the discussion so far one has noticed several striking 
. ·1 . . b h ' d 1 ' h . f d . 23 s1m1 ar1t1es etween Hutc eson s an Ry e s t eories o esire. In 
particular, both distinguish very carefully between desires and 
internal sensations. For Ryle, it is the distinction between desires 
and agitations (or, as he elsewhere calls them, thrills, twinges, 
palpitations, prickings, pangs, flutters, hankerings, cravings, 
23. Cf. Ryle, chapters III, IV and V. 
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itchings or commotions). But desires themselves are for Ryle and 
Hutcheson two vastly different things. For Ryle, desires are 
dispositions of a person to act in a certain fashion; which desires 
a person has is established by examining his actual behaviour. This 
examination of the agent's behaviour is open either to the agent him-
self or to the spectator; the agent does not have privileged access 
to his desires, nor is he always in a better position than a spectator 
when determining what his desires are. In contrast, desires for 
Hutcheson are not dispositions; they are mental entities or events 
(it is not clear which). As such, the agent has privileged access to 
his desires. Reflection or internal consciousness can allow a person 
to know his own desires in a way that a spectator can never do. A 
spectator can only guess from the agent's behaviour or statements 
about himself. This privileged access is what lies behind Hutcheson's 
empirical method; we need only reflect carefully to understand the 
nature of our desires. "In this inquiry we need little reasoning, 
or argument, since certainty is only attainable by distinct attention 
to what we are conscious happens in our own minds" (Essay, p. 1-2). 
The difference between desires as events, and desires as dispo-
sitions, implies not only a difference in how we know, and who knows, 
about one's desires; it also implies a different relation between 
desires and actions. For Ryle, desires are known by knowing behaviour, 
and it would appear that desires are only tendencies in a person's 
behaviour. Thus the behaviour is prior to the desire in that the 
desire presupposes the behaviour. But for Hutcheson it is the other 
way around; desires are prior to behaviour in the sense that they 
cause the behaviour. All intentional human behaviour presupposes a 
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desire or passion as the motivating force. If an action has no 
intention, that is, is motivated by no desire, then for Hutcheson it 
is merely a random or trifling action (cf. Illustrations, p. 166-167). 
But all desires or passions do not necessarily result in action; a 
desire may be overruled by a stronger desire and hence not result in 
any action. Yet even in this case the desire is still there, and can 
even be known to be there by the agent's self-conscious reflections. 
For Hutcheson, desires exist and are known independently of the 
possibly resulting behaviour. For Ryle, the desire is known only 
through knowing the related behaviour, and does not exist independently 
of that behaviour. (This last point is not to suggest that for Ryle 
a desire results in behaviour on every possible occasion; but rather 
that a desire must result in behaviour on at least some occasions. 
It is also not to suggest that desires for Ryle cannot be known on 
occasions when they do not result in behaviour; for Ryle, internal 
thoughts and feelings are part of the "behaviour" which must be taken 
into account when establishing the nature of one's desires. These 
internal indicators could be present even if there is no visible 
behaviour to indicate tendencies of behaviour. However, these 
internal thoughts and feelings still do not constitute direct access 
in Hutcheson's sense.) 
The notion of cause involved when Hutcheson claims that a desire 
causes behaviour, would appear to be some sort of Aristotelian notion 
of efficient cause. He uses such expressions as "exciting the agent" 
(Illustrations, p. 121), "detennine any agent to pursue" (Essay, p. 32), 
"propellent motive" (Essay, p. 33), and many others which make it clear 
that desires motivate action in a causal sense. This leads Hutcheson 
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to a very complex theory of motivation and of the human will. And 
so the relationship between desires and actions must be examined 
carefully. 
Not all desires result in action, either in a particular instance 
or in the long run. As I have pointed out, Hutcheson's theory still 
allows us to know we have a desire even if it never results in action, 
for desires are known by direct internal awareness and not indirectly 
through the actions they motivate. The reason that some desires do 
not result in actions (and it would seem that this is the only reason 
for a desire not to motivate action, if any action which tends to 
satisfy the desire is possible), is that they are overcome by a 
stronger desire or aversion: "So that it cannot be pronounced concern-
ing any finite good, that it shall necessarily engage our pursuit; 
since the agent may possibly have the idea of a greater, or see this 
to be inconsistent with some more valuable object, or that it may 
bring upon him some prepollent evil." (Essay, p. 32-33; cf. also 
Illustrations, p. 125). Peach uses the concept of defeasibility to 
1 . h' . . h b 1 
24 d f 'b'l' exp icate t is point wit respect to enevo ence. By e easi i ity 
he means that a desire will motivate action unless it is overcome by 
a competing or incompatible desire. It would seem that for Hutcheson 
all desires are defeasible in this sense. 
Although all desires do not result in actions, the reverse of 
this is true for Hutcheson; that is, all non-trivial actions are the 
result of some desire, desires, or passion. This is to say two things; 
firstly, that there are no unmotivated non-trivial actions; and 
secondly, that nothing other than desires and passions can motivate. 
24. Peach, p. 58-74. 
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Hutcheson is emphatic that no other aspect of human nature except 
desires and passions can motivate action; neither sensations, nor 
beliefs, nor reasons, nor pleasure nor pain can ever cause actions 
without the presence of some desire or passion. Hutcheson's arguments 
f h . 1 . th . . 25 or is c aim at reasons etc. cannot motivate are discussed below. 
The other point, that there are no unmotivated non-trivial actions 
can be discussed here. Hutcheson's most explicit discussion of this 
question is the passage in the 'Illustrations' (p. 166-167) where he 
is concerned with choosing freely. Here he argues that all motives 
or reasons for actions presuppose desires or passions, but then goes 
on to discuss "mere election". By "mere election" he means actions 
which have no motive and hence no desire motivating them. He seems 
to think that these are possible, and gives the example of someone 
moving "his first finger rather than the second, in giving an instance 
of a trifling action;" (Illustrations, p. 167). But it is clear that 
all such unmotivated actions imply the pursuit of no end, and in this 
sense are "trifling". If the action is designed to achieve an end, 
then the agent must desire that end, and the action is motivated by 
a desire. In other words, Hutcheson argues throughout this passage 
that although there may be unmotivated actions, they are trifling and 
random actions without any intention. 
Perhaps this last conclusion would suggest that Hutcheson has 
made it true by definition that all intentional human actions are 
motivated by the desire for some end. But I think Hutcheson's claim 
is stronger than that. Desires, it must be remembered, are mental 
entities of some sort or other, the presence of which in a given case 
25. Cf. below, chapter 6, sec. iii. 
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we can establish by reflective consciousness. Thus when he claims 
that desires are present in all non-random actions, he is making an 
empirical claim about the presence of a certain sort of mental 
entity whenever there is a certain sort of action. Any action which 
is the means to an end is accompanied by, or preceded by, an example 
of the mental entities called desires. The empirical nature of this 
claim appears to be recognized by Hutcheson in passages such as the 
following: "Then let any man consider whether he ever acts in this 
manner by mere election, without any previous desire. And again, 
let him consult his own breast, whether such kind of action gains 
his approbation?" (Illustrations, p. 166-167). 
But what does this claim, that all non-trifling actions are 
motivated by desires, involve? Perhaps the context of the claim 
should be spelt out further. Other passages of the book make it 
clear that 'desire' in this discussion of motivation should read 
'passion or desire' if these two are distinguished as I have above. 
A passion is a strong brutal impulse towards an action, accompanied 
by confused sensations of pleasure or pain. A desire involves some 
belief or beliefs about the possible pleasures and pains which will 
result from the action either to the agent doing the act or to some-
one else. Thus the claim about the connexion between desires and 
motivation can be cashed out as follows: all non-trifling actions 
are caused either by a violent instinct involving sensations of 
pleasure or pain, or by a desire involving some belief about possible 
pleasures or pains. Thus a substantial part of the claim that all 
action is motivated by passions or desires is that all human motiva-
tion involves present pleasure or pain, or beliefs about future 
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possible pleasure or pain. As I mentioned above, this is not to say 
that the pleasure or pain is the object of the desire, but rather it 
is to say that it is presupposed by the desire. All motivation to 
action presupposes pleasure and pain in the same sense, since all 
motivation presupposes desires. But it must be remembered that, as 
I pointed out above, the pleasure or pain believed to be possible 
need not be the agent's; it could be someone else's. 
Perhaps it would be best to recall here all the pleasures and 
pains that were distinguished from desires in the last section, for 
the relationship between these pleasures and pains, and motivation 
should now be noted. A desire is caused by, but is distinct from, a 
belief about some possible pleasure or pain; a desire may, or it may 
not, be accompanied by pleasure or pain; the satisfaction of a desire 
is accompanied by pleasure, and the failure to satisfy a desire by 
pain. These distinctions need now to be transferred to motivation. 
We are motivated, via desire, by a belief about pleasures or pains 
(ours or someone elses); we are not motivated by the pleasant or 
painful sensations which may accompany a desire, or by the pleasure 
of satisfying a desire. 
Philosophers who argue like Hutcheson that all motivation is 
from desires, but that not all desires result in action, often fall 
into a circularity. They often claim that it is the strongest desires 
that overcome the other desire and result in action, but when asked 
to give a criterion for strength in desires, they offer the criterion 
of whether the desire results in action. Hutcheson does not fall into 
this trap, and it is the relationship between desires and pleasure 
and pain which allows him to avoid it. For Hutcheson, it is the 
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strongest desires that motivate, but he gives at length non-rcotiva-
tional criteria for strength of desires. These criteria all depend 
on the pleasure or pain which any event or action is likely to result 
in; all desires involve of necessity such a belief about pleasure or 
pain, and so the extent of the potential pleasure or pain can be 
used to order all desires according to their strengths. 
The details of how to calculate the strength of desires by grief 
and pain, or promised joy, need not all be examined. But I will 
list a few to show the nature of Hutcheson's procedure. The strength 
of a desire "is proportioned to the imagined quantity of (natural) 
good, which will arise from it to the agent, or the person for whose 
sake it is desired" (Essay, p. 39). The quantity of good is the sum 
of its duration, intensity and dignity (Essay, p. 40). Any pain which 
will result from the action, and expense or effort of doing the 
action, is to be subtracted from the pleasure. The uncertainty or 
certainty of the pleasure and pain must be taken into account (Essay, 
p. 41); this in a finite being gives some preference for the near 
future over the distant future on the grounds that one may not live 
till the latter (Essay, p. 42). Finally, "Our publick desires of any 
events, are proportioned to the number of persons to whom the good 
event shall extend." (Essay, p. 42). In this last calculation one 
must take into account the attachments between the doer and the 
persons benefiting, the moral excellence and dignity of the persons 
benefiting, etc. Hutcheson believes that the strength of human 
desires, and hence their motivating force, is directly and causally 
dependent on our beliefs about the extent of the pleasure and pains 
that will result from the action. 
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There are a number of things that should be noted about this 
theory, for the theory becomes important for Hutcheson's account of 
the will and moral motivation. Firstly, it must be emphasized that 
it is our beliefs about future pleasures and pains which determine 
the strength of a desire, it is not the degree of the sensations of· 
pleasures or pains which may accompany the desire. The violence of 
the desire is in no way related to the strength of the desire, (cf. 
Essay, p. 44-45). The accompanying sensations, being pleasures and 
pains, may give rise to another desire or passion which will some-
times motivate in the same direction as the original desire. But the 
new desire is different from the original desire, for it is founded 
on different pleasures and pains, and may even motivate a different 
action from the original desire. 
Secondly, desires may be added and subtracted to calculate the 
strength of general desires which include them. The strengths of 
two desires towards the same object shall be combined to give the 
strength of the overall desire for that object; the strength of a 
desire which is incompatible with another desire is subtracted from 
that desire. 
Thirdly, it follows from the fact that desires and the strengths 
of desires are the direct causal results of beliefs, that we cannot 
create or increase desires at will. We cannot raise desires by our 
own volition, for they follow directly from our beliefs. This is 
rather important for Hutcheson, for it means that the only way we 
can control our desires is by controlling our beliefs. This point 
I will return to in the next section when I discuss free-will. 
Fourthly, the mathematical nature of these calculations requires 
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some comment. Hutcheson's presentation of this theory (Essay, p. 35-
45), sounds like the definitions and theorems of an algebra textbook. 
Nor is this a coincidence; Hutcheson quite intended these calculations 
to be viewed as mathematical. But doing so presupposes that the 
intensity and dignity of pleasure can be quantified; this is obviously 
impossible, especially where two different types of pleasure are 
involved. Furthermore, it is to commit the error of subtracting and 
adding different units, for the unit of duration of pleasure cannot 
be the same as the unit of its intensity. However, it must be said 
in Hutcheson's defence that he does not seem to imagine us actually 
making these calculations. When we consider the various pleasures 
and pains, our desires react accordingly without our actually being 
aware of what they are reacting to. So we do not have to perform 
the operations. The theory is not really a theory for calculating 
the strength of desires, but rather a theory about what influences 
them. From this point of view it is possible to accept the theory 
without specifying how to quantify pleasures. 
Finally, one should note that Hutcheson has not enlightened us 
on one point; How does the strength of desires for my own good compare 
with the strength of desires for the good of others? Such desires 
can seem to conflict, and Hutcheson provides no comment on which are 
likely to result in actions. But this is not a serious omission 
in Hutcheson's overall theory, for in the end he establishes (or 
tries to) that if our private good is properly understood, it will 
never conflict with the public good. He argues that our greatest and 
most lasting pleasures are those which result from being virtuous; 
that is, that the pleasures of moral self-approval and of receiving 
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the moral approval of others are the most intense and enduring 
pleasures of which we are capable. Since virtue consists in the 
benevolent pursuit of happiness for others, the pursuit of our own 
interests will always entail benevolence, and hence never be in-
consistent with the pursuit of the public good. Thus he does not, 
at least as far as the requirements of his moral theory go, need to 
provide a method for making our public desires stronger than our 
private ones, other than the suggestion that we should carefully 
consider what is in our personal best interest in the long run. 
Thus, in summary, Hutcheson contends that the strength of a 
desire is directly dependent on the amount of pleasure or pain which 
we believe will result to ourselves or others from the action. This 
relationship is a causal one, and hence beyond our direct control. 
We cannot raise desires at will, nor can we increase or decrease 
their strengths at will. 
This inability to control desires directly has major implications 
for Hutcheson's theory of human freedom in choosing how to act. One's 
actions are the inevitable causal result of one's various desires and 
their strengths; one's desires and their strengths are the inevitable 
causal result of one's beliefs about pleasures and pains; therefore, 
given one's beliefs about pleasure and pain, one has no control over 
one's desires and actions. Thus the only possibility for control 
over one's own actions is by controlling one's beliefs about pleasure 
and pain. This result has significance for Hutcheson's theory of 
motivation, for it implies that there is no possibility of controlling 
our behaviour directly: one can control behaviour only indirectly by 
controlling beliefs. This is true of behaviour motivated by passions 
43 
as well as that motivated by desires, for passions are also determined 
by beliefs: "We shall generally find our passions arising suitably 
to apprehensions we form of others." (Inquiry, p. 174). Thus any 
choice we make to be virtuous or good, for example, is not a choice 
about how we are going to act in the world, but rather a choice about 
how we are going to think or believe. This may sound rather bizarre 
until one realizes that this claim amounts to the claim that the 
only way we can control our behaviour is by controlling such mental 
factors as beliefs, desires, and feelings, or, as one might say today, 
by controlling our personality and wants, or our character in general. 
There is possibly a substantial element of truth in this suggestion. 
The relation between this theory of how we choose actions and 
Hutcheson's theory of the moral sense will be discussed in detail 
in Chapter 5 below. 
The way in which we can control our beliefs requires some comment. 
Hutcheson does not think that we can believe anything we fancy; 
beliefs are partly forced on us by circumstance. If something is 
conclusively demonstrated, then we cannot help believing it. But if 
the demonstration is inconclusive, then no matter how much evidence 
favours one side of the question, we can always at least suspend our 
judgement (Essay, p. 33). We have at least that much control over 
our beliefs. But more importantly, we have control over which 
evidence we consider, where we look for evidence, and whether 
we think about some aspects of a problem at all. Thus we can 
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influence our beliefs by examining those aspects of a problem which 
support the belief we want and ignoring the evidence against it. 
The best example of how this works is Hutcheson's comments on 
sectarianism (Essay, p. 106-110, 193-196). He suggests that the 
best way to overcome unwanted or evil desires which rest on sectarian · 
passions, is to try to control the passions by encouraging beliefs 
which favour the other sect. Thus we are to consider and dwell on 
the good and amiable aspects of the sect, we are to suspend as much 
as possible our belief of the evil we hear of the sect, and we are to 
go out of our way to find out the sect's good qualities and not make 
similar efforts to find out their bad. This almost amounts to inten-
tional self-deceit as a way of controlling our sectarian passions; 
we encourage beliefs about the other sect's good qualities so as to 
create desires which balance the evil we feel towards the sect, and 
prevent these evil feelings from motivating actions. 
But more important than encouraging new beliefs is our concen-
tration on some beliefs and expelling others from our mind. Frequent 
reflection on the pleasures of a virtuous life creates desires for 
virtue, and so such reflection is to be encouraged. We are not, of 
course, to encourage reflection on the effort or pain involved in 
being virtuous, for that would create unwanted contrary desires. 
All this makes it clear that for Hutcheson a person controls his 
behaviour by controlling his own mind; that is, _by controlling what 
he believes, and by controlling which pleasures and pains he reflects 
26 
on. This would seem to imply that human freedom consists in an 
26. This question of controlling beliefs and behaviour is discussed 
further and applied to Hutcheson's moral theory below in chapter 5. 
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ability to control one's behaviour by controlling one's overall 
personality. This is not far wrong as an interpretation of Hutcheson's 
thinking on free-will, but one has to examine another aspect of his 
theory before passing judgement. Namely, one has to consider 
Hutcheson's identification of the will with the calm general desires. 
e. Free-will 
Hutcheson was aware that his theory of desires involves, or at 
least appears to involve, a problem with human freedom of the will. 
The problem is basically this: if every human action is determined 
by the strongest of the desires the agent has at the time of the 
action, how can a person have any choice in deciding his own behaviour? 
How do people influence their actions by their own efforts? To some 
extent, this question was answered in the last section where it was 
established that we control our behaviour by controlling our desires, 
and that we control our desires by controlling our beliefs. The 
question I wish to deal with in this section is this: on Hutcheson's 
schema of motivation, how does the will function? And more importantly, 
how is freedom of choice in a person's actions possible? 
Unfortunately, we cannot be enlightened on this problem by the 
manner in which Hutcheson uses the word 'will'. The reason for this 
is the fact that Hutcheson was not consistent in his use of the word; 
he quite explicitly changed the usage in each of his works. The will 
is not directly discussed in his first work, the 'Inquiry'. In the 
'Essay', he equates the will with the calm desires. In a footnote 
referring to "the Schoolmen", Hutcheson discusses and appears to 
accept the distinction between appetitus rationalis and appetitus 
sensitivus, and identifies the will with the former: that is with 
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motivation which is founded on the calm reasoning of the understanding 
(Essay, p. 30-31). This passage is important for bringing out the 
role of reason in human will, and one cannot help thinking that 
Hutcheson's opinion on this subject would have been clearer if he had 
stuck with this use of the word 'will'. (The relation between reason 
and the calmness of desires will be discussed later in this section.) 
However, in the 'System', Hutcheson changes his mind and equates 
the will not just with calm desires, but with rcotivational impulses 
of any sort: calm desires, other desires, and passions (System, p. 13). 
Then in the 'Introduction', he seems to forget the passions, and so 
equates the will with desires only, either calm or not. I do not 
think that this changing use of the word reflects any change in 
Hutcheson's opinion about the nature of human motivation, but rather 
that it is part of an attempt to put his views more clearly or less 
contentiously. This changing usage means that Hutcheson's use of the 
word 'will' is not helpful in analysing the problem of how human 
choice functions in determining human behaviour. Throughout the 
rest of this discussion of the free-will determinism problem in 
Hutcheson's theory, I will use the word 'choice' rather than 'will'. 
In the previous section, it was established that we influence our 
own actions by controlling our desires, and that we control our desires 
by controlling our beliefs. In controlling one's beliefs, a person 
can exercise free choice in the following three ways; firstly, one 
can choose to reflect or not on one's beliefs and the evidence which 
is liable to influence them; secondly, one can choose which evidence 
to reflect on; and thirdly, one can, if the evidence is not conclusive, 
always choose to suspend judgement on a particular point. 
27. Cf. above, chapter 2, sec. ii-d, and below, chapter 5. 
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It follows that a person exercises choice in his actions as well as 
in his beliefs by these three methods. 
The fact that one can only exercise free choice in one's actions 
by exercising free choice over one's beliefs, implies that free 
choice requires rationality, and this in turn implies that free 
choice requires motivation by calm, general desires. Beliefs are the 
domain of reason. Thus one can only exercise one's free choice of 
beliefs by exercising one's reason and reflection. This means that 
we can only control our behaviour by the use of reason and reflection. 
But reasoning and reflecting necessarily mean that our actions will 
be motivated by calm general desires. In his discussion of desires, 
Hutcheson is not as explicit as one might wish about the difference 
between the calmness and generalness of desires. The lack of clarity 
on this point probably derives from the fact that for Hutcheson, 
calmness and generalness tend to go together in human desires. 
However, it is clear from his discussion that Hutcheson wishes to 
claim that reason and reflection imply that the motivating desires 
are both calm (as opposed to passionate), and general (as opposed to 
particular) . 
If we exercise free choice in our actions, then it must be calm 
desires which motivate. This is because the exercise of choice 
requires the use of reasoning for reasons just explained, and reason 
is impeded by the passions. Passions are, he says 
II strong brutal impulse(s) of the will, sometimes 
without any distinct notions of good, publick or 
private, attended with a confused sensation either 
of pleasure or pain, occasioned or attended by some 
violent bodily motions, which keeps the mind much 
employed upon the present affair, to the exclusion 
of everything else, and prolongs or strengthens the 
affection sometimes to such a degree, as to prevent 
all deliberate reasoning about our conduct." (Essay, 
p. 28-29, also, Illustrations, p. 161, 168; Introduc-
tion, p. 98) • 
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Furthermore, because the strength of desires depends on the natural 
good which we believe will result from an action, and not on the 
passionate sensations which accompany the desire, the passionate 
element of desires is of less importance when calculating our 
greatest good. 
Reasoning and reflecting about our actions also implies that 
the desires which motivate our actions will be general and not 
particular. Since our general desires take into account the particular 
desires, and a general desire is by definition the maximization of the 
possible good, it follows that the general desires, if we calmly 
consider them, are always stronger than particular desires. In the 
case of self-interested desires, this means that we always pursue 
our greatest good as we conceive it, and in the case of benevolent 
desires, that we always pursue the greatest good of the greatest 
number, if we are aware of what is the greatest and the most extensive 
good. If we reflect, we will be so aware, and hence the general 
desires will always be stronger than the particular. 
" ... we have power to reason, reflect and compare 
the several goods, and to find out the proper and 
effectual means of obtaining the greatest for ourselves 
or others, so as not to be led aside by every appearance 
of relative or particular good." (Essay, p. 43). 
From this argument it follows that any attempt to exercise free 
choice in our behaviour will lead to our behaviour being directed by 
calm general desires, and not by particular or passionate desires. 
This is why Hutcheson suggests that the general desires should always 
control the particular desires; the only way we can choose our actions 
is by reflecting, and that implies the strengthening of the general 
desires. "We obtain command over the particular passions, principally 
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by strengthening the general desires through frequent reflection, and 
making them habitual, so as to obtain strength superior to the 
particular passions" (Essay, p. 30). When Hutcheson discusses the 
hierarchy or structure of our soul as he increasingly does in his 
k 28 h' . . later wor s, t is superiority of the general over the particular 
desires becomes part of that structure. 
It also follows from the above argmnent that there is a sense in 
which the calm general desires are rational. They are rational in 
that if we exercise our reason, then the calm general desires are the 
ones which motivate. This, of course, does not mean that reason can 
ever motivate without a desire being present. 
"Perhaps what has brought the epithet reasonable, or 
flowing from reason, in opposition to what flows 
from instinct, affection, or passion, so much into 
use, is this, that it is often observed that the 
very best of our particular affections or desires, 
when they grow violent and passionate through the 
confused sensations and propensities which attend 
them, make us incapable of considering calmly the 
whole tendency of our actions and lead us often into 
what is absolutely pernicious, under some appearance 
of relative or particular good. This indeed may 
give some ground for distinguishing between passionate 
actions and those from calm desire or affection which 
employs our reason freely, but can never set rational 
actions in opposition to those from instinct, desire 
or affection." (Illustrations, p. 161; also, Essay, 
p. 30, footnote). 
The final point which must be mentioned in this context is that 
the moral sense approves of the calm general desires motivating in 
preference to the violent and particular desires. On this point, 
both with respect to calmness and with respect to generality, 
Hutcheson is quite clear: 
"Now every kind passion, which is not pernicious to 
others, is indeed approved as virtuous and lovely: 
28. Cf. below, chapter 7. 
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and yet a calm good-will toward the same persons 
appears more lovely. So calm good-will toward a 
small system is lovely and preferable to IOC>re 
passionate attachments; and yet a more extensive 
calm benevolence is still more beautiful and 
virtuous; and the highest perfection of virtue is 
an universal calm good-will toward all sensitive 
natures." (Inquiry, p. 183, added to 4th edition; 
also, System, p. 68-69, Essay, p. 32, xvi). 
This section is designed to show why it is that when we exercise 
free choice by controlling our behaviour in the fashion outlined in 
the previous section, we must be motivated by calm general desires. 
Regardless of how Hutcheson uses the word 'will', freedom of the will 
implies that the calm general desires motivate in preference to the 
particular and passionate desires. This argument is not presented 
explicitly as an argument by Hutcheson, but it lies behind his 
identification of the calm desires with the reasonable desires, and 
is implicit in the identification, in the 'Essay', of the will with 
the calm desires. Even in the 'System', where the will is identified 
with the passions as well as the desires, Hutcheson claims that true 
freedom consists in being motivated by the calm desires. In the 
following passage, the reason for this is not as explicit as one 
would like, but I think it represents the opinion which Hutcheson 
always held on this point. 
"When the calm principles are thus confirmed by 
frequent meditation, and the force of the passions 
abated, then it is we obtain the true liberty and 
self-command: the calm powers will retain and 
exercise that authority for which their natural 
dignity has fitted them, and our reaso"n will be 
exercised in correcting all appearances of good 
and evil, and examining the true importance of 
the several objects of our appetites or passions" 
(System, p. 102). 
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iii. Reason 
Hutcheson very carefully limits the role of reason in human 
nature so as to make as apparent as possible the fallacies, as he 
conceives them, of the moral rationalists. To this end, he makes 
two central claims about reason. The first can be seen from his 
definition of reason in the 'Illustrations' where he says " •.• reason 
is understood to denote our power of finding out true propositions ... " 
(Illustrations, p. 120). Combined with a Lockian theory of ideas, 
this definition has two corollaries, both of which Hutcheson accepts; 
to wit, reason is always confined to the perception of the relations 
of ideas already provided by the senses; and reason itself can never 
provide us with any new ideas. "Reason or intellect seems to raise 
no new species of ideas but to discover or discern the relations 
of those received" (Illustrations, p. 135). 
Hutcheson's second central claim about reason is apparent from 
his earlier definition of reason in the 'Inquiry'. There he 
rhetorically asks "What is reason but that sagacity we have in 
prosecuting any end?" (Inquiry, 2nd edition, p. 192). 29 Hutcheson 
is emphatic about this means-ends distinction, for it is central to 
his analysis of the relation between reason and motivation. As 
mentioned above, only desires and passions motivate or excite human 
actions; but one has to add that if a particular end is desired, then 
it is the role of reason to determine how the possible means of 
obtaining that end are related to the end. Thus, although reason 
plays a role in the resulting motive to obtain the means, this motive 
29. This was reworded in the fourth edition (Inquiry, p. 195) in an 
attempt to make his argument clearer, but the reference to ends 
remains the same. 
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necessarily presupposes a prior desire for the relevant end. Reason 
usually plays a role in human action, but this role presupposes 
desires. In this way, human motives are always fundamentally 
desires, and reason cannot by itself motivate. The point is the 
same as Hume's in the famous passage where he says "Reason is, and 
1 t b th 1 f h • II 30 ought on y o e, e s ave o t e passions. 
In summary, reason for Hutcheson is the faculty by which we 
perceive the relations between ideas. This is its only role; it 
cannot perceive new ideas, it cannot motivate action except in 
conjunction with desires, and, one can add, it cannot sense pleasure 
or pain, nor approval or disapproval. 
30. Hume, Treatise, p. 415. Note that for Hume the word 'passion' 
has a much wider meaning than for Hutcheson, and includes what 
Hutcheson calls 'desires' (and also 'internal sensations'?). 
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3. The Moral Sense 
i. Introduction 
It is perhaps best to begin my interpretation of Hutcheson's 
moral sense theory by considering what role the moral sense is supposed 
to play in morality; this will serve to eliminate several extraneous 
issues from the discussion. Hutcheson's theory of the moral sense is 
intended as a theory about the nature of moral ideas, about the nature 
of moral approval and the justification of approval, and about the 
connexion of these two topics with human nature. It is not a theory 
about what acts or men are in fact good, nor is it a theory about 
which characteristics of good acts makes them good; Hutcheson's 
theory of benevolence is designed to answer those questions, and we 
will not be considering that aspect of his thought in this chapter. 
Nor, one must add, is the moral sense theory taken by itself designed 
to explain the motivation for virtue; again one has to consider the 
theory of benevolence to explain that issue. 
The central problem of interpreting Hutcheson's moral sense 
theory is the problem of deciding whether he is some sort of intuitionist, 
or whether he is an emotivist of some variety. The parallels that he 
draws between the moral sense and our external senses tend to make 
one think that moral ideas are simple qualities which, if not actually 
perceived as in an action, are at least intuited as connected with the 
action. On the other hand, the role of pleasure and pain in his 
discussion of moral ideas, and the frequent references to feelings 
seem to indicate that the moral sense theory locates the origins of 
moral value in our emotions. There is also a parallel drawn between 
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the moral sense and our sense of beauty, but this seems more 
indicative of the origins of the moral sense theory in Shaftesbury's 
aesthetic theories, than it is enlightening about the nature of 
moral ideas. And indeed Hutcheson seems to use this parallel only 
to lend prima facie plausibility to the moral sense theory. This 
analogy with aesthetics is emphasized in the 'Inquiry', but tends to 
be less important as Hutcheson's philosophy develops, and hence is 
less of ten mentioned in his later works. 
I will first consider the analogy between the moral sense and 
the external senses. In section iv I will consider the relation 
between the moral sense and human emotions. In order to see what 
sort of interpretation of the moral sense the rest of Hutcheson's 
philosophy favours, I will consider the relation between the moral 
sense and two other aspects of Hutcheson's philosophy; to wit, the 
justification of moral approval, and the motivation of virtuous action. 
ii. 1 Intuitionist Aspects 
a. The Analogy With the External Senses 
If one interprets the moral sense as an internal sense, and 
takes seriously the analogy with the external senses, one can immediately 
draw several important conclusions about moral ideas from Hutcheson's 
theory of the nature of the senses in general. All senses are for 
Hutcheson the sources of new simple ideas; thus if ·there is a moral 
sense, it must provide us with simple moral ideas which are not 
perceived by any other sense. That some moral ideas are simple, 
1. By 'intuitionist aspects' I mean those aspects of Hutcheson's 
ethical theory which he arrives at by way of the analogy with 
sense perception. 
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unanalysable, and not reducible to non-moral ideas, Hutcheson appears 
to accept; Frankena and Peach both suggest that this is the first 
time in British moral philosophy that the unanalysability of moral 
ideas is advocated or even considered. 2 On the opening page of the 
'Illustrations', in which work the intuitionist aspects of Hutcheson's 
theory are more explicit than in the 'Inquiry', Hutcheson says: 
"The words election and (moral) approbation seem to denote simple 
ideas known by consciousness which can only be explained by synonymous 
words or by concomitant or consequent circumstances" (Illustrations, 
p. 115) • 
As explain in chapter 2, section ii-a above, the internal senses 
are characterized by the perception of ideas subsequent to, or 
accompanying, ideas which are already in the mind. Moral ideas conform 
to this criterion; they are perceived only when certain other ideas are 
already present to the mind. Hutcheson's theory of benevolence makes 
it clear that the ideas which provoke the moral sense into presenting 
moral ideas to the mind, are ideas about human actions, the motives 
for human actions, and the intended consequences of human actions. 
It is to be noted that only of the first of these, that is of human 
actions themselves, might it be said in any way that they are directly 
perceived by our external senses. Hutcheson realizes that the other 
two, namely the motive for and intended consequences of human action, 
can only be known by rational considerations. He makes his acceptance 
of this clear by locating one source of moral error in our imperfect 
knowledge of motives and intended consequences. But the implication 
of this that needs to be noted at the moment is that moral ideas 
arise subsequent to our conception of human actions, where conception 
2. Frankena, p. 364; Peach, p. 27. 
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is meant to include those aspects (i.e. motive and intended 
consequences), which are not perceived by the external senses. 
Hutcheson is explicit about the difference between the non-moral and 
the moral conceptions of actions: 
"These three things are to be distinguished, (1) the 
idea of the external motion, know first by sense, 
and its tendency to the happiness or misery of some 
sensitive nature, often inferred by argument or 
reason, ..• (2) apprehension or opinion of the 
affections in the agent, inferred by our reason. 
So far the idea of an action represents something 
external to the observer, really existing whether he 
had perceived it or not, and having a real tendency 
to certain ends. (3) The perception of approbation 
or disapprobation arising in the observer, according 
as the affections of the agent are apprehended kind 
in their just degree, or deficient, or malicious." 
(Illustrations, p. 164.) 
The final characteristic of moral ideas which can be derived from 
the claim that their source is an internal sense, is the fact that 
the perception of moral ideas is beyond our will. That is to say, 
once we have a fairly clear conception of an action, we are determined 
by our nature to attach to that conception either the idea of moral 
good, or the idea of moral evil. Moral ideas arise quite unbidden, 
and entirely beyond our control. Whether this is an adequate account 
of the relation between good actions and the idea of their goodness 
will be discussed later. 
It is important for the following discussion to mention which 
sort of action is in fact good, although a detailed account of this 
aspect of Hutcheson' s views is postponed until the n.ext chapter. 
Briefly, an action is morally good if it is done from, or is an 
indication of, benevolence, especially calm general benevolence. An 
acti~n is morally evil if it is done from the intention of injuring 
someone, or if it is done from any sort of motive, but indicates a 
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lack of a suitable degree of benevolence towards others. 
Given the Lockian background of Hutcheson's theory of ideas, it 
is important to consider whether moral ideas are to be considered 
analogous to ideas of primary qualities, or to ideas of secondary 
qualities. Hutcheson has a peculiar theory of primary qualities; he 
calls them concomitant ideas because he sees them as accompanying, 
and apparently necessarily accompanying, our ideas of certain 
secondary qualities, (Illustrations, p. 163). Thus, for example, 
an idea of extension necessarily accompanies our ideas of a colour; 
one cannot perceive unextended colour. There is, therefore, a 
considerable analogy between primary qualities and moral ideas; both 
accompany other ideas, for the idea of good necessarily accompanies 
the idea of a benevolent action. But is the necessity of this 
concomitance of a similar sort in both cases? This is a very intriguing 
point, and I will have occasion to return to it later. Hutcheson 
does not seem to consider this aspect of the possible analogy with 
the primary qualities. The only aspect of the analogy he considers is 
the fact that we use reason to correct our perceptions of primary 
qualities and that reason can correct the perceptions of the moral 
sense in a similar fashion, (Illustrations, p. 131, 163-164). This 
point applies equally well to the analogy with secondary qualities, 
a fact which Hutcheson is aware of, and which I will discuss below. 
The possibility of an analogy with our perception of primary 
qualities breaks down on one essential aspect. Our ideas of primary 
qualities are usually considered to resemble some quality which is 
actually in the external object. Hutcheson accepts this, for he is 
a representationalist, at least with respect to primary qualities: 
58 
"Other ideas are images of something external, as duration, number 
extension, motion, rest." (Illustrations, p. 163). But our moral 
ideas are not images of any quality in the action, and so the primary 
qualities and goodness differ in this respect. 
In view of this failure of the analogy with the primary qualities, 
the overall analogy between the moral sense and the external senses 
can only be maintained by limiting the analogy to the secondary 
qualities. This Hutcheson se'ems to do. It is generally assumed that 
our ideas of secondary qualities, which Hutcheson lists as colours, 
sounds, tastes, smells, pleasures and pains (Illustrations, p. 163), 
are not images of, and do not resemble, any quality which is in the 
external object. Similarly, there is no quality of a good action 
which resembles our ideas of goodness; our idea of goodness is not 
an image of any aspect of a good act: "This (moral) approbation 
cannot be supposed an image of any thing external, more than the 
pleasures of harmony, of taste, of smell" (Illustrations, p. 164). 
There is, of course, a quality in a good action by virtue of which 
the action is viewed as being good, namely, the degree to which the 
action has been motivated by benevolence. But the idea of goodness 
is not an image or representation of benevolence. That goodness is 
not an image of anything in the act, emphasizes that the goodness of 
an act and its benevolence are quite distinct, and that the one is 
not reducible to the other. In a similar way, red, for example, is 
not reducible to the primary qualities which cause us to see red, nor 
is the idea of red reducible to those qualities. 
It might be objected at this point that although the ideas of 
good and red are similar in that both are connected with, but not 
59 
reducible to, some external quality, in the case of red there is a 
causal connexion between the external primary qualities and our 
seeing red. And it might be added, this causal connexion is partly 
understood. The way in which the physical structure of an object 
(i.e. its primary qualities), reflects light, the action of the light 
on the eye, and the nerves connecting the eye and the brain, etc. all 
serve to connect the external qualities in the object and our resulting 
idea of red. There is no such connexion, the objector might say, 
between benevolence and goodness. To this several things need to be 
said: firstly, just because the causal connexion is not known does 
not mean that there is none. Secondly, no amount of knowledge of 
the physical events in the chain between the object and the brain can 
completely clarify the connexion between physical events and the 
perceptions of ideas in the mind. One link in the chain between 
physical and mental events will always be mysterious. This, as I 
understand it, is the point of Hutcheson's comparing this causal 
chain to "the Indian's Elephant and Tortoise": 
"This natural determination to approve and admire, or 
hate and dislike actions, is, no doubt, an occult 
quality. But is it any way more mysterious, that the 
idea of an action should raise esteem or contempt, 
than that the motion or tearing of flesh should give 
pleasure or pain; or the act of volition should move 
flesh and bone? In the latter case, we have got the 
brain, and elastic fibres, and animal spirits, and 
elastic fluids, like the Indian's elephant, and tortoise, 
to bear the burden of the difficulty: but go one step 
further, and you find the whole as difficult as at 
first, •.. " (Inquiry, p. 272-273). 
Thirdly, although Hutcheson does not make this point, it may be said 
that the objection misses the point of the analogy. The analogy is 
not intended to prove the moral sense theory: it merely is intended 
to show that the moral sense is plausible, and to help explain how it 
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works. Surely the question of the causal connexion is irrelevant 
to whether the moral sense theory makes sense, although, of course, 
the existence of such a causal connexion would be evidence for that 
theory. 
It should be clear by now that Hutcheson's moral sense theory is 
not to be interpreted in a naively relativistic or representational 
fashion, but the alternatives to naive realism are not clear. Broad 
seems to think that the only alternative is some form of dispositionalism. 3 
A dispositional theory for Broad is one which would distinguish between: 
a) the "peculiar sensible quality of certain sensations", and b) "the 
dispositional property which certain things have of giving rise to such 
sensations in a normal human observer •.. " The theory would then go on 
to explain what would be the criteria for a normal human observer. 
There is no question that Hutcheson' s moral sense theory has just this 
structure; moral ideas correspond to a. (i.e. the particular sensible 
quality), and benevolence would correspond to b. (i.e. the dispositional 
property). Furthermore, Hutcheson does provide criteria for the 
4 normal human observer. He obviously accepts this distinction between 
the goodness of an action and the qualities of the action by virtue 
of which it is good. And I think we can accept that this situation 
is parallel to that which exists in the case of secondary qualities 
on a Lockian theory. 
But this now raises several major problems; if goodness is not a 
quality of the action, what is one doing when one attributes goodness 
to an action? One cannot be simply saying that the action is 
3. Broad, "Some Reflections on Moral Sense Theories in Ethics"' 
p. 195-197. 
4. Eg. that self-interest does not interfere, etc. cf. below, sec. iii. 
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benevolent, for if goodness were reducible to benevolence, there 
would be no need for the moral sense and moral ideas. I see this as 
essentially identical to the question: What is the relation between 
the benevolence of an action and the goodness of the action? In 
other words, once the idea of goodness is distinguished from the 
good inclining qualities of the action (i.e. benevolence), and it is 
admitted that benevolence and goodness are only connected by the 
actions of human nature, then the following questions arise: 
1. Is the relation between goodness and benevolence contingent 
or necessary? 
2. Is the origin of moral evaluation to be found in the connexion 
between goodness and benevolence 
a. in the mind of the individual making the judgement at 
the moment of speaking? 
b. in the disposition of the individual normally to connect 
goodness and benevolence? 
c. in the mind of the individual if he proceeds in a 
certain fashion? 
d. in the minds of individuals with certain qualifications? 
or e. in the mind of most or all people? 
3. What is the relation between demonstrating that an act is 
benevolent and justifying the belief that it is good? 
The rest of this section is a discussion of the first two of 
these three questions; the third question will be discussed in the 
next section. 
b. The Relationship Between Goodness and Benevolence 
Is the relation between goodness and benevolence necessary or 
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contingent? There is one sense in which this relation is necessary. 
That is, it is necessary for us in that we are determined by our 
natures to perceive goodness when confronted with an act of benevolence. 
This aspect of the world is quite beyond our control. Hutcheson of 
course recognizes this, for it is one of the main points to the 
analogy between the internal and external senses. I will call this 
the natural necessity of morals. 
But there is another view of this relation between goodness and 
benevolence, one in which the relation is contingent. Hutcheson 
admits that God could have created our natures differently, either 
without a moral sense, or with a moral sense which perceived goodness 
in reaction to some idea other than benevolence. We could have 
created, he says, so that we perceived even malevolence as the good 
(Illustrations, p. 133, 13~, cf. also 1st Inquiry, p. 100). This is 
tantamount to admitting that there is no necessary connexion between 
the ideas of benevolence and goodness independent of the constitution 
o.f human nature. Hutcheson tries to give reasons to justify God 
having created us as he did, by showing that the moral sense as actually 
created is conducive to human happiness, but he realizes that this 
sort of justification of the moral sense in the end must lead back to 
the moral sense in a circular fashion, or else to the approval of 
our sense of self-interest, (Illustrations, p. 133-134, 136, 
Correspondence, p. 169). He thereupon suggests that God may have a 
faculty similar to our moral sense whereby he saw that creating us 
as he did was good: "Why may not the Deity have something of a 
· · 1 sense, essenti'al to h.;,....?." superior kind, analogous to our mora ~" 
(Illustrations, p. 138, also Illustrations, p. 169). But this approach 
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cannot create a necessary relation between benevolence and goodness 
unless we can prove that this divine moral faculty is a necessary 
part of God's nature. This may be possible, but Hutcheson does not 
attempt the task. The fact that the constitution of our internal 
senses cannot be justified except as being in our own best interests, 
or by reference to our or God's moral sense, is made explicit in 
the first 'Inquiry' in terms of our sense of beauty: 
"But then, beside this consideration of interest, 
there does not appear to be any necessary connection, 
antecedent to the constitution of the Author of 
nature, between regular forms, actions, theorems, and 
that sudden sensible pleasure excited in us upon 
observation of them, even when we do not reflect upon 
the advantage mention'd in the former propostion. 
And possibly, the Deity could have form'd us so as to 
have receiv'd no immediate pleasure from such object, 
or connected pleasure to those of a quite contrary 
nature .... This makes it probable, that the pleasure 
is not the necessary result of the form itself, other-
wise it would equally affect all apprehensions in what 
species soever; but depends upon a voluntary constitution, 
adapted to preserve the regularity of the universe, and 
is probably not the effect of necessity, but choice, 
in the Supreme Agent, who constituted our senses." 
(1st Inquiry, p. 99-100) 
From this we must conclude that the connexion between goodness and 
benevolence has a natural necessity, but no logical necessity; that 
it is contingent on human nature; and that it lacks rational 
justification in terms independent of itself. 
Since the goodness of benevolence is contingent upon human nature, 
it must be discovered by experience. Without experiencing the 
perception of a benevolent act, and experiencing the resulting 
perception of goodness, there is no possibility of having the idea of 
goodness, or of knowing that it is connected with benevolence. Herein 
lies Hutcheson's empiricism, and his claim to be a pioneer in the 
empirical approach to ethics. 
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It seems that we have been led to the conclusion that moral 
judgements are for Hutcheson synthetic and a posteriori; that is, 
that moral judgements are known by experience, and that they are 
not necessary. Their only necessity is a physical or natural one, 
founded in the way God created the world. But here a complication 
arises, a complication which it would appear that Hutcheson was not 
aware of. I wish to argue that Hutcheson's theory implies a type of 
necessary connexion between the ideas of benevolence and goodness 
which never occurs between any two ideas of secondary qualities. 
There are no two ideas of secondary qualities which we are determined 
by our nature always to perceive together, but we are always determined 
to perceive goodness if we perceive benevolence. (The present 
discussion assumes that we have a proper functioning moral sense; 
on whether or not Hutcheson thinks all mankind is in fact equipped 
with a moral sense, see the next part of this section.) The contingent 
facts on which morality depends are not facts about the world 
external to us, or facts about the human actions which we morally 
judge, but rather are facts about the way we perceive the world. 
Thus the necessity is not of the trivial form: that is the way the 
world is, so that is the way we must see it. Rather it is of the 
form: we are determined to see things, (i.e. goodness and benevolence), 
connected, even though they are not connected in the world external 
to us. This implies that Hutcheson's theory of the moral sense 
contains a type of necessity which our external senses appear not to 
contain. This gives rise to a dis-analogy between the external and 
internal senses in that the internal senses create a necessity in 
the connexion between ideas which the external senses do not. To make 
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this clearer by example, consider a pair of typical ideas which are 
connected by the external senses; this table is hard and brown. It 
is necessary that I perceive these ideas connected in that given the 
table's qualities, and given how I perceive the world, I have little 
choice in the matter. But on the other hand, this table could 
become red, green, yellow, or any other colour without affecting its 
hardness; there is no necessity, of the sort that would make this 
inconceivable, involved. But in the case of moral ideas, a benevolent 
action is good, and one cannot change the benevolent nature of the 
action without changing its goodness. In the case of external 
objects, one can always imagine one of a pair of ideas changed 
without a change in the other; one can never do this with the morality 
of actions. Thus there is a type of necessity between benevolence 
and goodness which never exists between two ideas of the external 
senses. It would seem that Hutcheson was never explicitly aware of 
there being a problem in the way the ideas of goodness and benevolence 
are connected, for he does not discuss it directly. However, for the 
sake of clarifying all the implications of the moral sense theory, 
I think the matter requires several comments. 
Firstly, it is not open to Hutcheson to solve this problem by 
a Kantian-style manoeuvre; he cannot claim that goodness and benevolence 
are necessarily connected because goodness is the form of the perception 
of benevolence. This possibility is consistent with most of the rest 
of Hutcheson's theory of moral perception, but it is not consistent 
with his perceptive atomism. The idea of good is a distinct simple 
entity, and so is the idea of benevolence. Their only connexion is 
that we are determined to perceive them together. Thus any Kantian-
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style theory of a priority cannot be used to explain that necessity 
in morals which is not found in sense perception. 
There is one aspect of sense perception which is possibly 
analogous to the necessity found in morals. Hutcheson does not 
discuss this possibility, and in the end he could not have accepted 
it, for it requires that a parallel be drawn between moral ideas and 
ideas of primary qualities. For reasons mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, (to wit, the representational nature of primary qualities), 
Hutcheson must reject this analogy in favour of the analogy with 
ideas of secondary qualities. But the possibility is perhaps of 
interest for its own sake. I mentioned above Hutcheson's theory of 
the concomitant nature of primary qualities; perceptions of the 
primary qualities necessarily accompany perceptions of some secondary 
qualities. Thus if I see something brown, I must see it as extended 
and shaped. The necessity here is far stronger than the connexion 
between accidental qualities such as brownness and hardness. It is 
not possible to conceive of an unextended colour, but one can easily 
conceive of a non-brown even colourless hardness. In the same way, 
if Hutcheson's moral sense theory is correct, then it is not possible 
for me to conceive of a genuinely benevolent action as not being good. 
Perhaps the notions of unextended colour and evil benevolence have 
the same sort of impossibility. This analogy may look enlightening, 
but it must be remembered that it requires moral ideas to be analogous 
to concomitant ideas, or ideas of primary qualities. And we have 
already established that this analogy breaks down because of the 
representational nature of the ideas of primary qualities. The moral 
sense is not representational. 
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We can now draw the following conclusions. There is no logical 
necessity connecting the ideas of benevolence and goodness. The 
only necessity in the connexion lies in the fact that we are determined 
by our nature to perceive them as connected. Thus their relation is 
contingent on human nature. Hutcheson did not seem to notice that 
this in fact is a stronger form of necessity than that which exists 
between our perceptions of secondary qualities, even though, given 
God's creation as it is, we are determined to see the world as we do. 
The only necessity amongst ideas of the external senses similar to 
that found in morality, is the necessity by which some concomitant 
ideas necessarily accompany some secondary quality ideas. But 
Hutcheson fails to develop his theory of concomitant ideas sufficiently 
to allow any conclusions to be drawn from this. And furthermore, 
there is a rather serious dis-analogy in the representational nature 
of our concomitant ideas. Mistakes in moral judgements and differences 
of opinion about moral matters can be attributed to human fallibility 
in knowing the non-moral nature of the action, and need not be 
inconsistent with there being a natural necessity in the connexion 
between the ideas of goodness and benevolence. 5 
c. Whose Moral Sense? 
The second aspect of the relation between goodness and benevolence 
which must be discussed in this: if goodness is only contingently 
connected to benevolence by a faculty of the human mind; whose faculty 
and whose mind are we going to accept - any individual's moral sense, 
most or all people's moral sense, or the moral sense of individuals 
with certain qualifications? What happens when people disagree, or if 
5. See later in this section. 
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I disagree with my own judgement at different times? 
To take the questions one at a time, let us consider first whose 
moral sense is to be accepted as the standard. In fact, this question 
simply does not arise for Hutcheson. He seems to think, but is not 
overly sure, that all humans have the same nature in this respect; the 
perceptions of the moral sense are always the same for everyone, and 
so it does not matter whose moral sense, or at what time the moral 
sense, is consulted. In the 'Illustrations', he considers the question 
"How can we be sure that we we approve, all others also approve?" 
(Illustrations, p. 162). His answer is that "of this we can be sure 
upon no scheme," and is uncertain about whether the moral sense ever 
varies; he suggests that "it is highly probable that the senses of 
all men are pretty uniform." (Illustrations, p. 162). If this is 
true, the question of whether the theory is individualistic or trans-
subjective is never pertinent. This is why Hutcheson never seems 
interested in proving his points by statistics of the sort 'most men 
approve'. 
In maintaining that for Hutcheson the moral senses of all humans 
react in the same way, two points must be clarified. Firstly, if 
everyone perceives only benevolence as good, how is Hutcheson going 
to account for errors in moral judgement? I discuss this matter at 
length later in this chapter. Briefly, Hutcheson locates moral error 
in our rational conception of the non-rroral character of the action 
(i.e., whether it is benevolent or not), rather than in the moral 
sense wrongly perceiving the connexion between benevolence and goodness. 
Secondly, if everyone perceives the same connexion between benevolence 
and goodness, how can one explain the fact, which Hutcheson mentions 
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in 'Inquiry', p. 254, that some people morally value some actions more 
than other people value those same actions? I would suggest that this 
sort of difference lies in the conception of the non-moral character 
of the action, and hence is consistent with everyone's moral sense 
being the same. For example, Hutcheson suggests that "Military men 
may admire courage more than other virtues; persons of smaller 
courage, may admire sweetness of temper; ... " (Inquiry, p. 254). 
This difference of opinion probably arises, and, if my interpretation 
of Hutcheson's view on moral error is correct, I think Hutcheson 
would view it as arising, in a difference of opinion about the non-
moral implications of the qualities in question. The military man 
would be very aware of the beneficial affect of courage (at least to 
those on the same side of a conflict), while a man of "smaller courage" 
is more likely to be aware of the happiness caused by sweetness of 
temper. Different qualities of character ensure that different people 
consider :rrore carefully different implications of actions. This 
leads to a difference of opinion about the non-moral character of 
actions and their implications, and this in turn leads to differences 
of opinion about the moral importance of actions. This is quite 
compatible with the claim that everyone's moral sense reacts the same 
if an action is conceived in the same way. 
The question of whether the perceptions of the moral sense are 
universally similar is distinct from the question of whether having 
a moral sense is universal. For Hutcheson possession of the moral 
sense is universal, but it would appear that this is established by 
empirical investigation of history and cultures. He says in the 
'Illustrations': 
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"'To know whether there are not some actions or 
affections which obtain the approbation of any 
spectator or observer and others move his dislike 
and condemnation?' This question, as every man 
can answer for himself, so universal experience 
and history show, that in all nations it is so; 
and consequently the moral sense is universal. 11 
(Illustrations, p. 159) 
But the next question which he raises at this point in the 'Illustrations' 
is of what everyone's moral sense approves; and this he seems to think 
can be answered by reflection on our own moral sense. Although the 
question of whether everyone has a moral sense is an empirical one 
for Hutcheson, he seems to think that the question of how the moral 
sense perceives can be answered by individual reflection. 
The status of the claim that the moral sense does not vary, is 
rather puzzling; this is mainly because Hutcheson is unsure on the 
point. As I mentioned, he does not think that it is an empirical 
claim established by a survey of all people. If he thinks that the 
claim has some sort of inherent necessity to it, he does not explain 
just what it is. When confronted with a denial of the claim, 6 he 
suggests that there are probably no cases of the moral sense having 
varying reactions to the same object, but completely fails to explain 
why this is so. The vagueness of this passage seems typical: "But 
whether our moral sense be subject to such a disorder as to have 
different perceptions from the same apprehended affections in an 
agent, at different times, as the eye may have of the colours of an 
unaltered object, it is not easy to determine. Perhaps-it will be 
hard to find any instances of such a change" (Illustrations, p. 164). 
The question of the necessity of the connexion between goodness 
6. By Burnet; Correspondence, p. 203-204, 224. 
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and benevolence, which I discussed above, is obviously relevant here. 
It was concluded that the necessity is somewhat stronger than that found 
between any two ideas of secondary qualities, but that this necessity 
had its origins in the nature of the moral sense. Now the question 
is, can anyone have a moral sense which perceives this connexion 
differently? Could a moral sense ever, for example, perceive the 
matter wrongly and connect goodness with malevolence? 
It was concluded above that the necessity which exists between 
the ideas of benevolence and goodness may be similar to the necessity 
which exists between perceiving a colour and perceiving extension. 
If this is so, then the possibility of the moral sense seeing malevolence 
as good is similar to the possibility of seeing an unextended colour. 
This would account for Hutcheson's uncertainty when confronted with 
the suggestion that the moral sense could get it wrong; for firstly, 
he does not seem to be clear on the sort of necessity involved in 
this case; and secondly, this does not actually explain why the moral 
sense cannot go wrong, it is merely to make plausible by analogy that 
it cannot. But it is not clear what sort of explanation is acceptable 
in either the moral sense or colour-extension case; perhaps this is 
why Hutcheson was unclear. 
d. Moral Error 
If the moral sense cannot vary, then it can never be in error. 
But if the moral sense cannot err, then Hutcheson must explain the 
sources of moral error in some other way. This he does at length. 
(It is to be remembered in the following discussion that we are 
considering error of moral approval, not error in moral motivation or 
action.) The moral sense reacts to the conception of an action; the 
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conception of an action consists of our perception or beliefs about 
the actual action, the good or evil consequences of the action, and 
the motives for which the agent in question did the action. If one 
or more of these beliefs is wrong, then we conceive of the action 
wrongly. In particular, the most common source of misconceptions as 
to the nature of actions is that people tend to take too narrow a view 
of the consequences of actions. When this is corrected, the moral 
sense gives a corrected moral judgement. For example; 'just so a 
compassionate temper may rashly imagine the correction of a child or 
the execution of a criminal to be cruel or inhuman; but by reasoning 
may discover the superior good arising from them in the whole; and 
then the same moral sense may determine the observer to approve them" 
(Illustrations, p. 134, cf. also, System, p. 60). It is important to 
note that the correction of our beliefs about the action and its 
consequences is the function of the faculty of reason; this is because 
the ascertaining of truth is always the function of reason. Hutcheson 
explicitly says that the natural good or evil to be expected from 
actions, and which actions indicate benevolence, is known by reason: 
"'What actions do really evidence kind affections or 
do really tend to the greatest public good?' About 
this question is all the special reasoning of those 
who treat of the particular laws of nature or even 
of civil laws. This is the largest field, and the 
most useful subject of reasoning, which remains upon 
every scheme of morals, and here we may discover as 
certain, invariable, or eternal truths, as any in 
geometry" (Illustrations, p. 159). 
Since these beliefs are the domain of reason, cases in which they have 
to be corrected do not constitute cases in which the moral sense has 
reacted wrongly; rather they are cases in which the moral sense has 
reacted rightly to the wrong thing. Hutcheson is thus able to explain 
without changing his views on the constancy of the moral sense, the 
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following three points: Firstly, he can attribute moral error to 
errors of non-moral belief. He can also explain how we sometimes 
come to change our moral opinion of an act, for he can attribute this 
to changes in beliefs about the non-moral character of the act. 
Secondly, he can explain differences of moral opinions between different 
people, for again he can attribute the disagreement to a disagreement 
about the non-moral character of the act. This point has the implication 
that the correct method of trying to reach moral agreement is to try 
and reach agreement on the non-moral character of the act; agreement 
on its moral character should immediately result. Finally, Hutcheson 
is now in a position to locate the role of reason in ethics, and to 
define precisely its limit. It is the role of reason to establish 
exactly what the act was, what the motive for the act was, and what 
the act's consequences are likely to be. Once reason has established 
a clear conception or idea of the non-moral character of the act, the 
moral sense is then in a position to decide on its moral nature. 
This view of moral error determines Hutcheson's account of the 
influence of self-interest and the passions on the moral sense. 
Given the idea of an action, then self-interest, the passions, 
sectarianism, etc. may interfere with the functioning of the moral 
sense. But this is not to say that the moral sense can get things 
wrong under these influences, but rather that these influences could 
prevent a clear conception of the act or prevent us from paying any 
heed to or even considering or noticing the moral sense. For example, 
self-interest may draw my attention to those aspects of the act which 
directly affect me and cause me to overlook other aspects of the act 
which may indicate benevolence to someone else. Or I may be so 
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engaged in the pursuit of my own interests that I may fail to note that 
some act is good, even if I have a fairly clear conception of the act. 
To correct these errors, one must consider actions carefully, and to 
take into account anything which might mislead, so that one has a 
clear and unbiased view of the act. And then one must carefully 
consider the results of the moral sense's perceptions; is the action 
good or evil? 
It is important to note that self-interest, the passions, etc., 
cannot mislead the moral sense itself; the moral sense reacts properly 
to whatever the idea of the action is. Rather it is in the formation 
of the idea of the act, (i.e. in understanding the act), that we are 
misled. The moral sense is inherently objective, even if we are not. 
This point seems quite explicit; 
"Assure us that it will be very advantageous to us, 
propose even a reward; our sense of the action is 
not alter'd. It is true, these motives may make us 
undertake it; but they have no more influence upon 
us to make us approve it, than a physician's advice 
has to make a nauseous potion pleasant to the taste, 
when we perhaps force ourselves to take it for the 
recovery of health." (Inquiry, p. 121) 
Or later he says: 
"No interest to myself, will make me approve an 
action as morally good, which without that interest 
to myself, would have appear'd morally evil;" 
(Inquiry, p. 123) 
We may conclude that the moral sense cannot err, or be affected 
by the circumstances of a particular situation, but that our judgement 
of the non-moral characteristics of an action can be misguided. This 
may result in a wrong moral judgement. So it is important to make 
allowances for a possible misunderstanding of the action, and it is 
important to have some ideas as to what can mislead us in this respect. 
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Thus it seems that after all some people may be better placed than 
others to judge the goodness of a particular act. This is true, but 
it would seem also that all of us can judge any act correctly if we 
are only careful enough to understand the exact nature of the act 
first. 
Hutcheson identifies numerous circumstances which may mislead us 
and must be allowed for. The most important of these are: self-
interest, the passions, too narrowly confined consideration of the 
results of the action, imagination, education, and the association of 
ideas. 
It may be thought that this aspect of Hutcheson's theory creates 
a dis-analogy with the external senses. Hutcheson is careful to 
point out that although the correction of moral judgements in the 
fashion just explained is carried out by reason, this does not imply 
that reason and not sense is the origin of moral ideas. He points 
out that we correct our external senses by reason; the standard example 
is of a man with jaundice who realizes that the white object is not 
really yellow as he sees it. But this does not make us think that 
the origin of colour perception is reason (Illustrations, p. 134-135). 
This point is uncontentious, but Hutcheson does not notice a further 
point. Where the dis-analogy with the sense may arise is in the nature 
of the perception after we have corrected the judgement. When the 
jaundiced man judges the white object to be white, he still sees it as 
yellow; the perceptions do not change when reason corrects the judgement. 
Thus it is easily possible for one's opinion of an object and one's 
perception of that object to differ. But in rrorality, one corrects 
the moral judgement by correcting the non-moral judgement of the action. 
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When the non-moral judgement is corrected, the moral sense corrects 
itself. But this implies that one cannot correct the moral judgement 
by reason, but still go on perceiving the uncorrected moral idea. 
Hutcheson does not notice that this is not analogous to the external 
senses. 
The point of raising this apparent dis-analogy is to draw out 
some implications of Hutcheson's theory, which Hutcheson does not 
develop. Let us consider an example. Is it possible for the following 
situation to occur? Suppose I disapprove of corporal punishment, 
disapprove so strongly that I tend to be emotional on the subject. 
Now suppose that I witness the caning of a schoolboy, and know little 
of the situation which gave rise to this event. I will disapprove 
of the action, hence considering it evil, and I will also be very angry 
at the agent, (i.e. the schoolmaster). If I am told that the master 
is really a benevolent man, and is acting in what he sees as the boy's 
best interest, I may still be so angry that I find I cannot imagine 
that such an action could be intended as benevolent. Thus I would 
continue to see the action as being evil. But suppose that I know 
that I am so passionate on this subject that I am inclined to be 
misled; in this case, if enough honest men and true assure me that the 
schoolmaster is really benevolent, I may come to accept this, even if 
I cannot bring myself to conceive of the caning as a benevolent act. 
I may come to rationally accept that the caning was a good act, but 
because my image of the action as a belligerent action has not changed, 
(even though my rational conception has), the moral sense might still 
label it as evil. Thus we have a case where I rationally judge the 
action good, but my moral sense perceives it as evil because it is still 
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reacting to a biased image of the action. This rather complicated 
situation thus leads to results analogous to more simple ones in the 
case of the external senses. 
Essentially, what has happened in this case is that r have accepted 
the moral judgement of others because I know that my passions will 
mislead me when making a non-moral judgement of the act. Similar 
examples could be thought of in which self-interest or too restricted 
a view of benevolence were the misleading factors. Thus it seems 
that Hutcheson's theory implies that one can accept the moral judgements 
of others if one thinks that they are less likely to be misled than 
oneself. The criteria for choosing such people will be derived from 
the factors which can mislead us. That is, one will be inclined to 
accept the judgement of those not involved, not passionate on the 
subject, and not of a sect involved. And, of course, they must have 
carefully considered the question. This looks like a version of the 
impartial spectator theory, which Hutcheson himself did not consider, 
but which seems at least consistent with, if not implied by, his moral 
sense theory. 
The final conclusion to this section of the thesis is this: the 
moral sense is always objective and correct, but there is still room 
for moral error, there are still criteria for judging whether one has 
made a moral error or not, and there are criteria for deciding who are 
the best moral judges of a situation. Hence there are occasions for 
comparing one's moral judgements with those of others, but also 
occasions for rejecting a prevailing moral opinion. 
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iii. Justification of Approval 
Sufficient attention has been paid to the moral sense as a sense; 
but the moral sense also has a normative element which the external 
senses do not have. This normative element has three aspects; to 
wit, the role of the moral sense in the justification of approval and 
disapproval of actions, the relation between moral ideas and pleasure 
and pain, and the relation of the moral sense to human motivation. 
None of these topics is similar in the cases of the external and 
internal senses. I will discuss them in order in the next three 
sections. 
Hutcheson's discussion of the justification of approval presupposes 
two distinctions. Firstly, moral approval is distinct from self-
interested approval. Hutcheson thinks that one can approve of actions 
which are either in the approver's interest, or which are in the 
agent's interest. This sort of approval is quite distinct from 
moral approval, but its logical structure and the structure of its 
justification would seem to be the same as that of moral approval. 
Secondly, Hutcheson distinguishes between the exciting and the 
justifying reasons which could be given for any act. The exciting 
reason for an action is the desire or passion which causes the action; 
I will discuss exciting reasons later. The justifying reasons for 
an action are the reasons one could give in recommending approval to 
others. Thus the approval and motivation of actions is clearly 
distinguished; it is the approval of actions, and hence justifying 
reasons, which I will discuss here. 
Central to Hutcheson's theory of the justification of approval and 
disapproval of actions is the distinction between means and ends. 
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some states of affairs and some actions are approved of as ends in 
themselves; some actions are approved of as the means to obtaining 
some end which is approved of in itself. The justification of the 
approval of means is straightforward; actions can be justified by 
giving reasons which indicate that an approved end will, or is likely 
to, result. Presumably, one would take into account whether any 
disapproved ends would also result. This process may be repeated 
several times before one reaches an end approved of in itself and not 
as a means. Since knowledge of the likely consequences of an action 
is for Hutcheson the domain of the faculty of reason, it is by 
reasoning that we justify the approval of actions which are the means 
to other things; thus 'justifying reasons' is not a misnomer. This 
sort of justification does not directly involve the moral sense. 
Hutcheson views the justification of means, or, as he sometimes calls 
them, subordinate ends, in this fashion as being uncontentious. The 
important question is as to the justification of the approval of 
ultimate ends. Hutcheson's language on this point (Illustrations, 
p. 128-140), is sometimes very misleading; he says, for example, "The 
justifying reasons then must be about the ends themselves, especially 
the ultimate ends." (Illustrations, p. 129). But I do not think he 
means to exclude altogether the possibility of justifying the means to 
ends. What he is arguing against at this point is the claim that 
means can be justified simply by truths about their relations to ends; 
any action is the means to some end, and hence this relation itself 
cannot justify them. "Here it is plain, a truth showing an action to 
be fit to attain an end, does not justify it; nor do we approve a 
subordinate end for any truth which only shows it to be fit to promote 
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the ultimate end; for the worst actions may be conducive to their ends, 
and reasonable in that sense." (Illustrations, p. 128-129). The point 
he is making is that approval of means can only be justified by 
showing that they are means to ends which are already approved. It 
is essential to the justification of approval of means that the end 
is approved prior to the justification of approving the means. It 
is not merely the means - ends relationship which justifies an action, 
for what if it is the means to an evil end? And so justifying reasons 
presuppose the approval of ends, and the discussion must centre around 
the approving of ends. 
The first and rather obvious point Hutcheson makes about justifying 
the approval of an end, is that one cannot justify ends in the same 
way that one justifies means; that would involve an infinite regression. 
In his discussion of fitness, which he views as a notion applicable 
only to the means - ends relationship, and not to ends, he puts the 
matter thus: "In this circle we must run until we acknowledge the 
first original of our moral ideas to be from a sense •.. " (Correspondence, 
p. 216). Or, making the same point with respect to exciting reasons 
when these are viewed as reasons for the pursuit of a means given in 
terms of an end, he says: "Were there exciting reasons for all ends, 
there could be no ultimate end, but we should desire one thing for 
the sake of another in an infinite series" (Correspondence, p. 227). 
Both the justifying and exciting reasons for ultimate ends, if there 
are any, must be in terms different from the reasons for means. 
This potentially infinite series must end somehow if there is to 
be any point to the justification of means, and Hutcheson can see only 
one way it could possibly end, and that of course is with the moral 
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sense. Thus the last term of any chain of justification for moral 
approval will, if carried far enough, always be this: the action was 
intended to enhance the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers. 
This intention of promoting general happiness the moral sense always 
approves, and hence there is no need to carry the justification any 
further. 
The chain of justification must stop with the moral sense, for 
as I pointed out above, there can be no rational justification of the 
moral sense itself. Furthermore, there is no rational justification 
of our approval of benevolence. Neither the existence nor the 
perceptions of the moral sense can be justified. Thus we have an 
ultimate end which is approved (i.e. benevolence), and which needs no 
rational justification. This establishes the possibility of justifying 
approval of any means to this end. 
In summary, I interpret Hutcheson's theory of justifying reasons 
thus: to justify approval of an action, one must show that the action 
promotes, or was intended to promote, the greatest happiness of the 
greatest number. This is purely a factual consideration, and is thus 
the domain of reason. Approval of benevolence cannot be justified: 
it simply is approved by, and because of, our rroral sense. General 
happiness is the ultimate end to which all approved acts are the means; 
our approval of general happiness is the end of all series of justifying 
reasons. The moral sense needs no justifying. 
ThQs interpretation is similar to Frankena's as he summarizes it 
. 1 7 in the passage at the end of his artic e. 
7. Frankena, p. 374. 
This passage Jensen quotes 
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at length and explicitly agrees with.
8 
But Jensen then goes on to 
claim that Frankena has made an error earlier in his article, and has 
said things which contradict his (Frankena's) final conclusion; Jensen 
9 also accuses Blackstone of the same error. Furthermore, Jensen goes 
on to add complications to the interpretation which I have stated 
above, and with which he has explicitly agreed. Clearly this situation 
needs to be disentangled. 
The error Frankena and Blackstone are accused of is this: 
10 Frankena says that moral judgements are "based on reasons"; Blackstone 
talks of "the ground or reason which he (Hutcheson) considers to be a 
' ' f 1 1 1111 d f II justifying one or mora approva ..• an re ers to the benevolence 
of motives as a justifying reason for moral approval 11 • 1 ~ There is a 
sense in which moral judgements are based on reasons for Hutcheson, 
for the moral sense reacts to a conception of the action which can 
only be established by reasoning. But these passages from Frankena 
and Blackstone seem to indicate that Hutcheson is being interpreted as 
saying that we can somehow justify, independently of the moral sense, 
the approval that the moral sense gives to benevolent acts. As 
Jensen puts it, Blackstone and Frankena seem to think that "benevolent 
motives are the justifying reasons for holding that acts or persons 
are worthy of approval", and adds that if they do hold this view, 
8. Jensen, p. 58. 
9. Jensen, p. 59. 
10. Frankena, p. 373. 
11. Blackstone, p. 30. 
12. Blackstone, p. 31. 
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"then I believe that they are mistaken. 1113 I agree with Jensen that 
this is an error; it is the error of thinking that the moral sense 
can justify our approval of benevolence, rather than thinking that the 
moral sense's approval of benevolence is the basis for the moral 
justification of actions or persons, or, as Jensen phrases it, that 
"the approval of the moral sense is the source of all justification. 1114 
The moral sense's approval of benevolence cannot be justified in the 
sense that there is no logical necessity for the moral sense to approve 
of benevolence rather than something else. 15 The moral sense simply 
does approve of a certain type of action; prior to its doing so there 
is no notion of moral approval and hence no moral goodness, and there 
thus can be no concepts with reference to which this approval can be 
justified. Justifying reasons presuppose the moral sense, for "the 
f th 1 ° h f 11 ° 0 f 0 0 II 16 approval o e mora sense is t e source o a Justi 1cat1on. 
But does Hutcheson's theory imply that one is justified in approving 
whatever one feels approval for? Jensen thinks this unacceptable, for 
it would place no restraints on possible moral views. He therefore 
reconsiders the interpretation of Hutcheson on justifying reasons 
13. Jensen, p. 59. Jensen's emphasis. 
14. Jensen, p. 59. 
15. Cf. above, chapter 3, sec. ii. Although, of course, God might 
have good reason for his choice, such as that our present moral 
sense is conducive to human happiness, such a reason would not 
be logically compelling, for it presupposes that God desires 
that humans be happy. 
16. Jensen is actually rather cautious in his accusation, using 
phrases like "seems to", and hypotheticals like "If Blackstone 
and Frankena do indeed mean ..• " (p. 59). The language of both 
Blackstone and Frankena is ambiguous enough to warrant this 
hesitation. 
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which he originally gave, and adds some complications. He thinks 
that the approval of the moral sense must be strictly limited to 
benevolence, and suggests that Hutcheson does so by placing "logical 
conditions" on what the moral sense approves. This suggestion that 
there are logical restrictions on the moral sense is erroneous in 
two respects. Firstly, the conditions are not logical; there is no 
logical connexion between moral approval and benevolence. The 
passages which Jensen cites in support of this contention do not seem 
to indicate any logical necessity. He attaches great importance to 
the 'must' in quotes like: "Every spectator or he himself upon 
. ..17 h' reflection must approve... Butt is 'must' does not indicate 
logical necessity, it merely indicates natural necessity, as I have 
established above.
18 
If the necessity is logical, then it could be 
known by reason, and there would be no need for the moral sense. 
Secondly, Jensen's claim that there are conditions on the moral 
sense's approvals seem slightly inaccurate; I have already argued 
that there are no conditions on the moral sense, but that there are 
conditions on the clear conception of the action to which the moral 
sense responds. If the conditions are on the actual approval, then 
why is Hutcheson at such great pains to establish that the approvals 
of the moral sense are not swayed by self-interest? 
Jensen concludes that "Hutcheson is maintaining that this feeling 
(i.e. moral approval) has certain logical conditions, namely, those 
19 
requiring the standpoint of the impartial spectator." It seems to 
17. Illustrations, p. 130 and Jensen, p. 61. 
18. Cf. above: Ch. 3, sec. ii. 
19. Jensen, p. 62. 
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me that these conditions for Hutcheson cannot be on the feeling, nor 
can they be logical. 
But it will be remembered that Jensen introduced these logical 
conditions to prevent Hutcheson's theory of justification leading to 
the conclusion that one is justified in approving morally anything of 
which one approves. Is Hutcheson committed to such a view on my 
interpretation? 
I think not. Firstly, because moral approval is different from 
other forms of approval, such as approval of that which I see as being 
in my own interests, it is only moral approval of an end which can 
justify moral approval of a means to that end. Secondly, the moral 
sense is based on reason in the sense that the moral sense reacts to 
a conception of an action which can only be established by reasons. 
And there are conditions on establishing this conception, namely, the 
conditions of objectivity, non-passionate involvement, non-sectarianism, 
etc. which I discussed earlier in this chapter. If the conception of 
the action does not fit these conditions, then the perceptions of the 
moral sense are, or may be, unreliable. Since not only is it by 
reason that we establish the conception of the action, but also by 
reason that we judge whether or not the relevant conditions are met, 
we are in a position to judge the reliability of the perceptions of 
the moral sense. This I hope I established earlier. The point which 
can be seen now is that this is equivalent to establishing the 
reliability of moral approval of ends. This, like Jensen's suggestion 
that there are logical conditions on what is acceptable as perceptions 
of the moral sense, undermines the objection that one can give a moral 
justification of anything which leads to ends of which one happens to 
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approve. And it has the textual advantage as an interpretation of 
Hutcheson that it does not contradict the explicit passages in which 
Hutcheson tries to establish that the moral sense cannot be swayed 
by self-interest. 
Perhaps an implication of this position, which Hutcheson nowhere 
seems aware of in his discussion of moral justification, should be 
noted here. If there are conditions, albeit indirect ones, on which 
approvals of ends are reliaable, then presumably these conditions 
will also apply to any means which are approved of for their relationship 
to those ends. This is only to say that one could question the 
justification of the approval of an act by questioning the adequacy 
of the end to which it was regarded as contributing. Thus if someone 
justified approving of blowing up pillar boxes by claiming that it 
aided the cause of an independent Scotland, one could object that if 
the prospect of an independent Scotland were considered objectively, 
and without sectarian passion, it would not be approved of. This 
would remove the justification for approving of the destruction of 
pillar boxes. 
Even if it is admitted that the indirect conditions which I have 
proposed are as adequate as the logical conditions which Jensen 
proposes, it may be objected that neither is adequate to remove the 
possibility of justifying anything one happens to approve of. What 
does one say, for example, if someone claims that even viewing the 
matter objectively and dispassionately, he still approves of flagpole 
sitting as morally good? Hutcheson's reply would be that in fact, 
this case would never arise. The moral sense will always approve of 
only benevolence. This raises again the question of the relationship 
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between the perceptions of the moral sense and benevolence, but I 
think I have discussed that adequately earlier. But here it should 
be noted that the "weird moral views" objection20 is ultimately 
replied to by Hutcheson by his claim that the moral sense just always 
does approve of benevolence and only benevolence. 
One further remark on this objection must be made; namely, that 
in fact Hutcheson's theory of justification does not allow one to 
justify one's approval of benevolence anyway. It merely allows one 
to justify anything which enhances the greatest happiness, in terms 
of our approval of benevolence. Thus one could not be entitled 
under any interpretation of perversion of the moral sense to justify 
"weird moral views" in terms of one's approval of them. One can 
never justify one's ultimate moral approval, one can only justify 
other activities in terms of it. Our feeling of approval of the end 
is not a justification of the moral worth of that end; it is rather 
the perception of that moral worth. And this in turn may be used to 
justify a means to that end. Approval is not justification, but the 
source of justification. 
Hutcheson's theory of justifying reasons is a theory about the 
justification of moral approval of some acts in terms of the moral 
approval of the ends to which these acts are means. The moral approval 
of ul tirna te ends is the perception of their goodness by the moral 
sense. This approval of ends cannot be justified. The discussion in 
Hutcheson is intended to prove that there can be no moral justification 
of means without presupposing moral approval of ends by the moral sense. 
20. The phrase "weird moral views" is borrowed by Jensen from 
Phillipa Foot; Foot uses the phrase to raise a similar sort of 
objection to Hume as that discussed here. Cf. Foot, P· 71. 
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Justification is a rational procedure, and is conducted by showing 
that an action is intended to enhance the greatest happiness for the 
greatest numbers. We cannot justify approving an act merely by 
claiming that we feel approval for it. Even our approval of benevolence 
is not justified in that fashion; indeed it is not justified at all. 
Lastly, it only needs to be added that this role of the 
perceptions of the moral sense in the justification of approval, is 
part of what I have called .the normative content of moral ideas. 
It seems to have no parallel in the perceptions of the external senses. 
iv. Moral Sense and Pleasure and Pain 
In discussing the role pleasure and pain play in Hutcheson's 
moral theory, one is essentially discussing the question of whether 
Hutcheson is an emotivist or intuitionist. This is because Hutcheson 
views emotions and feelings as types of pleasure or pain. There are 
two separate questions involved in deciding the emotivist-intuitionist 
issue. Firstly, are the reactions of the moral sense perceptions, or 
are they emotions or feelings? Answering that question leaves the 
further question: how are the reactions of the moral sense related 
to pleasure and pain? Are moral reactions types of pleasure (or pain), 
or are they only accompanied by pleasure (or pain)? 
The first of these questions is impossible to answer, for 
Hutcheson blatently fails to distinguish feelings and emotions from 
the perception of ideas: . f h' 21 they are the same sort of thing or im. 
One would normally think that having emotions or feelings is quite 
21. Cf. above, sec. 2-ii-a. 
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distinct from having perceptions, even if one wanted to claim that 
our ideas of our feelings arise in a fashion analogous to perception. 
For Hutcheson, this is not the case. He explicitly says that pleasure 
and pain are senses, and that they are analogous to our other sense 
faculties. "By sensation we not only receive the image or representation 
(i.e. idea), but some feelings of pleasure or pain; nay sometimes the 
S ole perception is that of pleasure or pai· n." (Essa 2) y, p. . Since 
all emotions are types of pleasures and pains for Hutcheson, this view 
implies that the emotions and sense perceptions are the same sort of 
thing for him. This means that on Hutcheson's theory, the difference 
between emotivism and intuitionism cannot be very great. So in this 
sense at least, the question of whether Hutcheson is an emotivist or 
an intuitionist does not arise. 
But this does not solve the problem of whether pleasure and pain 
accompany or inhere in moral perceptions; it merely establishes that 
the perceptions of the m:>ral sense can either be forms of pleasure 
or not and still remain perceptions. So the question of intuitionism 
vs. emotivism remains in so far as we still have not established the 
relationship between pleasure and the idea of good. We have established 
that for Hutcheson the perception of ideas and the feeling of pleasure 
are the same sort of thing; we now have to examine whether in the case 
of the moral sense, the perception of pleasure and t.~e perception of 
good are identical events, or only always 'concomitant'. 
This question of the relationship between moral ideas and pleasure 
and pain is relevant to the question of whether Hutcheson is an 
emotivist or an intuitionist because all feeling or emotion is for 
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Hutcheson inherently pleasant or painful; 22 so if the ideas of good 
and evil are types of pleasure or pain, then moral ideas are merely 
feelings. This I would consider an emotivist interpretation of 
Hutcheson. It should be noted that it is consistent with at least 
two views of the nature of moral judgements; moral judgements could 
be eit.~er expressions of these feelings, or they could be statements 
about someone's having these feelings. I mention this to make clear 
that I am not using the term 'emotivist' to describe a theory of 
moral language or judgement, but rather a theory about moral ideas. 
If Hutcheson is interpreted as saying that pleasure or pain 
accompanies our ideas of good or evil, then feelings are extrinsic 
to the perceptions of the moral sense. This I would consider to be an 
intuitionist's position, for moral ideas would be intuited separately 
from any feelings which might accompany the intuitions. Again, this 
interpretation is compatible with more than one theory of moral 
judgements or language, although it would seem probable that a 
philosopher who was an intuitionist in this sense would view moral 
judgements as judgements using the intuited moral ideas. Still, there 
is the question of whether judgements reflect one's own intuitions 
or are statements about most people's intuitions. But the question 
at the moment is not of the nature of moral language or judgements, 
but of the relationship between moral ideas and feelings. Are pleasure 
and pain inherent in moral ideas, or do they only accompany moral ideas? 
Hutcheson's writings are ambiguous on this question~ There are 
innumerable passages throughout his works in which moral approval 
appears to be a form of pleasure; for example, his most explicit 
22. Cf. above, Ch. 2, sec. ii. 
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definition of the internal senses seems to equate them all with 
feelings of pleasure or pain: the internal senses are, he says, 
"determinations to be pleas'd with any forms, or ideas which occur 
to our observation" (Inquiry, p. xiii). On the other hand, there 
are passages which explicitly state that the pleasures of the internal 
senses are distinct from, but always accompany, the perceptions of 
those senses. It would be difficult to get a more explicit statement 
than this: "The perception of the approver, tho' attended with 
pleasure, plainly represents something quite distinct from this 
pleasure; even as the perception of external forms is attended with 
pleasure, and yet represents something distinct from this pleasure. 
This may prevent cavils upon this subject." (Inquiry, p. 131. Added 
in 4th edition). But perhaps Hutcheson's considered opinion lies in 
the following passage rather than either of those just quoted: 
"Approbation of our own action denotes, or is attended with, a pleasure 
in the contemplation of it, ... " (Illustrations, p. 116). There seems 
to me no point in counting the passages which favour one interpretation 
or the other; rather I think it more profitable to accept the text as 
ambiguous on the point, 23 and to consider instead the philosophical 
compatibility of each of the possible interpretations with the rest 
of Hutcheson's moral sense theory. Unfortunately, there are problems 
with the rest of Hutcheson's theory if we accept either that the 
perceptions of the moral sense are a form of, or contain, pleasure 
or pain, or that they are accompanied by pleasure or pain. Let us 
consider these in turn. 
23. For a more detailed discussion of Hutcheson's texts on this 
matter, see Norton, passim. 
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There are two ways in which pleasure could be inherent in the 
idea of good; to wit, pleasure could be a part of the idea of good, 
or the idea of good may be identical with pleasure or a type of 
pleasure. 
The first possibility, that pleasure is a part of the idea of 
good, is unacceptable in the context of Hutcheson's moral theory, 
for it is inconsistent with the claim that moral ideas are simple. 
Their simplicity is destroyed if moral ideas can be analysed into 
pleasure and some other component, even if that other component is 
unanalysable. If moral ideas are not simple, then Hutcheson's reason 
for postulating the moral sense is undermined, for Hutcheson assumed 
that a sense was necessary for perceiving new simple ineas, an 
assumption which he never questioned. So one can conclude that the 
moral sense theory does not allow for the possibility that pleasure 
is part of the idea of good. 
The other possibility, that the idea of good is identical with 
pleasure or a type of pleasure, has equally serious objections to it. 
Good cannot be equivalent to pleasure in general, for this would 
eliminate all moral value from the term, and be quite inconsistant 
with the special connexion that good has with benevolence. It would 
be absurd to suggest that we derived pleasure only from contemplating 
benevolence. This leaves the possibility that the idea of good could 
be a special type of pleasure. To this suggestion there is the 
important objection that it completely undermines the analogy with 
the external senses. Red is not a form of pleasure, though the 
perception of red may be accompanied by pleasure (e.g. the Red Flag 
seen by a socialist). The same point could be put otherwise; although 
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the perception of red may give pleasure, or be pleasant, it cannot 
be said that this is what is perceived. If the analogy between the 
external and internal senses is to be maintained, then there must 
be a similar distinction between good and any pleasure that is to be 
found in the perceptions of good acts. We may find pleasure in 
perceiving good, but it is the good we perceive, not the pleasure. 
Thus if the analogy is to be taken seriously, good and the pleasure of 
perceiving goodness must be two separate ideas. And hence the idea 
of good cannot be a type of pleasure. It should be emphasised that 
Hutcheson does not seem to be aware of this point, and that there are 
definitely passages in his writings, especially his early writings, 
in which the perceptions of the internal senses are viewed as types 
of pleasure. 
And there is a further problem with moral perceptions being a 
type of pleasure. There is nothing in Hutcheson's writings which 
allows us to distinguish one internal pleasure from another except 
the object that provokes them. Moral good cannot be pleasure of just 
any type whatever; that is natural good which Hutcheson carefully 
distinguishes from moral good. This means that moral good must be 
defined thus: pleasure in reaction to our conception of benevolent 
actions. But this is anything but a simple idea! Furthermore, 
it suffers under the problem that not all pleasure in benevolent 
acts is moral good; I may be the beneficiary of the act and hence 
also feel pleasure arising out of self-interest. If perceiving 
pleasure is the only thing that the moral sense does, then there would 
seem to be no way of distinguishing this pleasure from other sorts 
of pleasure. There must for Hutcheson be an idea of good at least 
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for the purpose of distinguishing moral pleasure from self-interested 
pleasure. But if this idea of good is to be simple, then it must 
be distinguished from the pleasure, and the moral sense would have 
two functions; perceiving good and perceiving pleasure. Hence the 
perceptions of the moral sense cannot be simply feelings of pleasure 
because Hutcheson has provided no criterion for distinguishing moral 
24 pleasures from non-moral pleasures. 
If pleasure is not inherent in the idea of good, then perhaps 
we can interpret Hutcheson as meaning to say that pleasure is distinct 
from the perception of good, but always accompanies the perception of 
good. There is, as I have suggested above, some textual support for 
this view. But interpreting the moral sense as a faculty which 
intuits moral ideas which are then accompanied by the quite separate 
ideas of pleasure and pain, creates a problem for the moral theory 
as a whole. Pleasure and pain are obviously value laden concepts; 
and the role of them in Hutcheson's moral theory and theory of 
motivation indicate that he wants to, and indeed must, keep their 
value connotations. This value system inherent in pleasure and pain 
becomes written into the perceptions of the internal senses. Pleasure 
. h 25 d accompanies our ideas of beauty, honour, and moral rig tness; an 
thus we value the things to which we perceive these things as belonging. 
24. It is interesting to note that Hrnne uses a theory of impartiality 
to solve this problem; see the appendix to this section. 
25. It is interesting to note in passing that all of the ·internal 
senses, (e.g. sense of beauty, honour, etc.), have the same 
relation to pleasure and pain that the moral sense has. Thus 
the question of whether pleasure and pain accompanies or is 
part of the ideas perceived by the internal senses arises in 
the same fashion for all of the internal senses. 
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Pain, or unpleasantness, accompanies our ideas of ugliness, 26 dishonour, 
and moral evil; and thus we place a negative value on those things to 
which we apply these ideas. The only source of value for Hutcheson 
is pleasure and pain, and thus the value content of the internal 
senses must lie in their relation to pleasure and pain. This must 
apply to the moral sense, and hence any value we attach to goodness 
must on every occasion, come from the pleasure it gives us when we 
contemplate it. 
If this is indeed the correct interpretation of Hutcheson on 
this point, then it would seem that it is a very serious fault in his 
theory. That that which is good is more valuable than that which is 
evil seems to me to be an inherent part of the idea of goodness. 
It seems logically incoherent to reverse the value of good and evil. 
Surely it is a contradiction, not just a factual error, to say: that 
was a very evil act and therefore of great value. Yet for Hutcheson 
the claim that evil actions are of great value is only contingently, 
or factually, false. If the interpretation which premises this 
argument is correct, its falsity is dependent upon the empirical 
fact that pain, not pleasure, accompanies our perceptions of evil. 
But if value connotations must be inherent in the ideas of good and 
evil as I suggest, then Hutcheson has committed an error if he has 
separated these ideas from their source of value, which for him is 
their pleasure and pain. The relation between good and the value of 
goodness becomes contingent on human nature. It was noted· earlier 
26. Actually, Hutcheson doubts that the sense of beauty has a 
negative side; that is, he doubts that ugliness causes pain. 
I think the new Edinburgh University Student Centre proves 
him wrong on this point. 
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that the relation between good and benevolence is also contingent 
on human nature for Hutcheson. His contemporaries objected to this, 
but Hutcheson replied that the natural necessity inherent in human 
nature is sufficient to connect the idea of good with good actions. 
Now we have a similar objection. If it is only human nature which 
finds the idea of good pleasant, if pleasantness is not logically 
inherent in the idea of good, then good can be related to pleasantness 
by at most a natural necessity. But this is much more serious than 
the other objection; Hutcheson could accept a contingent relationship 
between good and benevolence; I do not think he would have accepted, 
nor could have accepted, a contingent relationship between goodness 
and the value of goodness. Such a possibility does too much violence 
to morality as a source of valuation. 
This objection to Hutcheson's suggestion that pleasure should 
accompany perception of good by the moral sense, is a fundamental 
problem for all intuitionist moral theories which are based on an 
analogy with sense perception. If moral ideas are intuited, then a 
value system must be intuited as inherent in them. This undermines 
all possibility of analogy with sense perception. If moral ideas 
are intuited neutrally, and their value comes from some outside source 
such as accompanying pleasures and pains, then the contingent nature 
of the resulting relation between goodness and the source of its 
value does violence to our conception of morality as inherently 
value-laden. 
I draw the conclusion from the discussion of this section that 
it is impossible to determine whether Hutcheson's theory of the moral 
sense should be classified as an emotivist or intuitionist theory. 
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I conclude this for two reasons: firstly, because it is impossible 
to determine whether the reactions of the moral sense are perceptions 
or emotions; and secondly, because it is impossible to determine 
whether the reactions of the moral sense are accompanied by pleasure 
and pain, or whether they are a form of pleasure and pain. 
That Hutcheson is ambiguous on the emotivist-intuitionist issue 
has been noted by other authors. For example, Swabey remarks on the 
27 vagueness of the moral sense theory in this respect, and Norton 
t 1 th f . . 1 1 . 28 argues a eng or a s1m1 ar cone usion. 
Appendix 
It is perhaps worth adding that it is this problem of identifying 
the pleasures of the moral sense that the impartial spectator theory 
in Hume was intended to solve. There can be no question that for 
Hume the moral sense was the faculty of moral feeling, and not of the 
intuition of ideas; the perception of good and evil was a particular 
type of pleasure or pain. As I have argued above, if this is the case, 
there must be some way of distinguishing moral pleasures from other 
types of pleasure; there must be some way of identifying moral feelings. 
The proposed answer, in a word, is that moral feelings are the feelings 
that result when one assumes the viewpoint of an impartial spectator. 
Hume does not use the expression 'impartial spectator'; he does use 
th · 11 • d · · t t " 11 every spectator", and "every e expressions a JU 1c1ous spec a or , 
29 bystander". Hume's suggestion is that since a person cannot expect 
27. Swabey, p. 83, 98. 
28. Norton, passim. 
29. Raphael, "The Impartial Spectator", p. 8. 
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other people to sympathize with his self-love, "he must here, therefore, 
depart from his private and particular situation, and must choose a 
point of view, common to him with others; he must move some universal 
principle of the human frame, and touch a string to which all mankind 
30 
have an accord and sympathy." An "affection of humanity", since it 
is the only affection common to all men, "can alone be the foundation 
of morals, or of any general system of praise and blame. 1131 r think 
this passage in Ht.nne's Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals 
supports my suggestion that Hume uses his version of the impartial 
spectator theory as a means of identifying which of our feelings are 
moral feelings and which are not. Those affections are moral affections 
which "every bystander", or the "judicious spectator", can sympathize 
with. 
This placing of the condition of impartiality on the moral 
perceptions has its origins in Hutcheson, but for Hutcheson the 
conditions are on the conceptions of the action, not on the resulting 
reactions of the moral sense. I think it fair to say that Hutcheson 
did not see a problem in identifying the perceptions of the moral 
sense; we just know what is moral approval and what is not. At one 
point he suggests that this may require some care: "In our sentiments 
of actions which affect ourselves, there is indeed a mixture of the 
ideas of natural and moral good, which require some attention to 
separate them" (Inquiry, p. 114). But this definitely suggests that 
with due attention they can be separated. No criterion is explicitly 
suggested, but the next line perhaps contains a hint of what Hutcheson 
30. Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, p. 272. 
31. Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, p. 273. 
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would have said if confronted with the problem; "But when we reflect 
upon the actions which affect other persons only, we may observe the 
moral ideas unmix'd with those of (natural) good and evil" (Inquiry, 
p. 114). It needs only be added that moral ideas in the cases where 
we are interested can be identified by comparison with the cases 
where we are not, and one has the rudiments of the impartial spectator 
theory. Hutcheson would certainly have been able to elaborate just 
what constituted impartiality, for he does so at length in another 
context. However, it must be emphasized that Hutcheson develops 
notions of impartiality in the context of establishing the nature of 
the idea to which the moral sense reacts. He does not need to apply 
the impartial spectator theory to the moral sense itself, for the 
moral sense cannot be influenced by self-interest, and the perceptions 
of the moral sense can be identified simply by reflection. 
v. Moral Sense and Motivation 
The third and final aspect of the normative content of moral 
ideas is their ability to motivate. Moral motivation is an 
exceedingly complex problem for Hutcheson, sufficient to warrent a 
chapter on its own. Here I will only summarize a few of the main 
points, so that the conclusions to this chapter will reflect all 
aspects of the rroral sense. 
Pleasures and pains are for Hutcheson the only source of desires. 
The moral sense is a source of pleasure and pain, and therefore it is 
a source of desires; it is in fact the source of such desires as the 
desire for self-approbation. Thus the moral sense can motivate 
action through this sort of desire. But it must hurriedly be added 
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that no motive which originates in the pleasures and pains of the moral 
sense can be the motive for morally good acts; benevolence is the 
only possible motive for virtuous acts. Self-approbation is a self-
interested motive, and hence will not be approved by the moral sense. 
Thus, although the moral sense can motivate action, it cannot motivate 
virtuous action. 
What then is the point to the moral sense? What is the point of 
recognizing which actions are morally good if this can never help us 
to be virtuous? Hutcheson's answer is that although moral knowledge 
cannot be a direct motive for virtuous action, the pleasures and 
pains of the moral sense can indirectly lead us to act more virtuously. 
Benevolent motives are often overcome by competing self-interested 
motives. The fact that the moral sense gives us pleasure, and a 
very considerable pleasure, in exercising our benevolence is a powerful 
self-interested motive which always favours the same actions as our 
benevolent motives. Thus the moral sense provides a motive which 
can act as a counter-balance to the self-interested motives which 
threaten to overcome benevolence. This does not increase the 
benevolent motive, and hence it does not increase the virtue of the 
action, but it does make the virtuous action more likely to result by 
eliminating the competition, as it were. The moral sense also 
influences our actions in another indirect way: the prospect of the 
pleasure of being virtuous causes us to study how to increase the 
actions done from the benevolence in our nature. This can be done 
either by trying to decrease any self-interested motives which might 
compete with benevolence, (an objective best accomplished by contemplating 
the pleasures provided by the moral sense), or by actually trying to 
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increase one's benevolent desires. This can only be accomplished 
indirectly by such methods as trying to find out the good points of 
others, and not making similar efforts to find out their bad. 
The conclusion which results from this is that the moral sense 
cannot motivate us directly to virtuous actions. But it can motivate 
us to control our other desires and beliefs in such a way that we 
are more virtuous. Thus the direct objects of the actions motivated 
by the moral sense are always our desires and beliefs. This means 
in effect that the scope of the moral sense in influencing us towards 
good actions is all within our own nature. It does not directly 
influence the way we behave. 
This section is a summary of the relation between the moral sense 
and motivation. It is intended to show that the moral sense does not 
provide the motive for good acts directly, but that it does have a 
role in influencing a person's nature, and hence his actions indirectly. 
This control the moral sense exercises because of the structure of 
human nature, a point which Hutcheson begins to mention in his second 
book (i.e. the Essay and the Illustrations), but it is developed more 
thoroughly in the 'System' where he talks of the moral perfection of 
our nature (System, p. xiv, 61, 114). If fully developed, the theory 
indicates that although actions are good because of the approval of 
the moral sense, people are good in virtue of whether their personality 
conforms to the correct hierarchy of influences inherent in the 
structure of human nature. The position of the moral sense in this 
structure must be considered part of the normative content of its 
perceptions. All of these topics are discussed in more detail below 
in Chapter 5. 
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vi. Sununary 
I will now summarize the conclusions I have drawn throughout this 
chapter. 
From the fact that the moral sense is a sense, one can immediately 
conclude that some moral ideas are simple, and that moral ideas arise 
in the mind independently of direct human volition. 
Classifying the moral sense as an internal sense implies that 
moral ideas arise subsequent to and in reaction to some other ideas 
which are already in the mind. It was found that moral ideas arise 
when the mind has an idea of, or conception of, a human action, 
including the motive and likely consequences of the action as well as 
any part of the action which might be perceivable. 
Hutcheson favours the parallel between moral ideas and ideas of 
secondary qualities, rather than a parallel between moral ideas and 
primary qualities, on the grounds that the theory of secondary 
qualities is not a representationalist theory. Hutcheson's moral 
theory is not a representationalist theory, nor is it a naively 
realistic theory. Moral ideas are not images of any quality in the 
actions. But there are qualities in the action which are the 
occasion for moral ideas. What is the connexion between these 
good-inclining qualities and the idea of good? 
The connexion between goodness and benevolence appears necessary 
to us in that we are determined by our nature to perceive them as 
connected. But this is not a logical necessity; it is contingent on 
the way God created human nature. This combination of one form of 
necessity and another form of contingency is somewhat similar to that 
which exists in the case of secondary qualities. But there seems a 
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type of necessity in morality not found in the perceptions of 
secondary qualities, but which seems similar to that found in the 
perceptions of concomitant ideas. 
In the discussion of the sources of moral error, it was shown 
that although the moral sense is never in error, there are still 
criteria for judging the accuracy of one's moral judgements, and for 
judging who is in the best position to make a particular moral 
judgement. 
All of the above are conclusions arrived at by viewing the moral 
sense as a sense. But moral ideas also have a normative content. 
It was noted that there is a problem in reconciling the normative 
and non-normative aspects of the moral sense. The external senses 
have none of the three aspects of the moral sense which make it 
normative, and this tends to undermine the analogy between the external 
and internal senses. 
The three normative aspects of the moral sense are its role in 
the justification of approval, its relation to pleasure and pain, and 
its ability to motivate action. 
The moral sense does not justify our approval of benevolence; 
this approval is what the moral sense does, and is beyond justification. 
But this approval provides the basis for justifying our approval of 
all means which enhance benevolent ends. 
It is not clear whether the perceptions of the moral sense are a 
form of pleasure and pain, or whether they are accompanied by pleasure 
and pain. And hence it is not clear whether Hutcheson is an emotivist 
or an intuitionist. In general, I think it can be said that his 
analysis of the non-normative aspects of the moral sense favour an 
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intuitionist approach, and that the normative aspects of his theory 
favour an emotivist approach. There seems to be some difficulty in 
reconciling these two aspects of his theory. 
Finally, the moral sense can motivate action, but it does not 
motivate virtuous action directly. Rather it plays a role in 
controlling the structure of our personality, from which virtuous 
actions hopefully result. 
Hutcheson's moral sense theory must be seen in all these aspects. 
There can be no simple statement of the nature of the moral sense, 
and hence no simple definition of the good. 
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4. Benevolence 
i. Benevolence - First Version 
In the previous chapter, I simply assumed that for Hutcheson , 
only acts motivated by benevolent desires could be morally good, and 
that the moral goodness of an act consists in its being so motivated. 
But Hutcheson's theory of benevolent desires and how they motivate is 
by no means simple. I will therefore consider it in detail in this 
chapter. 
Part of the complexity of Hutcheson's remarks on benevolence 
sterns from the fact that he held two separate theories of benevolence 
at different times. The first of these is most clearly expounded in 
his first book, the 'Inquiry'. There the second theory is not 
1 
mentioned at all, and so only the first theory is used in the 
discussions of benevolence. By the time he came to write his second 
book, the 'Essay' and the 'Illustrations', in 1726, Hutcheson had 
read Butler's Fifteen Sermons which had been published that year. 
Under this influence, Hutcheson greatly changed his thoughts on 
benevolence, and, perhaps even more importantly, also changed the 
relation between the moral sense, benevolence, and the motivation 
of virtuous actions. However, it is my opinion that this second 
theory was superimposed on the first theory; the earlier view of 
benevolence was never dropped, but was only supplemented and made 
more complicated in the later writings. In fact, the earlier view 
is present even in the 'System'. I hope it will become clear from 
1. At least in the second edition (1726). Some of the corrections 
in the fourth edition refer to or presuppose the second.version. 
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my exposition of these two theories that they are quite consistent, 
or even complementary with each other; there is certainly no problem 
involved in Hutcheson's advocating both of these theories at once. 
The significance of the two theories is rather in this: adopting 
the second theory necessitates a change in the theory of how moral 
knowledge, as supplied by the moral sense, influences and controls 
our desires and leads to benevolent action. In brief, the second 
theory leads to a rather complicated theory of the structure of human 
nature, whereas under the first theory in the 'Inquiry', the moral 
sense influences our actions rather more directly. I will explicate 
these two theories of benevolence in turn in this chapter, and discuss 
their relation to the problem of motivation in Chapter 5. 
In the 'Inquiry', benevolent desires are all particular, never 
general. In fact, the distinction between particular and general 
desires is not drawn in that book, and plays no role in the theory. 
Furthermore, benevolent desires appear to be all violent to some 
degree or other; that is, they are all accompanied by sensations of 
pleasure or pain. Hutcheson does not actually distinguish calm and 
violent desires in this book, and hence his theory of calm desires 
plays no role in his early theory of benevolence. Nor is the 
distinction between desires and passions clear in the 'Inquiry', and 
hence it is not at all clear whether benevolence is a passion or 
d 
. 2 esire. It may be, of course, that some benevolent affections are 
passions and some are desires. This last question, of whether 
particular benevolent affections are passions or desires, remains 
2. For an explanation of the distinctions between general and 
particular desires, violent and calm desires, and passions and 
desires, cf. above, sec. 2-ii-b and c. 
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throughout all of Hutcheson's works, and I will have occasion to 
. . 3 Th . 
discuss it again. e question, taken out of Hutcheson's terminology, 
is whether particular benevolent affections are direct impulses 
towards the good of others, (i.e., are passions), or whether they 
presuppose some prior belief about natural good and evil, (i.e. are 
desires). Sexual lust is obviously the former, but is not considered 
a form of benevolence by Hutcheson even though directed towards others. 
On the other hand, affection for one's children is a form of benevolence, 
but it is not clear whether this is a passion or a desire, or sometimes 
one and sometimes the other. Hutcheson's first theory of benevolence 
is not clear on this point, and his theory of particular desires 
remains unclear. This question does not arise in the case of the 
calm general benevolence advocated in later books, for passions can 
be neither calm nor general. 
In summary, benevolent affections in the 'Inquiry' appear to be 
particular, and violent, and perhaps being, or containing an element 
of, passionate impulse. The theory of calm general benevolence is 
not yet advocated. Examples of benevolent affections given in the 
'Inquiry' are affection toward our offspring, gratitude towards a 
benefactor, (Inquiry, p. 142), and any desire to see our friends, 
country, or relations happy, (Inquiry, p. 148). In the 'Inquiry', 
benevolence is viewed as an emotion; it is in fact sometimes called 
'love'. The later theory of calm general benevolence decreases the 
emotional content of benevolence, and increases the emphasis on the 
motivational non-emotional side of benevolence. 
The argument in the 'Inquiry' is intended to prove two basic 
3. Cf. below, sec. 4-ii. 
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points; to wit, that our moral approval of virtuous actions is not 
founded on any view of self-interest, and that we have benevolent 
affections which are independent of our self-interested desires. 
Hutcheson's arguments for the latter of these points is discussed 
in section iii of this chapter; the aspect of these arguments that 
must be noted here is what exactly Hutcheson is claiming with respect 
to the benevolent affections.
4 
His claim is that benevolent affections 
do not arise from any view of what is in our own interests; he 
claims, in other words, that being benevolent or having benevolent 
desires is not a means to satisfying some self-interested end. 
Benevolence is inherent in human nature and is not reducible to 
self-interest in the sense of resulting from some self-interested 
desire. We have, of course, the desire to fulfil our benevolent 
desires, and this may be viewed as a self-interested desire 
in so far as our benevolent desires are indeed our own desires; 
but this self-interested desire for satisfying benevolent desires 
presupposes those benevolent desires, and hence could not be the 
cause of them. 
Because he thinks they are not reducible to self-interested 
desires, Hutcheson uses the word 'disinterested' to describe 
benevolent desires. But to say that benevolence is disinterested is 
not to say that it is objective or unbiased. Benevolent desires may 
not be caused by or reducible to self-interested desires, but for 
Hutcheson they are greatly affected by the good done to us by others. 
4. The chapter of the 'Inquiry' dealing with these arguments was 
substantially re-written between the second and fourth editions. 
It is the former version I comment on here, (2nd edition, p. 142-
161). The fourth edition dates from after the 'Essay.' 
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our feelings of benevolence are greater for those who show benevolence 
5 
towards ourselves or those we love. The increased benevolence we 
feel for those who are benevolent towards ourselves Hutcheson calls 
by the normal English word of 'gratitude'. He argues, and I think 
correctly argues, that the existence of gratitude towards our 
benefactor does not reduce even this form of benevolence to self-
interest; gratitude, he points out, is the result of good done towards 
us, and is not the means of obtaining good. Hence it is not self-
interested. Hutcheson phrases the argument as follows: 
"Nay, farther, is not our good-will the consequent 
of bounty, and not the means of procuring it? 
External shew, obsequiousness, and dissimulation 
may precede an opinion of beneficence; but real 
love always presupposes it, and will necessarily 
arise even when we expect no more, from 
consideration of past benefits." (Inquiry, p. 156; 
the second edition has 'love always' for 'good-will' 
in the first line.) 
In sununary, Hutcheson argues that benevolent feelings are 
disinterested; that is, that they are not reducible to self-interest. 
However, he admits that our benevolent feelings are biased in favour 
of those who are benevolent towards us or those we love; this he calls 
'gratitude'. He also claims that benevolence is biased in favour of 
those near us, for example, (and especially), our children. 
In the 'Inquiry', benevolent affections are normally accompanied 
by sensations of pleasure or uneasiness, but even at this early stage 
in the development of his thought Hutcheson explicitly argues that it 
is not this concomitant pleasure or uneasiness which motivates us to 
5. It is questionable whether this is always true. When a person is 
dependent on a benefactor, for instance, he sometimes resents the 
relationship, even though he benefits from it. 
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do benevolent acts (Inquiry, 2nd edition, p. 152). He forgets to 
argue explicitly that we do not do benevolent acts for the pleasures 
of self-approval (though he has added this by the time of the fourth 
edition, Inquiry, p. 141-142), but that he did not view this as a 
possibility is clear from his argument that the motive to virtue 
cannot be any sort of reward (Inquiry, 2nd edition, p. 149-151), for 
the pleasure of self-approbation has the same nature as a reward in 
this context. So despite the fact that in this early discussion of 
benevolence, benevolence is never calm (a fact made obvious by his 
use of the term 'love' for benevolent feelings throughout), it is 
not the accompanying feelings which motivate benevolent actions. 
Just how benevolent feelings do motivate us, Hutcheson does not 
attempt to answer at this stage. His comment on the matter is this: 
"If any enquire, Whence arises this love of esteem, 
or benevolence, to good men, or to mankind in general, 
if not from some nice views of self-interest? Or, 
how we can be mov'd to desire the happiness of others, 
without any view to our own? It may be answer'd, That 
the same cause which determines us to pursue happiness 
for our selves, determines us both to esteem and 
benevolence on their proper occasions; even the very 
frame of our nature, or a generous instinct, ••. " 
(Inquiry, 2nd edition, p. 142). 
It is interesting to note that this passage is omitted in the fourth 
edition, though it is not clear why. In his later works, Hutcheson 
drops the use of the word 'love' for benevolent affections, and is 
much clearer that benevolence is a desire (not a passion) which is 
sometimes accompanied by passionate feelings. His theory of desires 
makes clear how benevolence can motivate action, thus improving on 
his earlier version. 
The development of Hutcheson's thinking on benevolence after the 
'Inquiry' changed an important aspect of his overall moral theory: 
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to wit, it changed the relation between the moral sense and benevolence. 
As I have emphasized above, Hutcheson's later theory of benevolence 
was largely a clarification and development of his earlier theory, 
and not a rejection of it. But the relation between the moral sense 
and benevolence did change substantially, leading to the development 
of a very complex theory of how moral knowledge can motivate virtuous 
actions. I think, therefore, that the earlier theory of the motivation 
of virtuous actions should be explained here; the later more complex 
theory is explained in Chapter 5. The following discussion will also 
serve to emphasize the nature of benevolence as a passion in the 
'Inquiry', rather than as a desire as it was later to become. 
In the 'Inquiry', Hutcheson mentions several ways in which the 
moral sense influences human actions. The most straightforward of 
these is the desire of honour amongst our fellow men. We find pleasant 
the moral approval of our actions by those around us, and so there 
arises within us the desire for this honour; this desire for honour 
can, of course, influence our actions. The desire of honour presupposes 
that those around the person with the desire have a moral sense, for 
the satisfaction of the desire is dependent on their moral approval. 
(Hutcheson also adds that love of honour presupposes a moral sense 
in the person who has the desire; Inquiry, p. 225.) Thus the desire 
for honour is dependent on the existence of the moral sense in mankind 
in general. 
Even at the early stage of his development when he wrote the 
first editions of the 'Inquiry', Hutcheson realized that the desire 
for honour was a self-interested desire. 6 He says explicitly: "Now 
6. One has to be careful not to confuse Hutcheson's views on honour 
with his views on compassion or pity, which he discusses in the 
same chapter. Compassion is not a self-interested motive, and 
hence may be the motive for virtuous actions, (Inquiry, p. 239). 
-
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it is certain, that ambition, or the love of honour, is really 
selfish; •.. " (Inquiry, p. 225). Since it is a self-interested desire, 
and hence not a benevolent desire, the desire for honour can never be 
a virtuous motive. The moral sense will never approve of the desire 
for honour or the actions it motivates. What then, is the point of 
the moral sense influencing our actions in this way? Hutcheson 
replies that the desire for honour, though self-interested, tends to 
motivate the same actions as benevolence. Hence, though the desire 
for honour does not increase the virtue of an action, it provides an 
additional self-interested motive for pursuing the good of others. 
This makes doing such actions more likely than if benevolence were 
the only motive. In the following passage, Hutcheson uses 'ambition' 
as a synonym for 'desire of honour': 
"And let it be observ'd, that if we knew an agent had 
no other motive of action than ambition, we should 
apprehend no virtue even in his most useful actions, 
since they flow'd not from any love to others, or 
desire to their happiness. When honour is thus 
constituted by Nature pleasant to us, it may be an 
additional motive to virtue, as, we said above, the 
pleasure arising from reflection on our benevolence 
was: but the person whom we imagine perfectly virtuous, 
acts immediately from the love of others; however these 
refin' d interests may be joint motives to him to set about 
such a course of actions, or to cultivate every kind 
inclination, and to despise every contrary interest, 
as giving a smaller happiness than reflection on his 
own virtue, and consciousness of the esteem of others." 
(Inquiry, p. 225-226) 
The primary point of this passage is to show that honour is a 
self-interested motive, but that it may combine with benevolence and 
be an additional motive for benevolent actions. But attention should 
be drawn to one phrase of the quotation; namely, to the phrase "or to 
cultivate every kind inclination". This idea that self-interest is a 
motive for cultivating benevolent affections is an essential part of 
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Hutcheson's later theory of how the moral sense motivates actions; 
the curious thing about its inclusion in this passage is that the 
second and fourth editions both read the same at this point. usually, 
references in the 'Inquiry' to the idea of cultivating benevolence 
(eg Inquiry, p. 197) are later additions. Its presence on one 
occasion in the earlier edition probably indicates that Hutcheson 
was aware of the idea before it became a central part of his theory. 
In the 'Inquiry', there are several other suggestions of how 
the moral sense influences our actions. The presence of several 
undeveloped ideas on this topic indicate that Hutcheson was not too 
concerned with or conscious of the problem at this early date and 
that hence he had not worked out a consistent theory. On pages 120, 
123, and several other places he mentions a "desire of virtue" 
without any explanation of what such a desire would be. Also on 
page 120, he claims that generosity, faith, humanity, and gratitude 
"excite our admiration, and love, and study of imitation". This 
idea that we have an immediate desire to imitate what the moral 
sense approves is not developed further. Hutcheson also suggests 
several times that the moral sense directly guides actions; he says, 
for example: "in the same manner he (the author of nature) has 
given us a moral sense to direct our actions." (Inquiry, p. 128-129). 
None of these suggestions is developed and I will therefore not go 
into them. 
There is, however, one suggestion, unfortunately not developed 
either, which was probably Hutcheson's main opinion on this matter. 
In several places he says things which presuppose that our moral 
approval of a virtuous person partly consists of, or causes us to 
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feel, benevolence towards that person. In the second edition of 
the 'Inquiry' (p. 216) he begins section 5 by telling us he will be 
discussing the biases of our feelings of benevolence; he mentions 
natural affection and gratitude, and then goes on thus: "or when 
benevolence is increas'd by greater love of esteem." ('love of 
esteem' means the approval of the moral sense). Hutcheson never 
does discuss this suggestion directly, either in this section or 
elsewhere, and the phrase which I have just quoted was dropped in 
the fourth edition of the 'Inquiry' (cf. p. 218). There are, however, 
several passages in the 'Inquiry' where this causal influence of the 
moral sense on benevolence is mentioned or presupposed. For instance, 
in the preliminary definition of the moral sense with which he opens 
the 'Inquiry' he says, "The word moral goodness, in this Treatise, 
denotes our idea of some quality apprehended in actions, which 
procures approbation, attended with desire of the agent's happiness." 
(Inquiry, p. 105). In several places he suggests that moral approval 
is accompanied by, or causes, or contains, (it is not clear which), 
good-will; and good-will he equates with benevolence.
7 
For example, 
he says: "All men who speak of moral good, acknowledge that it 
procures approbation and good-will toward those we apprehend possessed 
of it; ... " (Inquiry, p. 106). Elsewhere, the influence of the moral 
sense on benevolence is presupposed but not directly ref erred to. 
For example, when he enumerates the differences between moral good 
and natural good, he says: 
7. To see that good-will and benevolence are similar for Hutcheson, 
consider this passage: "Suppose we reap the same advantage from 
two men, one of whom serves us from an ultimate desire of our 
happiness, or good-will toward us; the other from views of self-
interest or by constraint: ... " Inquiry, p. 113. 
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"For let it be here observ'd, that those senses by 
which we perceive pleasure in natural objects, whence 
they are constituted advantageous, could never raise 
in us any desire of publick good, but only of what 
was good to ourselves in particular." (Inquiry, p. 114) 
The implication not stated is that the perception of moral good does 
"raise in us the desire of publick good". I conclude that, although 
he never explicitly discussed the question, when he first wrote the 
'Inquiry', Hutcheson thought that the moral sense caused, or contained, 
feelings of benevolence towards those perceived as virtuous. This 
is not very strange when one considers that on the early theory, 
the moral sense gives us feelings of love, approval, or esteem of 
virtuous people, and that it is not a very great step to add that 
these feelings tend to include a desire for the virtuous man's good. 
Later, when the moral sense becomes more clearly a source of perceptions 
rather than feelings, to add desires to these perceptions would be a 
more questionable step. 
In surrunary, Hutcheson's early theory of benevolence in the 'Inquiry' 
portrays benevolence as any feeling motivating us to consider the 
wants of others. These are normally particular feelings directed 
towards specific individuals, and include all ot our social emotions 
which are not founded on self-interest. The perceptions of the moral 
sense are interpreted as feelings of love towards people who display 
benevolent affections. These feelings of the moral sense include or 
cause reciprocal benevolent affections to arise in us; these feelings 
may in turn cause us to do benevolent actions. 
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ii. Benevolence - Second Version 
In his second book, the 'Essay on the Passions', Hutcheson 
greatly develops and expands his theory of benevolence. I have been 
ref erring to this as the second version, but I should again emphasize 
that Hutcheson never rejects his analysis of particular benevolent 
affections. Rather he adds to it a theory of calm general benevolence, 
and makes related changes in other aspects of his theory of human 
nature. He introduces a structure of hierarchy to the various 
elements of human nature, and produces an elaborate theory of how 
this structure functions in producing actions, virtuous actions in 
particular. There can be little question that Hutcheson's theory of 
calm general benevolence was inspired by Butler's Fifteen Sermons; 
these had been published in the interval between the publication of 
the 'Inquiry' and the 'Essay'. 
The distinctions between calm and violent, and between general 
and particular des ires have been outlined in detail in Chapter 2 above. 
The application of these distinctions to benevolence is quite straight-
forward. A calm benevolent desire is one in which there are no 
accompanying sensations of pleasure or uneasiness. A violent, or 
as Hutcheson tends to refer to them, a passionate, benevolent desire, 
is one in which there are such accompanying sensations. For example, 
a nationalistic desire for the good of one's country might be 
passionate and violent; and abstract desire for the good of one's 
fellow countrymen might be quite calm. The violence of benevolent 
desires is, of course, a question of degree. Particular desires are 
desires which presuppose no other desires; thus my benevolent feelings 
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towards this particular down-and-out is unconnected with any other 
desires I may have. General desires are desires which take into 
account groups of other desires; thus a general desire to be benevolent 
to those who need help in my society will be an overall desire which 
encompasses my desire to help down-and-outs, my desire to donate 
blood, my desire to help old-age pensioners, etc. In the first 
version of the theory of benevolence, benevolent desires were particular 
and passionate: they were viewed as feelings of love towards other 
people, either singly or in groups. Now Hutcheson has added the 
possibilities of calm and general benevolence. These two factors, 
calmness and generalness, tend to go together for Hutcheson, but 
there is no necessity for them to do so. In introducing calm general 
benevolence, Hutcheson has shifted the emphasis in his discussion 
from the feeling or emotional aspects of benevolence, towards the 
desire or motivational content of benevolence. 
The notion of generality with respect to benevolent desires 
requires further comment. It is important to note that generality 
when applied to benevolence is not related to the number of people 
towards whom the desire for good is directed; rather it is the 
presupposition of other desires which makes a desire general. For 
example, a fanatical Scotsman may feel hatred for all Englishmen; this 
hatred would be particular despite the large number of Englishmen in 
the world, if it were a fundamental hatred rather than a conglomeration 
of a great number of hatreds towards the English. Similarly for 
benevolence; I may feel a benevolent desire to help a great number of 
people, a family or a sect, for example, but if this desire is not the 
combination of a number of other desires to help various people, then 
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it is not a general desire in the sense that Hutcheson uses it in the 
'Essay'. In the first version of his theory, Hutcheson clearly 
recognized that benevolence could be directed towards large numbers 
of people. Indeed it was in the 'Inquiry' (p. 181) that he first used 
the expression "the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers"; 
clearly this indicates that he was, even then, aware of the need for 
benevolence to be directed towards people in general. But the concept 
of generality used in the 'Essay' is quite different from this; 
generality involves numerous desires, not numerous people. 
That this is the notion of generality which Hutcheson is using, 
is clear from a passage in which he discusses a related question. 
In the 'Illustrations', he points out that we do not form "some 
conception of an infinite good, or greatest possible aggregate, or sum 
of happiness, under which all particular pleasures may be included ... " 
(Illustrations, p. 124). He argues that we do not have desires for 
the good of particular individuals because we have a general desire 
for the good of all mankind. Rather, it is the other way around; 
we have the general desire because we are capable of taking into 
account a number of particular desires. Thus the generalness of 
general desires must have to do with the fact that they subsume a 
number of particular desires, and not with the fact that they may be 
a desire for the good of the generality of mankind. 
Further substantial evidence that it is generality of desires, 
not generality of people, that he means in the case of general 
benevolence, comes from the fact that he also talks in te:r:ms of general 
self-interested desires. In the case of self-interest, it makes no 
sense to talk in terms of the number of people whose good is sought. 
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The number is obviously always one. But one can still have a general 
desire for what is in one's own interests. The generality of such a 
desire comes from the fact that it presupposes, and takes into account 
several particular desires. It is a general desire for that which 
will satisfy as many particular desires as are mutually compatible. 
The generality of desires varies according to the number of particular 
desires which they take into account. The most general desires are 
general self-interest and general benevolence, though in the 'System' 
he also adds a general desire for moral perfection. (Cf. System, 
p. xiv). In the case of both general self-interest and general 
benevolence it is important to remember that their generality lies in 
the fact that they are desires for maximizing the sa~isfaction of 
several particular desires. 
The importance of this theory of general desires lies in the 
relation between general and particular desires, and motivation. 
All desires can motivate, and the degree to which a desire can motivate 
depends on the strength of that desire. The strength of a desire 
depends on the amount of pleasure which it is believed that satisfying 
the desire will produce, plus the strength of the passionate element 
'f th . 8 1 ere is one. General desires, since they are desires for the 
maximization of a number of particular desires, can inherently promise 
more pleasure than any particular desire. They can thus overrule 
particular desires, particularly those taken into account in the 
maximization calculations. General desires can in this way control 
our particular desires, they consider and balance the pleasures which 
will result from various combinations of satisfying compatible desires, 
8. Cf. above, sec. 2-ii-d. 
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and motivate us towards the action which will give the maximum 
satisfaction. Since this is maximization of pleasure, general 
desires are stronger than particular desires and can overrule and 
9 
control them. 
There are several things which should be noted about this theory 
of general desires controlling particular desires. Firstly, it may 
be observed that this theory is missing in the first version of the 
discussion of benevolence. There, benevolent affections seemed to 
be all particular, though the number of people they were directed 
towards varied. It was the function of the moral sense to control 
the various particular benevolent affections; it did this by tending 
to give rise to, or to increase, affections it approved of, and by 
adding self-interested motives tending to motivate the same actions 
as the benevolent desires. This function of the moral sense (and 
sense of honour), has now been dropped; the role of controlling 
particular benevolent desires is now the function of general benevolence. 
However, the moral sense on the new theory does have a role in deciding 
whether general benevolence or general self-interest will motivate 
. 10 our actions. 
Secondly, it should be noted that general desires are normally 
calm. This derives from the fact that general desires presuppose the 
functioning of reasoning; general desires rely on estimates of which 
actions will lead to the greatest pleasures, and since this sort of 
estimation is the function of reason, general desires presuppose 
9. On the relation of this point to the question of freedom of the 
will, cf. above, sec. 2-ii-e. 
10. Cf. below, chapter 5. 
121 
reasoning. Since reason can only function properly when not interfered 
with by the passions, it is important that general desires be calm. 
Otherwise the calculations on which they rest will be unreliable. 
This need for general desires to be calm does not ensure that they 
will be calm; but the mind's realization that general desires function 
more accurately in maximizing pleasure when they are not passionate, 
encourages us to keep them calm, and gives them added strength when 
they are so. 
Thirdly, the only way in which a particular desire can be 
stronger than a general desire is by being passionate. Thus the 
question of the control of particular desires by general desires 
becomes the question of how passionate desires can be controlled by 
calm desires. Or, in other words, how do we control our passions? 
Finally, for Hutcheson there are two desires at the most general 
level, benevolence and self-interest. General benevolence is founded 
on our desires for the good of others, self-interest is founded on 
our desires for our own good. Since Hutcheson provides no way of 
comparing the pleasures of others with our own pleasures, there is no 
way of calculating the maximization of the good which will result 
from a mixture of self-interested and benevolent desires. This means 
that for Hutcheson no general desire can be founded on a mixture of 
benevolent and self-interested desires, and it means that general 
benevolence and general self-interest can never be subsumed under an 
even more general desire. Hutcheson never attempts to use the 
controlling function of general desires as a solution to the problem 
of the conflict between self-interest and benevolence. This is 
basically because he does not think he has to. Rather he claims that 
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general self-interest and general benevolence never need to conflict. 
The role of general desires in controlling particular desires makes 
the question of how the two most general desires control or influence 
each other very important. I deal with their connexion in Chapter 5 
below; here I merely note the origin of the problem which Hutcheson's 
theory that our greatest self-interest lies in being benevolent is 
meant to solve. 
The relation between Hutcheson's theory of benevolence and his 
theory of the moral sense, is straightforward. The moral sense 
approves of actions which are motivated by benevolence. Or, in 
other words, actions motivated by benevolent desires can be said to 
be morally good. The moral sense approves of actions motivated either 
by particular benevolent desires, or by calm general desires, but it 
approves of the latter more than the former (cf. Inquiry, p. 183, 
this passage was added in the fourth edition; Essay, p. xvi, 32; 
System, p. 68-69). In the 'Inquiry' it is sometimes suggested that 
the moral sense controls which one of the benevolent desires motivates. 
But in the later works, the calm general benevolent desires control 
the particular ones, and the moral sense has no function in directly 
controlling desires or behaviour. The method by which the moral 
sense controls actions indirectly by way of influencing beliefs, is 
discussed below in Chapter 5. 
For Hutcheson, if a benevolent and a self-interested desire 
combine to motivate a particular action, then the moral worth of that 
action depends on the strength of the benevolent desire, a fact which 
is not influenced by the strength of the self-interested desire. In 
most cases, particularly when judging others, it will be very difficult 
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to establish the degree to which self-interest and benevolence are 
involved in the motivation of a particular act. In the early editions 
of the 'Inquiry', Hutcheson had provided mathematical equations for 
calculating the degree of benevolence involved by taking into account 
the self-interested desire and the motivation necessary for the act 
(Inquiry, 2nd edition, p. 182-188). He dropped this in later editions 
and in his later works, probably because of the realization that it 
is impossible to determine with any accuracy, and certainly not 
quantitatively, the various degrees of benevolence and self-interest 
. . 1 11 involved in particu ar acts. This point is not important for the 
theory that the moral sense approves benevolence, for the degree of 
the benevolence which motivates a particular act must be established 
by reason and not by the moral sense (Illustrations, p. 159). 
There are passages in Hutcheson's writings which may cause one 
to question that the moral sense approves only those actions motivated 
by benevolence; Hutcheson sometimes seems to suggest that the morality 
of actions depends not only on the motive, but on whether the action 
actually does enhance the happiness of the greatest number. Some 
modern commentators have accepted that for Hutcheson the morality of 
11. Bryson notes that Thomas Reid pointed out this error of Hutcheson's, 
and refers to a letter in the Transactions of the Royal Society 
(Vol. 45, 1748, p. 505-520) in which Reid discusses which sorts 
of quantities may be measured mathematically. The title of this 
letter says that it was "occasioned by reading a Treatise, in 
which simple and compound ratio's (sic) are applied to virtue 
and merit, ... ", but Hutcheson is not mentioned by name. Although 
this letter was not published till after Hutcheson's death, he 
possibly could have seen it, or similar communications of Reid's, 
before publishing the later editions of the 'Inquiry'; the letter 
as published was not directly from Reid, but via other people, 
and so may have been written long before publication. 
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actions depends on both the motive and the results.12 However, I am 
convinced that those passages which suggest that the moral sense 
approves of the actual consequences and not the intended consequences 
of the action, are the result of careless writing and do not represent 
Hutcheson's considered opinion. Other aspects of Hutcheson's theories 
substantiate this interpretation. For example, why does Hutcheson 
need to develop the indirect method by which the moral sense influences 
our actions (which I outline in Chapter 5 below), if the virtue of an 
action does not necessarily reside in the motive? If actions which 
actually enhance the greatest happiness for the greatest nmnbers are 
for that reason virtuous, then the desire to do virtuous actions is 
the desire to do actions which promote general happiness. But that 
desire just is benevolence itself, and is not the desire to have 
benevolent desires which Hutcheson in fact uses to explain how the 
moral sense can make us more virtuous. There is no need for this 
meta-desire theory if the virtue of actions does not consist entirely 
in their motive and not in their actual results. One can therefore 
conclude that those passages in which Hutcheson seems to suggest 
that the virtue of actions may depend on the actual results do not 
represent his considered opinion. 
Hutcheson's theory of benevolence requires one further comment, 
which also serves to introduce the topic of the next section. It 
will be remembered from the discussion of desires in Chapter 2 above, 
that for Hutcheson, desires differ from the passions by the fact that 
desires presuppose a belief about possible pleasures and pains, and 
passions do not. The central contention of Hutcheson's theory of 
benevolence is that desires can be caused in one person by beliefs 
12. Blackstone, p. 30-31. 
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about the possible pleasures and pains of another. And furthermore, 
that this causal link, and the resulting desire do not presuppose 
any beliefs about the first person's own self-interested pleasures. 
This contention had been questioned by Hobbes and others, a fact 
Hutcheson was well aware of, for he argued at length that those of 
Hobbes's persuasion on this point were in error. These arguments of 
Hutcheson's will be discussed in the next section. However, if the 
issue in those arguments is not stated as clearly as it is in this 
section, this is because it is primarily in the 'Inquiry' that 
Hutcheson argues against the egoists, and it is not until the 'Essay' 
that Hutcheson's theory of calm general benevolence becomes fully 
developed. To the arguments against the egoist we now turn. 
iii. Arguments against Hobbes and Mandeville 
Hutcheson's theory of the moral sense and benevolence presupposes 
that human nature actually does contain benevolent desires. That 
people of ten do actions which appear to be benevolent, no one has ever 
denied. However, there have been philosophers who have maintained 
that appearance in this case is misleading; that in fact all actions 
which appear to be motivated by benevolence are actually motivated by 
self-love. Normally, such philosophers have then proceeded to argue 
that, or explain how, morality is based on self-interest. Hutcheson 
felt it incumbent on himself to refute such arguments. Usually he 
does not specify whose theory he is refuting, and for my purposes it 
does not matter, but it is clearly Hobbes or some of Hobbes' disciples 
whom he has in mind. In the few passages where he does attribute some 
version of the theory to a particular individual, it is Mandeville who 
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is mentioned. I shall not attempt to establish the origins of the 
arguments Hutcheson is attacking, nor shall I attempt to establish 
that they are accurate versions of arguments which anyone ever held. 
I am only interested in how Hutcheson sets about defending his 
position from this line of attack as he sees it, and the light that 
his defence throws on the rest of his theory. Hutcheson uses in this 
defence many of the tenets he has established in other contexts, but 
r shall point out that on at least one important point (i.e. his 
attitude towards sympathy) his opinion seems to be determined by the 
f h . t . 14 requirements o is argumen against Hobbes. 
I shall ref er to those whom Hutcheson is arguing against as the 
egoists. It should be noticed that the issue is with psychological 
egoism: that is, in these arguments Hutcheson is concerned mainly 
to refute those who claim that man simply never does act from 
benevolence. To the ethical egoist, that is, to the person who 
maintains that one ought always to act from self-interest, Hutcheson's 
reply is an appeal to the moral sense. To those who claim that they 
just are going to act always in their own best interest while admitting 
that one can or even should be benevolent, Hutcheson replies with his 
proof that one's greatest happiness is to be found in being benevolent. 
15 These latter two arguments I deal with elsewhere; this section is 
concerned with the psychological egoist. 
The structure of the egoist's arguments determines the structure 
of Hutcheson's reply. The egoist does not deny that there are actions 
13. Cf. Inquiry, p. 124-125, and "Remarks on the Fable of the Bees". 
14. Cf. below, section 5-iv. 
15. Cf. above, chapter 3. 
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which appear benevolent; rather he claims that appearances are 
deceptive in these instances. The egoist's claim, therefore, depends 
on his ability to show convincingly how any particular benevolent-
appearing act is in fact self-interested. This reduction of apparent 
benevolence to self-interest has been attempted in a variety of ways 
by different philosophers and in different contexts. This means 
that Hutcheson cannot reply to the egoists simply by claiming that a 
certain type of action is benevolent; that will always leave open 
the possibility of the egoist performing his reduction on that sort 
of act. The only way that Hutcheson can reply to the egoist is 
by showing that the various types of procedures the egoist uses for 
his reductions do not in fact work. This means that Hutcheson must 
reply to each of the procedures separately and hence that he can 
never produce a single argument which refutes all forms of psychological 
egoism. It also means that there is always the possibility of a new 
type of egoistic reduction which Hutcheson has not replied to, but 
I will not discuss any recent developments in this debate because my 
purpose in dealing with this topic is only to throw light on certain 
aspects of Hutcheson's thought. Hutcheson was aware that he had to 
reply to the various egoistic arguments separately; he explicitly 
points this out in the 'System': "But very different and contrary 
accounts are given, by these authors, of the private enjoyments and 
happiness pursued in the of fices we comroc>nly repute virtuous" (System, 
p. 39). This explains the great multitude of different arguments 
. k 16 against egoism scattered throughout his wor s. 
16. The main passages are: Inquiry, p. 105-165; Essay, P· 8-26, 
p. 86; Illustrations, p. 116-119; Introduction, p. 20, P· 304; 
System, p. 38-52, p. 75-76. 
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In understanding Hutcheson's various a rguments it is important 
to notice the sort of benevolent desire which Hutcheson is defending. 
He is not defending desires for states of affairs or events which are 
viewed as objectively valuable - objective reasons as a recent writer 
17 
has called them. Nor is he def ending directly a calm desire for 
the general good of mankind. He appears to think that these more 
difficult tasks are not necessary to refute the egoist. It is only 
the existence of particular benevolent desires which Hutcheson is 
trying to establish.
18 
This is a legitimate procedure for Hutcheson 
even though he elsewhere claims that it is calm general benevolence 
which is morally approved. Since he views general desires as nothing 
other than the maximization of particular desires, if there are 
particular benevolent desires then there is at least the possibility 
of a general benevolent desire. It is thus acceptable for Hutcheson 
to establish particular benevolence against the egoist's denial of 
altruism. 
In his long argument against the egoist in the 'Inquiry' (p. 105-
165), Hutcheson divides his opponents into two types; those who claim 
that all actions are done from self-interest, and also claim that we 
approve virtuous actions because they are in our interests; and, on 
the other hand, those who admit that moral approval is not reducible 
to self-interest, but claim that all motivation is from self-interest. 
In other words, there are those who claim that both moral approval and 
17. Cf. Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism. Since for Nagel, 
reasons can motivate, reasons play a similar sort of role in his 
philosophy as desires play in Hutcheson's. It is interesting to 
note that Nagel's reasons and Hutcheson's desires are both 
closely linked with beliefs. 
18. For a recent defence of this approach as applied to the ethical 
egoist, cf. B. Williams, Problems of the Self, paper 15, "Egoism 
and Altruism", p. 250-265. 
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benevolence are reducible to self-interest, and those who think 
benevolence is and moral approval is not so reducible (Inquiry, p. lOS). 
The first chapter of the 'Inquiry' deals with the reduction of moral 
approval to self-interest. It is perhaps a bit of a digression for 
me to deal with this question, relating as it does to the moral sense, 
in a chapter on benevolence, but Hutcheson uses the independence of 
moral approval as a step in his argument against the psychological 
egoist. I will return to the argument in defence of benevolence 
after conunenting on the argument in defence of the objectivity of 
moral approval. 
Hutcheson spends most of the first chapter of the 'Inquiry' 
establishing that our moral approval is not the same as, and is not 
reducible to, our approval of what is in our own interests; he also 
often returns to this point throughout the rest of his works. His 
main argument, which he presents in various forms to meet various 
types of reductions, is that we are directly aware by reflection on 
particular examples that our moral and self-interested attitudes are 
different from each other. "That the perceptions of moral good and 
evil, are perfectly different from those of natural good or advantage, 
everyone must convince himself, by reflecting upon the different 
manner in which he finds himself affected when these objects occur to 
him." (Inquiry, p. 111). 
In replying to each of the various methods of reducing moral 
approval to self-interest, Hutcheson's procedure is to present an 
example in which moral approval favours one act and our self-interest 
favours another. On Hutcheson's own theory, this means finding an 
example of a situation in which the pursuit of the general good would 
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entail a different act than that most in the agent's interest. In 
practice, however, Hutcheson in this chapter tends not to appeal to 
general benevolence specifically, but relies on the plausibility of 
our approving the sort of action normally approved of: kindness, 
heroism, statesmanship, etc. Hutcheson's own statement of his 
procedure is to be found hear the beginning of this chapter. There 
he explains that the correct approach is to think of examples in 
which self-interest and morality are separate: 
"In our sentiments of actions which affect ourselves, 
there is indeed a mixture of the ideas of natural 
and moral good, which require some attention to 
separate them. But when we reflect upon the actions 
which affect other persons only, we may observe the 
moral ideas unrnix'd with those of natural good or evil." 
(Inquiry, p. 114). 
Since most of the arguments in this chapter use basically the same 
techniques, I will only give one example of how the procedure works. 
In section IV, Hutcheson considers the argument that we approve of 
actions aimed towards the general good because since we are part of 
society, the general good rebounds to our private benefit. He 
replies to this by asking us to consider an example in which our 
self-interest is not involved; for example, consider the case of a 
past or distant society. Here the general good is not in our interest, 
for we are not members of the society in question. But we still 
approve of morally good acts performed by members of that society. 
Thus by considering an example where our self-interest is not involved, 
we can see that moral and self-interest approval are distinct. Perhaps 
this point is made even more forcefully if we consider a case where 
our self-interest is involved, but in which it leads to different 
approval than the moral sense. Consider the finding of a buried Greek 
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treasure (Inquiry, p. 119); the miser who buried it acted greatly 
to our advantage, but yet we do not confer the same approval on his 
action as we do on the actions of Greek heroes even th h d , oug we o not 
benefit from the latter and we do from the former. All of these 
arguments rest on the assumption that we do approve morally of the 
actions which Hutcheson suggests we do. But this would not normally 
be denied by Hutcheson's opponents, though they may of course object 
to particular examples. His opponents are not arguing that we do not 
approve morally; they are arguing that normal moral approval is 
reducible to self-interest. Hutcheson is replying to various suggested 
reductions by giving examples where normal moral approval and self-
interested approval diverge. So his assuming normal moral approval 
is not a begging of the question. 
I think that it should be noted here precisely what it is that 
Hutcheson has proved. In showing that the dictates of self-interest 
and the perceptions of the moral sense sometimes diverge or even 
conflict, Hutcheson has shown that self-interest and morality are 
two different things. They have to be different if they are to give 
rise to different views of the same actions. However, Hutcheson has 
not shown that self-interest does not affect the moral sense. Even 
if self-interest and morality conflict on an issue, it is still 
logically possible that the perceptions of the moral sense would have 
been different if self-interest was not involved at all. Hutcheson 
presents no argument to eliminate this possibility, a fact which I will 
mention again later in this section. 
Hutcheson sometimes resorts to forms of argumentation other than 
those in which he invites us to consider examples in which self-interest 
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and moral approval diverge. For example, he points out that our 
rroral approval does not depend on our seeing the connexion between 
the approved action and our interests. We all approve of virtuous 
actions, but we do not all have the philosophical abilities to perform 
the reduction to self-interest. "But must a man have the reflection 
of Cumberland or Pufendorf, to admire generosity, faith, humanity, 
gratitude?" (Inquiry, p. 119). Or again, he argues that we do not 
approve of virtue because of God's promised rewards, on the grounds 
that even atheists sometimes approve morally (Inquiry, p. 122). But 
all these arguments, whether by example or otherwise, rest on an 
attempt to separate moral approval from self-interest in such a way 
that the egoist's reduction of the one to the other must fail. 
I think that Hutcheson's approach can show that moral and self-
interested approval are not the same thing; one should always with a 
little imagination be able to think of an example in which the act we 
morally disapprove of is the act most in our interest. But Hutcheson 
does not seem to rest his case on the claim that moral approval and 
self-interest are distinct. He draws the further much stronger and 
m::>re questionable conclusion that self-interest does not bias our 
moral opinions. His main argument for this is the claim that the 
m::>ral sense cannot be bribed (Inquiry, p. 121). I do not think 
anyone has ever suggested that one's moral opinions could be swayed 
by self-interest in so crude a fashion as bribery, and Hutcheson does 
not deal with more subtle versions of biased moral belief. But he 
seems to think that he has proved that moral approval is beyond the 
bias of self-interest altogether; he thinks that our own interests 
have no more effect on our moral perceptions than anyone else's 
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interests. This passage is typical: 
"But no interest to myself, will make me appr . ove 
an action as morally good, which without that 
interest to myself, would have appear'd morall 
evil; if upon computing its whole effects, it y 
appears to produce as great a moment of good in 
the whole, when it is not beneficial to me, as 
it did before, when it was. In our sense of moral 
good or evil, our own private advantage or loss 
is of no more moment, than the advantage or loss 
of a third person, to make an action appear good 
or evil. This sense therefore cannot be over-
balanc' d by interest. How ridiculous an attempt 
would it be, to engage a man by rewards or 
threatnings into a good opinion of an action, 
which was contrary to his moral notions?" 
(Inquiry, p. 123-124). 
The significance, for the other aspects of Hutcheson's theory, 
of the claim that the moral sense cannot be biased by self-interest 
has been discussed elsewhere in this thesis. 19 Briefly, it means 
that Hutcheson must locate the source of moral error in our opinions 
of the nature of the actions rather than in the perceptions of the 
moral sense. It also means that Hutcheson did not have to develop 
the impartial spectator theory, although the rudiments of that theory 
are to be found in his writings. Why does one need to consider the 
impartial spectator if the moral sense is completely beyond the 
influence of our self-love? The point I wish to make here is that 
the opinion which has these rather far-reaching implications for 
Hutcheson's philosophy, comes from his attempts to refute the view 
that moral approval is reducible to self-interest. Furthermore, I 
wish to suggest that Hutcheson has made an error here. What he needs 
to prove, and what his arguments do in fact prove, is that moral 
approval and self-interested approval are two different things in the 
19. Cf. above, chapter 3, sec. ii. 
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sense that moral approval is not just the approval of what is in our 
own interests. What he has not proved, what he does not need to 
prove to refute the egoists, but what he thinks he has proved, is 
that moral approval cannot be biased at all by self-interest. The 
moral sense can be influenced by our self-interest because our own 
interests count as much as anyone else's, assuming equal merit. 
But, as the long quotation above makes clear, Hutcheson thinks that 
the moral sense cannot be biased by our self-interest, for the 
influence on our moral sense of own own interests is no greater than 
that of the interests of anyone else: "In our sense of moral good or 
evil, our own private advantage or loss is of no more moment, than the 
advantage or loss of a third person, to make an action appear good or 
evil." (Inquiry, p. 123-124). Hutcheson's arguments as I have outlined 
them above do not prove this; they merely prove that self-interest and 
moral approval are not the same thing. 
Hutcheson's conclusion that moral approval is independent of 
self-interest is used in one of his arguments against the psychological 
egoists. I wish now to consider his arguments to prove that human 
nature does contain benevolent desires, and that people do in fact 
sometimes act out of concern for the interests of others. As I 
mentioned above, it is particular benevolent desires that Hutcheson 
wishes to establish. I have also mentioned that Hutcheson must reply 
to each type of egoist's reduction; he does not have a single 
refutation of all forms of psychological egoism. 
A word on Hutcheson's texts must be inserted here. Hutcheson 
presents his arguments against the egoists in the 'Inquiry', Section 
II; the 'Essay', Section I; and the 'System', Chapter 3. Each of these 
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presentations uses very much the same approach; the development of 
Hutcheson's philosophy did not greatly influence these arguments, 
perhaps because the point of these arguments is to prove the existence 
of particular benevolent desires, and such desires were part of his 
philosophy from the start. However, Hutcheson became much clearer in 
the presentation of his position. This is best seen by comparing the 
d h f h d
. . 20 
second an t e ourt e 1t1ons of the 'Inquiry'. Hutcheson 
substantially rewrote Section II between these two editions, and it is 
perhaps worth noting the major changes. Firstly, it is most striking 
that he has rearranged the order of the numbered sub-sections, and 
sometimes of paragraphs within these. The reason for this would appear 
to be that he is clearer on the structure of his argument. In the 
fourth edition, he largely rewrote sub-sections IV and v (Inquiry, 
p. 138-150). In the later edition, these begin with the phrase "There 
are two ways in which some may deduce benevolence from self-love ... " 
It is the difference between these two types of reductionist claims 
that Hutcheson is clearer on by the fourth edition, and which caused 
him to revise this chapter. However, the difference between the types 
of reductions is found as early as the 'Essay', although in a much 
less clear presentation. 
The other differences between the second and the fourth editions 
are largely in bringing his terminology and references to other aspects 
of his theory into line with his later opinions. For example, in the 
first version of the 'Inquiry', Hutcheson tends to confuse the moral 
sense and benevolence, partly because he tries to use the terms "love 
of complacence" and "love of benevolence". He is later much clearer 
20. The fourth edition dates from 1738, and hence was published about 
the same time that Hutcheson was writing the System. Cf. Scott, 
p. 210. 
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on the difference, and so adds to the fourth edition a couple of 
sentences to make this difference clearer: "Complacence denotes 
approbation of any person by our moral sense; and is rather a perception 
than an affection; tho' the affection of good-will is ordinarily 
subsequent to it. Benevolence is the desire of the happiness of 
another" (Inquiry, p. 135). The development of Hutcheson's thought 
in general is discussed elsewhere in this thesis; the changes in this 
chapter of the 'Inquiry' are generally in conformity with these. 
However, I will later in this section quote one remark from the 
second edition which was dropped in the fourth edition where the 
reason for this is not clear. The following discussion follows mainly 
the fourth edition of the 'Inquiry', but reference will also be made 
to the 'Essay' and the 'System'. 
Hutcheson decides that there are basically two sorts of methods 
by which the egoists have attempted to reduce benevolence to self-
interest. Some argue that "we voluntarily bring this affection upon 
ourselves, whenever we have an opinion that it will be for our interest 
to have this affection ••• " (Inquiry, p. 138). Others argue that "our 
minds (are) determined by the frame of their nature to desire whatever 
is apprehended as the means of any private happiness; •.• They alledge 
it to be impossible to desire either the happiness of another, or any 
event whatsoever, without conceiving it as the means of some happiness 
or pleasure to ourselves" (Inquiry, p. 138-139). In other words 
some argue that self-interest gives us grounds for wanting to have 
benevolent desires, and others argue that self-interest causes us to 
want other people to be happy. The first is a desire for a desire 
(i.e. benevolence) and the second a desire for a state of affairs 
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(i.e. the happiness of others). 
Against the claim that we decide to have benevolent feelings 
because it is in our interests to do so, Hutcheson points out that 
tw ibl . f h . t . . . f . 21 o poss e views o w y i is in our interests rest on con usions. 
Firstly, we cannot desire a desire so that we can have the pleasure 
which is concomitant with that desire. Hutcheson's main argument on 
this point is that desires are not normally accompanied by pleasure; 
if accompanied with any sensation, it is usually an uneasy feeling. 
" ... desire of the good of others, which we approve as virtuous, 
cannot be alledged to be voluntarily raised from the prospect of any 
pleasure accompanying the affection itself: for 'tis plain that our 
benevolence is not always accompanied with pleasure; nay, 'tis often 
attended with pain, when the object is in distress" (Inquiry, p. 140). 
Nor do we desire benevolence for the pleasure of removing any uneasiness 
which may accompany the desire. This cannot be the case for 
Hutcheson because desires are distinct from, and are not necessarily 
accompanied by, uneasiness (cf. Essay, p. 44). This view involves a 
rejection of Locke's suggestion that the motivating force of a desire 
has its origins in wanting to get rid of the accompanying uneasiness 
(Essay, p. 24); Hutcheson's analysis of desire separates the desire 
(which is a simple idea), from any accompanying sensations.
22 
Since 
any uneasiness is the result of having the desire, not the other way 
around, Hutcheson concludes that a desire cannot be "raised with a 
view to remove this uneasy sensation, for the desire is· raised 
previously to it" (Essay, p. 16). 
21. The best presentation of these two arguments is in Essay p. 16-17. 
22. Cf. above, chapter 2, sec. ii-c. 
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Secondly, we cannot have a self-interested desire for benevolent 
desires which is grounded in the expectation of the pleasure of 
satisfying those benevolent desires. This cannot be for Hutcheson 
because he has distinguished the object of desires from the pleasures 
of satisfying desires, and further pointed out that, as Jensen puts 
it, "it is logically impossible for a desire to have as its object 
. . f. . .. 23 its own grati ication. Hutcheson uses the argument that if we could 
raise desires simply for the pleasure of the gratification, then "the 
strongest desires might arise toward any trifle, or an event in all 
respects indifferent" (Essay, p. 17). 
It may be noted that the arguments in the above two paragraphs 
have the form of Hutcheson refuting a particular attempt to reduce 
benevolence to self-interest by ref erring to a distinction he draws in 
his analysis of desire; in the first case he uses his distinction 
between desires and any accompanying sensations, and in the second 
case he uses his distinction between the object of a desire and the 
pleasures of satisfying that desire. 
Hutcheson rejects a third self-interested reason which one might 
have for creating the desire of doing good for others. He points 
out that if we attempt to create benevolence with the view to gaining 
the self-approbation of the moral sense, then in fact the moral sense 
will not approve of such self-interest (Inquiry, p. 142). His next 
argument tries to undermine the whole procedure of claiming that we 
create benevolent desires for reasons of self-interest.· He argues 
that we simply cannot create desires in ourselves for any reason 
whatsoever. This he views as an empirical claim, but one which can 
23. Jensen, p. 17. 
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be tested by imagining our reaction to being offered a bribe to have 
a want. The bribe might create a want for the want, but we could 
not generate the basic want itself. Thus he concludes that "neither 
benevolence nor any other affection or desire can be directly raised 
by volition" (Inquiry, p. 139) • 
It might appear that these two arguments contradict a theory 
that Hutcheson has expounded at length elsewhere. As I will describe 
in Chapter 5, 'On Motivation', Hutcheson argues that the pleasures of 
a virtuous life are greater than any of the other pleasures of which 
men are capable. He is careful not to give the impression that he is 
arguing that one should be benevolent out of self-interest, but the 
question arises: Are the arguments I outlined in the previous 
paragraph equally as critical of Hutcheson himself as they are of the 
egoist? Does the apparent conflict between the above arguments and 
Hutcheson's own desire-of-desire theory imply that Hutcheson has 
contradicted himself? 
Hutcheson seems to have been aware of this problem, or at least 
he became so by the time he wrote the corrections for the fourth 
edition of the 'Inquiry'. To his consideration of the view that the 
promised rewards of a deity may provide a self-interested motive for 
wanting benevolent feelings, he adds a sentence pointing out that such 
a self-interested motive may be the indirect cause of benevolent 
desires; "The prospect of a future state, may, no doubt, have a 
greater indirect influence, by turning our attention to the qualities 
in the objects naturally apt to raise the required affection, than any 
other consideration" (Inquiry, p. 143). This suggestion that self-
interest may cause benevolent desires indirectly, and that this does 
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not contradict the critique he gives on the direct reduction of 
benevolence to self-interest, is the view he takes when explaining 
why he argues for the pleasures of virtue. Even the example of 
turning our attention to qualities "apt to raise the required 
affection" is repeated elsewhere. This whole theory of self-interest 
as the indirect cause of benevolence is discussed below in Chapter 5: 
the point to be made here is that the theory of indirect causation 
does not contradict Hutcheson's critique of the direct reduction of 
benevolence to self-interest. This may seem like a sophistical point 
until one considers in detail what Hutcheson is suggesting. He is 
claiming that if we simply decide to have benevolent desires from 
considerations of self-interest, then benevolence is reducible to 
self-interest; this reduction he rejects. On the other hand, self-
interest may draw our attention to the needs of others, and noticing 
these needs will automatically cause benevolent desires to arise; this 
does not constitute a reduction of benevolence to self-interest. The 
reason this avoids the reduction is that the indirect influence of 
self-interest on benevolence presupposes that benevolent desires are 
caused simply by being aware of the needs of others. Hutcheson 
added the following sentence to the fourth edition, making this view 
clear: "To raise benevolence, no more is required than calmly to 
consider any sensitive nature not pernicious to others" (Inquiry, 
p. 137). This means that benevolent desires must be inherent in human 
nature when one is aware of the needs of others. But that is 
precisely the view the egoist is arguing against. Hence the egoist 
cannot use the indirect method of reducing benevolence to self-interest, 
and Hutcheson's critique of the direct reduction does not contradict 
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his use of the indirect reduction in his own theory. 
Not all of the egoist's reductions of benevolence to self-interest 
try to show that we choose to have benevolent desires because it is 
in our interests to do so. Some egoists have argued that we desire 
the happiness of others because their happiness is a means to our own 
happiness. Hutcheson gives three arguments against this form of 
reducing benevolence to self-interest. 
Firstly, some egoists have suggested that the happiness of others 
is in our interests because we sympathize with the pleasures and pains 
of others. The pleasures and pains of others become in small degree 
our pleasures and pains, thus giving us an interest in the feelings 
of others. Hutcheson rejects this view. In his earlier works he 
considers this topic under the name of 'public sense'; in the 'System', 
he uses the term 'sympathy'. He has basically three arguments to show 
that "sympathy can never account for all kind affections, tho' it is 
no doubt a natural principle and a beautiful part of our constitution" 
(System, p. 47). He argues that the degree of benevolent feelings 
is not proportional to the feelings of others, so there must be 
factors other than sympathy involved in benevolence (System, p. 47-48). 
Further, men demonstrate that they wish the happiness of others even 
when they know they will not see that happiness; the wishes of dying 
men are often in this category. If they know they will not share the 
happiness they want for the other person, then their desire cannot be a 
desire for the pleasure of sympathizing with the happiness of that 
24 
other person. Finally, the desire to help others cannot be caused 
24. Essay, p. 23, System, p. 48. 
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by the self-interested desire to remove the uneasy feeling we have 
at seeing others in distress. This self-interested desire might just 
as well result in a desire to avoid seeing those in distress. We 
. h 1 k th h h h h 1 . 25 mig t oo e ot er way rat er t an e ping. Thus benevolent 
desires are not reducible to self-interest by way of sympathy. 
Hutcheson also argues that the possibility of benevolence is 
26 
presupposed by moral approval. This is not to beg the question, 
for first, he has already established separately that there is moral 
approval independent of self-interest; second, many egoists will admit 
moral approval, they only question whether man is ever benevolent. 
Hutcheson's point is quite simply that since only benevolence is 
morally approved, then there must be benevolence which is not reducible 
to self-interest if there is to be any moral approval. If the egoist 
is right about all actions being motivated by self-interest, then 
all moral approval will automatically cease when this is realized. 
This argument is designed to prove that one cannot accept moral approval 
and simultaneously deny that there is benevolence. This is why 
Hutcheson divides his oppopents into those who deny only benevolence, 
and those who deny both benevolence and disinterested moral approval. 
It now appears that the first sort of egoist has an untenable position; 
he must deny either both moral approval and benevolence, or neither 
of them. The two stand or fall together. This explains why Hutcheson 
was concerned first to prove that there is moral approval; that there 
is benevolence follows therefrom. It spould be noted that the argument 
by itself does not prove that there is benevolence; it only proves that 
25. Inquiry, p. 147, Essay, p. 22. 
26. Inquiry, p. 146, p. 157-159, Essay, p. 21-22. 
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one must accept the possibility of benevolence if one is going to 
pass moral judgement. The argument seems to be correct if it is 
actual benevolence and not apparent benevolence that one morally 
approves of. 
Hutcheson also uses an argument which is of ten attributed to 
Bishop Butler. In connexion with the suggestion that we desire the 
happiness of those we love (e.g. our children) because their happiness 
gives us pleasure, Hutcheson points out that the fact that we share 
their happiness presupposes that we are concerned for them. Thus the 
desire for their happiness cannot be a desire for our own happiness, 
for the possibility of our getting pleasure from their happiness 
presupposes the benevolent desire for their good. Perhaps Hutcheson 
makes the point better himself: 
"But say some of our philosophers, 'The happiness 
of their children gives parents pleasure, and their 
misery gives them pain; and therefore to obtain the 
former, and avoid the latter, they study, from self-
love, the good of their children.' .•. but whence 
the conjunction of interest between parent and child? 
Do the child's sensations given pleasure or pain to 
the parent? Is the parent hungry, thirsty, sick, 
when his children are so? No; but his naturally 
implanted desire of their good, and aversion to 
their misery, makes him affected with joy or sorrow 
from their pleasures or pains. This desire then is 
antecedent to the conjunction of interest, and the 
cause of it, not the effect: it then must be 
disinterested." (Inquiry, p. 160-161).27 
One must conclude from the discussion in this section that 
Hutcheson has presented a number of powerful arguments to prove the 
egoist wrong. One cannot conclude that he has proved that there are 
27. Inquiry, p. 160-161. It is questionable that Hutcheson borrowed 
this argument from Butler, for it is presented in the second 
edition of the Inquiry, (p. 155-6) as well as the fourth. There 
is no change between the editions in this passage. 
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benevolent desires in men, but he has shown that the egoist's 
reduction of apparent benevolence to self-interest rests on certain 
important confusions. When this has been done, the empirical evidence 
speaks for itself, and the evidence does in fact indicate that concern 
for others can motivate. In explicating the confusions of the egoist, 
Hutcheson has drawn on several of the distinctions he has made in his 
analysis of desires. For example, he has used the distinction between 
desires and accompanying sensations, and between the object of desires 
and the pleasures of their satisfaction. I think one must agree that 
once one is clear on these aspects of human desire, then many of the 
egoist's arguments are seen to be confused. 
But how can the concerns of others become the motive for one's 
actions? Hutcheson considers this question in the second edition 
of the 'Inquiry', but he dropped this passage in the fourth edition. 
It is not clear why, but perhaps it was because the last line gives 
the impression that benevolence is a passion or instinct, and Hutcheson 
later became convinced that it was a desire, which is something quite 
distinct. In the second edition he says: 
"If any enquire, 'Whence arises this love of esteem, 
or benevolence, to good men, or to mankind in general, 
if not from some nice views of self-interest? Or, how 
we can be mov'd to desire the happiness of others, 
without any view to our own?' It may be answer'd, 
'That the same cause which determines us to pursue 
happiness for ourselves, determines us both to esteem 
and benevolence on their proper occasions; even the 
very frame of our nature, or a generous instinct, •.. " 
(Inquiry, 2nd edition, p. 142). 
One comment must be added to this·quotation. What does it involve, 
on Hutcheson's theory, for the interests of others to be the motive 
for our actions? Elsewhere I have discussed how desires are caused 
by our beliefs about possible pleasures and pains. It would now appear 
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that such beliefs need not be about our own pleasures and pains. 
Beliefs about the possible pleasures and pains of one person can 
cause desires in another. This is what is entailed by Hutcheson's 
claim that human nature contains benevolent desires. 
Appendix: 'Remarks on the Fable of the Bees' 
These three letters are concerned to prove that Mandeville's 
dictum "Private vices, public virtue" is erroneous. They give an 
indication of how Hutcheson could use aspects of his moral theory to 
refute more specific moral claims. In the first letter, Hutcheson 
argues that the public good does not consist in excessive luxury, and 
indulgence. Rather it consists in the satisfaction of basic appetites, 
and the maximizing of the satisfaction of the rest of our desires. 
It is essential if this maximizing is to function properly, that every 
one have a clear idea of what will bring them happiness. Failure to 
have correct opinions will lead us to pursue the wrong ends. "What 
then remains, in order to public happiness after the necessary supply 
of all appetites, must be to study, as much as possible, to regulate 
our desires of every kind, by forming just opinions of the real value 
of their several objects, so as to have the strength of our desires 
proportioned to the real value of them, and their moment to our 
happiness. 1128 Hutcheson then argues that private vices tend to 
generate false opinions of what constitutes happiness. The vices of 
luxury, pride, drunkenness, etc. are all based on false opinions of 
happiness, and hence as such tend to disrupt the pursuit of the 
28. Remarks on 'The Fable of the Bees', p. 45. 
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general good. This claim that correct morality is linked with 
correct beliefs about what will lead to happiness, is one of the 
central tennets of Hutcheson's philosophy. 
In the second lette~, Hutcheson turns his attention to Mandeville's 
claim that indulging in private vices generates demand for material 
objects and thus encourages trade and industry which are to the good 
of the public. Hutcheson replies that private vice is the excessive 
pursuit of objects; the consumption of goods is itself not evil. He 
then claims that if there were no private vice, the money not thus 
spent would be spent anyway on the sort of goods the consumption of 
which is not evil. This implies that the money spent, and hence the 
good to trade and industry, would be the same whether or not the 
:rroney was spent in a fashion which constituted private vice. In 
modern terms, one might restate Hutcheson's claim as saying that 
private vice does not increase the money supply, and therefore does 
not help the economy any more than the same amount of money spent in 
a virtuous fashion. 
Hutcheson's third letter is mostly a polemic on Mandeville's 
arrogance, and the confusions in Mandeville' s thought which make that 
arrogance so little justified. But towards the end, he returns to the 
claim that Mandeville has misunderstood the nature of private vice. 
He claims that Mandeville's position necessarily involves viewing 
virtue as the denial of self-interest - which virtue is not for 
Hutcheson. If virtue is viewed as the pursuit of the good of others, 
whether or not it conflicts with self-interest, and vice is viewed as 
harming others, then self-interest by itself becomes ethically neutral. 
This undermines Mandeville's argument, for the "Fable of the Bees" 
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is founded on the opinion that vice consists in the pursuit of one's 
own interests. Mandeville, he says, "has probably been struck with 
some old fanatic sermon upon self-denial in his youth, and can never 
get it out of his head since. It is absolutely impossible upon his 
scheme that God himself can make a being naturally disposed to virtue: 
for virtue is 'self-denial and acting against the impulse of nature. 11129 
'Ihus two of Hutcheson's main arguments against Mandeville are that 
Mandeville has misunderstood the nature of both private vice and 
public virtue. When vice and virtue are understood on Hutcheson's 
model, the paradox of private vices resulting in the public good does 
not arise. 
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iv. Benevolence, Utilitarianism and Rights 
Those familiar with the history of British moral philosophy in 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries may be wondering 
why I have not previously mentioned utilitarianism in this chapter 
on what is actually of moral value for Hutcheson. Did not Hutcheson 
coin the phrase which became the slogan of utilitarianism? Did he 
not influence Hume, and through Hume the other utilitarians, on the 
central tenet of the utilitarians' creed? The answer to both of 
these questions is probably yes, but this thesis is not about the 
historical influence of Hutcheson; if it were, utilitarian doctrines 
would have a more prominent position. Rather, this thesis is about 
Hutcheson's moral philosophy in itself. Given that, the absence of 
a discussion of utilitarianism is explained quite simply by the fact 
that Hutcheson was not a utilitarian. I mean this not in the historical 
sense that he was not a member of that school, but in the sense that 
he did not subscribe to the main doctrine in virtue of which a 
utilitarian is a utilitarian. This suggestion is, I think, sufficiently 
curious to warrant a short explanation of why I think it is true. 
In his book on the English (sic) utilitarians, (in which, 
incidentally, Hutcheson is not discussed), Plamenatz proposes a 
definition of 'utilitarianism' which he thinks is an adequate framework 
for discussing utilitarianism, though he does not maintain that it 
precisely fits all the utilitarians. It is, I think, a sufficient 
definition for the present purpose of seeing why Hutcheson does not 
belong as a member of that school. Plamenatz lists four propositions 
which he thinks all the utilitarians accept in some form. 
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Since Hutcheson would disagree with the first of these and with the 
reason for the third, and since he would qualify the second, it 
follows that his theory differs fundamentally from utilitarianism. 
The first three of Plamenatz's propositions read as follows: 
"(i) Pleasure is alone good or desirable for its 
own sake; or else men call only those things good 
that are pleasant or a means to what is pleasant. 
(ii) The equal pleasures of any two or m:>re men 
are equally good. (iii) No action is right unless 
it appears to the agent to be the action most 
likely, under the circumstances, to produce the 
greatest happiness; or else men do not call any 
action right unless it is one of a type that 
usually produces the greatest happiness possible 
under the circumstances. 11 30 
These propositions could be given various interpretations, and 
the utilitarians Plamenatz deals with all have slightly different 
views on the main tenets of their creed. I do not wish to maintain 
that the above interpretation has any merits other than as a device 
for explicating an aspect of Hutcheson's philosophy. For this purpose, 
it does not matter if my claim that Hutcheson is not a utilitarian 
is questioned by questioning my conception of the utilitarian 
doctrine, as long as Hutcheson's position on the central issue is 
clear and uncontentious. 
The first of Plamenatz's propositions says that pleasure, or 
happiness, is what is of ultimate value: (ultimate because it is 
desirable for its own sake). The goodness of happiness is not 
qualified in this proposition by any conditions on how or why the 
happiness might come about. Presumably then, and this is probably 
an accurate account of the thinking of most utilitarians, it does 
not matter whether the happiness results from accidental factors, good 
30. Plamenatz, p. 2. 
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intentions, or even bad intentions gone wrong. 
, 
Whether it is the 
result of natural accident, or human action, happiness is valuable 
in itself. 
Hutcheson would not agree with this first proposition. Pleasure, 
regardless of its source, Hutcheson calls 'natural good'; " •.. nothing 
is advantageous or naturally good to us, but what is apt to raise 
pleasure mediately, or immediately." (Inquiry, p. 107). But natural 
good is not the only good for Hutcheson. There is also moral good, 
which is a quite different thing and which Hutcheson is very careful 
to distinguish from natural good, (cf. Inquiry, p. 106). Therefore, 
pleasure is not alone good or desirable for its own sake. Benevolence 
is also an ultimate good, and is desirable for its own sake. (Later, 
Hutcheson adds individual perfection as an ultimate good.) 
To this suggestion that benevolence as well as pleasure is an 
ultimate good for Hutcheson, it might be objected that benevolence 
is only of value on his theory because of the pleasure it gives us 
through the moral sense. Hutcheson indeed maintains that we know 
the value of benevolence because of a type of pleasure it gives us, 
but that does not affect the point I am making at the moment. The 
important point is that for Hutcheson benevolence is an ultimate good, 
and that we do not desire benevolence simply as the means to the 
pleasures of the moral sense. Hutcheson is, of course, very emphatic 
in asserting that we do not desire benevolence only as a means to 
pleasure, for he has to maintain this to make his case against the 
egoists. I conclude that even though the pleasures of the moral sense 
are essential to our knowing the value of benevolence, benevolence is 
still an ultimate good for Hutcheson, and is not desired only as a 
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means to pleasure. The distinction between what is of value, 
(in Hutcheson's theory, benevolence), and how we know what is of 
value, (by the pleasures of the moral sense), is, I hope, a clear 
one, for it is presupposed by the present discussion. I will have 
more to say below on the difference between Hutcheson and the 
utilitarians on how we know what is morally of value; at the moment 
I will return to the question of what is in fact of value. 
The second proposition requires little conunent, except to note 
that Hutcheson would accept it only with the qualification that the 
relative dignity of men must be taken into account. 
The third proposition says that an action is right if it is 
intended to promote the greatest possible happiness; presumably, 
'right' here means morally right. With this, Hutcheson would agree; 
an action which is morally right for him is one which is motivated 
by calm general benevolence, and any action so motivated will 
obviously be "the action most likely, under the circumstances, to 
produce the greatest happiness". 
But why are these actions right for Hutcheson, and why are they 
right for the utilitarians? For Hutcheson, benevolent actions just 
are morally right in themselves; they are not right because they are 
the means to a morally good end, nor can their rightness be justified 
31 in any other way. Our moral sense approves directly of them and 
they are therefore immediately (not mediately) good. 
The utilitarians would differ on this point. Fo~ them, proposition 
31. Cf. above, chapter 3, section iii. This claim that benevolent 
actions are right in themselves without reference to any other 
end, must not be confused with the assertion that we know that 
benevolence is good by means of the moral sense. 
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iii is a corollary of propositions i and ii. Actions intended to 
enhance the greatest happiness are right because happiness is alone 
of ultimate value and it is irrelevant whose happiness it is. For 
the utilitarians, the pursuit of general happiness is of moral value 
because happiness is of value; for Hutcheson, the pursuit of general 
happiness is of moral value without justification because the moral 
sense approves of benevolence. The difference between Hutcheson and 
the utilitarians on this point revolves around the distinction between 
general happiness and the pursuit of general happiness. For Hutcheson, 
'general benevolence' means the pursuit of general happiness, and it 
is this pursuit which is of general value. The utilitarians, on the 
other hand, only value this pursuit because they value the goal; 
that is, they value general happiness first, and value the pursuit of 
general happiness as a means of obtaining that goal. Here, and in 
many places in this theory, it must be remembered that for Hutcheson 
benevolence is a desire which may motivate action, but it is not the 
object or goal of such actions. General happiness is a state of 
affairs; benevolence is the desire to bring about that state of 
affairs. Hutcheson places ultimate value on benevolence, the 
utilitarians place ultimate value on general happiness. 
Thus we find that Hutcheson would have disagreed with the first 
of Plamenatz's propositions, qualified the second, and disagreed 
with the reason for the third. For the utilitarians, happiness is 
of ultimate value, and the rest of their doctrine is based on that 
principle. For Hutcheson, benevolence is of ultimate value. 
Benevolence is quite different from happiness. 
So far, I have been discussing the differences between what is 
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held to be of ultimate value by Hutcheson and the utilitarians. But 
Hutcheson also differs from the utilitarians in his theory of how 
we know what is of value. The utilitarians rely on the single 
insight that general happiness is the ultimate good; the rest of their 
doctrines are the consequences of this principle, deduced from it in a 
purely rational fashion. Hutcheson, on the other hand, maintains 
that we have a sense which reacts to different actions separately, 
and which tells us in each case whether the action is right or not. 
The general contention that benevolence is found by the moral sense 
to be good, is not a basic principle from which he deduces the rest 
of his theory, but rather is an empirical observation about the way 
in which the moral sense does in fact tend to react. Not only are 
moral values different for Hutcheson and the utilitarians, but we 
arrive at our knowledge of values in a different fashion. 
If Hutcheson is not a utilitarian, why does he discuss the 
greatest happiness for the greatest numbers? The answer to this 
question lies in the fact that general benevolence has a necessary 
relationship with general happiness; this is quite obvious since 
general benevolence is the desire for the happiness (or natural good) 
of people in general. But though this means that the notion of 
general happiness is necessarily a concern of Hutcheson's, it does 
not mean that the notion has the same primacy for him as it does 
for the utilitarians. As I mentioned when discussing Plamenatz's 
third proposition, the utilitarians value benevolence, (or, in some 
cases, the pursuit of general happiness for whatever motive), because 
they value general happiness. For Hutcheson, it is the other way 
around; he must consider happiness because he values benevolence. 
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This difference between Hutcheson and the utilitarians has two 
major implications; it affects the relationship between the morality 
and the consequences of actions, and it affects the discussion of 
perfection in Hutcheson's later philosophy. 
For the utilitarians, since the value of the pursuit of general 
happiness derives from the value of happiness, the consequences of 
actions tend to be more important for moral judgements than the motive. 
The important question for them is: Does the action result in happiness? 
I say 'tends to' because the matter is complicated by there being 
many versions of utilitarianism, and it is not possible to do justice 
to them all. However, I would suggest that for Bentham at least, the 
consequences of actions are paramount, and the motive of lesser concern. 
Hutcheson's position on the relative weight, in moral considerations, 
of the motives and the consequences of actions follows from his claim 
that benevolence is the ultimate moral value. For him, when appraising 
the moral value of an action already done, one considers only the 
motive; that is, one considers only whether the motive was benevolence 
or not. The actual consequences are not important, except as they 
may indicate the presence or degree of benevolence. In this respect, 
the calculations Hutcheson proposes in the 'Inquiry' (2nd edition, 
p. 183-188) are interesting. These are not utilitarian calculations; 
their purpose is not to facilitate the process of calculating the 
happiness which will result from an action. Rather, the formulas are 
designed to aid the calculation of the degree of benevolence the 
. d' 1 32 action isp ays. It is the intention or motive, not the consequences, 
which is relevant to the virtue of actions. This, however, applies 
32. Cf. Albee, p. 61. 
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only when estimating the moral worth of actions already done. In 
deciding which actions one ought to do, one has to consider the 
results. This is because one cannot fulfil a desire without considering 
which actions will achieve the desired end. Hence, one cannot fulfil 
benevolent desires without considering which possible action results 
in the greatest possible happiness. It is in this context that 
Hutcheson uses the famous formula "the greatest happiness for the 
greatest numbers". The paragraph in which this phrase occurs has 
the marginal title, "Qualitys determining our Election", and begins 
thus: "In comparing the moral qualitys of actions, in order to 
regulate our election among various actions propos'd .•. " (Inquiry, 
p. 180). It is in the context of election of actions, not in 
judging them, that the greatest happiness principle is applicable. 
Hutcheson makes this point explicit in the 'System': 
"An action is called materially good when in fact it 
tends to the interest of the system, as far as we 
can judge of its tendency; or to the good of some 
part consistent with that of the system, whatever 
were the affections of the agent. An action is 
formally good, when it flowed from good affections 
in a just proportion. A good man deliberating 
which of several actions proposed he shall chuse, 
regards and compares the material goodness of them, 
and then is determined by his moral sense invariably 
pref erring that which appears most conducive to the 
happiness and virtue of mankind. But in judging 
of his past actions he considers chiefly the 
affections they flowed from abstracting from their 
effects." (System, p. 252-253.) 
When electing to do an action, Hutcheson's theory implies that 
one ought also to consider one's motives carefully to make sure one 
is acting from genuine benevolence and not disguised self-interest. 
Hutcheson does not develop this line of thought, probably because he 
thought that we have direct access to information about our own desires, 
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and that it would be immediately apparent to us which of these are 
benevolent and which are not. 
It is in the context of the utilitarian considerations relevant 
when choosing an action, that Hutcheson discusses the notion of 
rights. He thinks that it is part of the philosopher's business to 
establish the universal rules or maxims which will lead to the greatest 
general happiness: 
"Then he (the moral philosopher) is to inquire, by 
reflection upon human affairs, what course of action 
does most effectually promote the universal good, 
what universal rules or maxims are to be observ'd, 
and in what circumstances the reason of them alters, 
so as to admit exceptions; ... " (Inquiry, p. 271) 
The use of the phrase "universal rules or maxims" in this quotation 
suggests that Hutcheson, in those contexts in which he is a utilitarian, 
is a rule-utilitarian. However, considering his moral theory as a 
whole, Hutcheson is ambiguous as to whether he advocates rule- or 
act-utilitarianism, (that is, in those limited contexts in which he 
seems to espouse utilitarianism; this qualification is assumed throughout 
the present discussion). But when he discusses rights, he always 
introduces the notion of universal rules, laws or maxims, and assumes 
that utilitarian considerations should refer to rules, not individual 
acts. D.D. Raphael, in a paper entitled "Utilitarianism and Rights1133 , 
argues that this introduction of the notion of laws into the discussion 
of utilitarianism arose because of the historical fact that the notion 
of rights in the general philosophical sense, was derived from the 
legal notion of rights. When Hutcheson, Hume, and the later utilitarians, 
discussed rights from the utilitarian standpoint, the legal origins of 
the notion led them to discuss the utility of laws or rules, not 
33. Raphael, "Utilitarianism and Rights", passim. 
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individual actions. Raphael attributes the rise of the notion of 
rule-utilitarianism to the discussion of rights, and related topics, 
such as Hume's discussion of justice. 
Hutcheson's definition of rights, then, is based on the 
utilitarian criterion applied to universal maxims or laws. As given 
in the 'Inquiry' it reads thus: 
"Whenever it appears to us, that a faculty of doing, 
demanding, or possessing any thing, universally 
allow'd in certain circumstances, would in the whole 
tend to the general good, we say, that one in such 
circumstances has a right to do, possess,or demand 
that thing." (Inquiry, p. 277) 
Hutcheson then goes on to draw a distinction between perfect and 
imperfect rights. Both these terms he defines in utilitarian terms 
as well. Perfect rights 
"are of such necessity to the publick good, that the 
universal violation of them would make human life 
intolerable; and it actually makes those miserable, 
whose rights are violated." (Inquiry, p. 278; see also 
System, p. 257.) 
Imperfect rights 
"are such as, when universally violated, would not 
necessarily make men miserable. These rights tend 
to the improvement and increase of positive good 
in any society, but are not absolutely necessary 
to prevent universal misery." (Inquiry, 279; see 
also System, p. 258.) 
Hutcheson also appeals to the principle of utility to establish 
whether the use of violence is justified in defence of these rights. 
Violence is justified in the case of perfect rights because such 
violence 
"cannot in any particular case be more detrimental to 
the publick, than the violation of them (perfect rights) 
with impunity." (Inquiry, p. 278) 
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On the other hand, violence is not justified in the case of imperfect 
rights because 
"a violent prosecution of such rights would generally 
occasion greater evil than the violation of them." 
(Inquiry, p. 279) 
In this account of the various aspects of rights, Hutcheson has 
been appealing to the utilitarian principle of pursuing the greatest 
general good. Does this conflict with my claim that Hutcheson is not 
a utilitarian? Hutcheson answers this question, for he immediately 
proceeds to relate rights to the degree of benevolence (or the lack 
of it) which their violation indicates in a person who violates them. 
"The violation of imperfect rights only argues a man 
to have such weak benevolence, as not to study 
advancing the positive good of others, when in the 
least opposition to his own: but the violation of 
perfect rights argues the injurious person to be 
positively evil or cruel; or at least so immoderately 
selfish, as to be indifferent about the positive 
misery and ruin of others, when he imagines he can 
find his interest in it." (Inquiry, p. 280) 
Thus in the case of the violation of rights, as in morality in general, 
when one judges the actions of others, one considers the degree of 
benevolence the actions display. When deciding what the rights of 
people are, one uses the criterion of the greatest general good; 
this is because rights are general rules or laws which govern the 
election of actions. But when judging actions already done, even 
in the case of rights, one must look at the benevolence or lack of 
it in the agent, not at the good of society. This is why when discussing 
the violation of rights in the above quotation Hutcheson makes central 
the concept of benevolence, not the principle of utility. 
Although there is a sense in which Hutcheson is entitled to 
stipulate any definition of 'rights' he wants, so long as he is 
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consistent, it must be pointed out that his definition is· not consistent 
with certain ideas usually included in the notion of rights. Without 
attempting a detailed analysis of the concept of rights, it is 
nevertheless worth noting that, in the eighteenth century at least, 
it was common to view rights as giving the individual a claim on 
society which would give him some guarantee against interference in a 
specific area. If it was asserted, for example, that a man had a 
right to the product of his labour, then it was being asserted that 
society ought not to interfere with the individual in this respect; 
that is, that he should enjoy exclusive, or near exclusive, use of 
such products. (This is not to suggest that this is all that was 
being asserted.) Now it is not at all clear that Hutcheson's 
utilitarian definition of rights includes this notion that the 
individual has certain fundamental claims on society. This problem 
arises with all utilitarian definitions of rights and related terms, 
a fact which is most apparent in John Stuart Mill's defence of 
individual liberty. 
he is going to defend 
In his essay "On Liberty", Mill suggests that 
34 
individual liberty on utilitarian grounds, 
but it is not obvious that this intention is borne out in the body 
of the essay. Indeed, the question of whether he is able to defend 
liberty on utilitarian grounds is an often discussed question; the 
. 1 . 35 answer is usua ly negative. 
34. Mill, p. 74. 
35. See, for example: Watkins, p. 165-6; Levi, p. 19;. or (on justice 
and utility) Raphael, "Rights and Utilitarianism", passim. I 
think it obvious from my definition of how philosophers of the 
eighteenth century were wont to use the term 'right', why Mill's 
notion of liberty is closely related to it; (both give the 
individual claims to non-interference from society). However, 
for a discussion of the relation of Mill's notion of liberty 
with the notion of rights, see Rees, passim. 
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Examination of Hutcheson's definitions of 'rights' and of 'perfect 
rights' allows us to see how the problem will arise for him, and will 
perhaps make clear why he failed to notice the problem. According to 
Hutcheson, a person has a right if allowing that right universally 
is to the good. He then defines perfect and imperfect rights in terms 
of the results of allowing the universal violation of the right; this 
much, I think, is clear from his definitions as I quoted them above. 
What Hutcheson has not done in these definitions is to justify his 
use of the term 'universal'. The definitions taken together suggest 
that he thinks these rights will be either universally defended by 
society, or their violation universally permitted. He does not discuss 
the case where the right is partially defended and partially violated 
with impunity. He then argues in favour of the defence by society of 
perfect rights, and the non-enforcement of imperfect rights. But 
what if allowing the partial violation of perfect rights (as Hutcheson 
uses the term) would lead to greater general happiness than maintaining 
the right universally? If he adheres both to his utilitarian principles 
and to his definition of rights, in such a case Hutcheson would have 
to say that everyone had a right to a thing, (since allowing it 
universally would be to the general good) but that selected violation 
of the right ought to be allowed since this would lead to an even 
greater good. A person might have a right according to Hutcheson's 
definition, and at the same time society would have a moral claim to 
violating that right under certain circumstances. Surely, this is 
peculiar, if not contradictory. I think Hutcheson has ignored this 
possibility because, no doubt for historical reasons having to do with 
the then contemporary discussion of a state of nature, he views the 
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alternative to universal enforcement of a right as being no social 
enforcement of it at all; either there is total enforcement or there 
is a state of nature, or natural liberty. 36 He has not considered 
the case where society enforces a right partially but allows its 
violation in certain cases. If in such a case the partial violation 
of the right was to the greatest general good, there would be a 
conflict between utilitarianism and the individual's claims on society 
which are normally acknowledged when we say a person has a right. In 
a word, is it acceptable to sacrifice the rights of a few individuals 
to the greater good of the society as a whole? If one defines rights 
on a utilitarian criterion, the answer would seem to be yes, because 
there is no criterion other than the greatest good to which one can 
appeal. But if rights are defined separately, and are viewed as 
fundamental, as they often are, then the answer would seem to be no. 
Thus there seems to be great violence done to the normal notion of 
rights by trying to give a utilitarian-based definition of them. 
It might be objected to my argument that Hutcheson could have 
defined rights not as that which, if universally allowed, would tend 
to the public good, but rather as that which, if violated in any 
individual's case, would lead to a diminution of the general good. 
This is a utilitarian-based definition which does not allow an 
individual's rights to be violated for the sake of the general good, 
for it makes that logically impossible. If a person can be sacrificed 
to the general good, then on this definition he has no right not to 
36. Cf. Inquiry, p. 278. The text of the fourth edition reads 
"state of nature", but in the corrections to the fourth edition 
which arrived too late for inclusion in the text but which the 
printer includes at the end of the book, Hutcheson requests that 
this be changed to "natural liberty"; Inquiry, p. 311. 
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be sacrificed. This definition may solve the problem of making 
individual rights consistent with the principle of utility, but it 
suffers from the problem that no such rights exist. It is doubtful 
whether there are any candidates for rights which will never give 
rise to a single instance in which violating that right would be to 
the general good. Consider the right to life, (which Hutcheson 
considers a perfect right, and which surely must be basic if any 
right is); it is trivially easy to think of a case where violation 
of this right in an individual's case is to the general good. 
Hutcheson's failure to see the conflict between utility and 
rights may, as I have suggested, derive from his comparing universal 
enforcement with universally permitted violation, (that is, with 
universal non-enforcement, or a state of nature). What he has not 
considered is partial enforcement. Perhaps the reason for this is 
that he seems to think that rights are liable to be violated by 
individuals, not by society. But in fact, when rights are partially 
enforced and partially violated, the rights are as likely as not to 
be violated by society rather than individuals. By the violation of 
an individual's rights by society, I mean the use of laws or institutions 
by a large group in a society to impose a system of laws or a social 
structure on that society, in which the wants of the dominant group 
are pursued at the expense of the rights of other individuals. 
Slavery is an obvious example of this. It is the case of a majority 
advancing its interests at the expense of a minority that is most 
likely to give rise to a conflict of rights with utility. 
Let me end this section by returning from this discussion of 
rights to the discussion of the role of the utilitarian principle 
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in Hutcheson's moral philosophy. Earlier I argued that Hutcheson was 
not really a utilitarian because he gave primacy to benevolence 
over utility as the ultimate moral good. This led him to emphasize 
the motives for actions more than their results, while the utilitarians 
tended to be more concerned with the results of actions. This 
difference of emphasis is related to the change Hutcheson made in his 
later philosophy whereby the pursuit of individual perfection also 
becomes a moral good. On the question of the pursuit of perfection, 
Plamenatz presents forcibly the utilitarian attitude; "The utilitarians 
share with Hobbes a complete indifference to the notion of self-
37 
improvement as a thing desirable for its own sake." Hutcheson, on 
the other hand, precisely because he locates the value of actions in 
the motive from which they are done, came to view the pursuit of virtue 
as consisting in the cultivation of certain motives (or desires). 




I hope that I have established why Hutcheson ought not to be 
considered a utilitarian despite the fact that aspects of his writings 
bear some similarity with utilitarian ideas. To summarize, the only 
ultimate value for the utilitarians is human happiness. For Hutcheson, 
happiness, or natural good, is of value, but for him the ultimate 
moral value lies in benevolence. This difference of valuing happiness 
or benevolence leads to a different emphasis on the consequences or 
37. Plamenatz, p. 11. He excepts John Stuart Mill. 
38. This development in Hutcheson's thought is discussed below in 
chapter 7. 
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on the motives of actions. Emphasizing the motives of actions leads 
Hutcheson, in his later writings to locate virtue in the cultivation 
of one's personality, a notion which the utilitarians did not accept. 
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5. The Problem of Motivation 
i. The Problem 
In the previous three chapters I have given outlines of Hutcheson's 
theories of human nature, of the moral sense, and of benevolence. 
The question now arises of whether these theories are compatible with 
one another. Much doubt has been expressed in this matter concerning 
one point; namely, the relation between the moral sense, benevolence, 
and Hutcheson's theory of motivation. The problem arises because it 
is difficult to see how the moral sense, and hence moral judgements 
and moral knowledge, can influence us towards being virtuous. One's 
normal moral intuitions suggest that there is a problem with any 
ethical theory in which an agent's knowledge of right and wrong does 
not or cannot influence the agent's actions. In Hutcheson's theory, 
the most noticeable point in this regard is that the moral sense is a 
sense, and sensations cannot motivate actions. But the problem goes 
deeper than that, for not only can the moral sense as a sense not 
motivate; it would appear difficult for any desire which the moral 
sense might generate (for example, the desire to be virtuous), to 
motivate virtuous behaviour. The moral sense approves or disapproves 
of actions according to how strong a benevolent desire is the 
motivating force behind the action. Hence benevolent desires are the 
motive for all virtuous action. But if this is true, then any act 
motivated by a desire to do one's duty, or to be virtuous, or to 
obtain the approval of one's own or another's moral sense, cannot be a 
virtuous act, for none of these motives is a type of benevolence. 
One can only conclude that the moral sense cannot influence us towards 
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moral behaviour. I wish to try to establish in this chapter that 
Hutcheson has attempted to answer this problem. 
The problem is more than a prima facie one. In his book, 
Motivation and the Moral Sense in Francis Hutcheson's Ethical Theory, 
Jensen's central claim is that Hutcheson does not and cannot solve 
this problem. Jensen says, for example: "Hutcheson simply fails to 
give a clear and consistent account of how the moral sense and 
justifying reasons motivate. 111 Elsewhere he says there are 
"characteristics of Hutcheson's doctrine of obligation and motivation 
which taken together, render it wholly untenable. 112 I do not agree 
with these conclusions. I think Jensen has missed Hutcheson's theory 
of how the moral sense influences our actions, and how it can lead a 
person to be more virtuous. This theory I will now consider. 
The problem of how the moral sense can influence actions arises 
from a number of aspects of Hutcheson's theories taken together. I 
have mentioned these points in the previous chapters, but gathering 
them together here will help to establish both the problem and the 
possible solution: 
a. All human behaviour is motivated by passions or desires. In the 
case of conflicting desires, the strongest one wins. This is 
true even if the conflicting desires are benevolence and self-
interest. "When the publick desires are opposite to the private, 
or seem to be so, that kind prevails which is stronger or more 
intense." (Essay, p. 34) . 
b. All virtuous actions are motivated by benevolence. Or, to put the 
1. Jensen, p. 85-86. 
2. Jensen, p. 97. 
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same point another way, the moral sense approves of all actions, 
and only those actions, which are motivated by benevolent 
affections. (In his later writings, Hutcheson changed his 
opinion on this point; cf. below, chapter 7.) 
c. The moral sense is a sense, not a desire, and hence cannot 
motivate actions directly. Neither can moral judgements, nor 
justifying reasons, founded on the moral sense, motivate directly. 
d. No desire or passion can be raised at will. Thus he explicitly 
says: "neither benevolence nor any other affection or desire 
can be directly raised by volition." 
Essay, p. 1 7.) 
(Inquiry, p. 139, Also 
From these claims it logically follows: 
1. that we cannot create or increase our benevolent desires at will, 
and hence that we cannot increase our virtuous actions at will. 
2. that the moral sense, being a sense, cannot directly motivate 
action, either virtuous or otherwise. 
3. that any desire which the moral sense gives rise to cannot motivate 
virtuous action, since only benevolence can motivate virtuous 
action and the moral sense does not generate the desire of 
benevolence. 
4. and that therefore, the moral sense cannot motivate us to do 
virtuous actions, either directly or by giving rise to such 
desires as a desire for virtue, desire to do one's duty, etc. 
This problem, and Hutcheson's way around it, are of great 
significance, partly because Hutcheson in his discussion of it develops 
a theory on a very important aspect of human morality, and partly 
because it is a problem which will occur in some form or other in any 
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moral theory which locates virtue and vice in the motive for actions. 
The first of these points I will discuss in the second part of this 
chapter, the second requires comment here. 
It is apparent from my statement of the problem above, that how 
moral knowledge can motivate virtuous actions is a problem for 
Hutcheson because he locates virtue in a specific type of motive for 
actions, namely benevolence, and then locates moral knowledge in 
another faculty of the mind, the moral sense. It is immediately 
apparent that any desire which arises because of the moral sense, 
is not benevolence, and hence cannot motivate virtuous action. Thus 
the desire for virtue cannot motivate virtuous action. I think it 
obvious from this formulation of the problem that the paradox will 
arise even if the criterion for virtuous action is some motive other 
than benevolence, and even if moral knowledge arises in a fashion 
other than a moral sense. The core of the problem is located in 
the identification of virtue with a particular motive, which seems 
then to exclude a virtuous action being done from a desire for virtue. 
It might be suggested that a theory which located virtue in 
performing acts from a sense of duty or from a desire for vitue would 
avoid this problem, even though it locates the virtue of actions in 
the type of motive from which the action was performed. In this case 
knowledge of duty or virtue can influence virtuous actions because 
virtuous actions are done from a desire to do what is known to be 
virtuous or to be one's duty. But this theory is afflicted with a 
form of the problem which was discussed by Hume at length. Hutcheson 
does not discuss this version of the problem because it supposes that 
the fundamental motive for virtuous actions is the desire to do what 
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is virtuous, whereas Hutcheson assumes that the fundamental motive 
for virtuous actions is benevolence. But the problem is worth noting 
anyway. If virtuous actions are those motivated by a desire to be 
virtuous, then knowing that an action is virtuous is knowing that it 
is done from the desire to be virtuous. But knowing what is virtuous 
cannot generate a desire to be virtuous, for that would be a desire 
to act from the desire itself. It would be a desire whose only object 
was to motivate action. Obviously, that is circular. This version 
of the problem can be put another way; if an action is done from a 
motive of being virtuous, then this presupposes some criterion of 
virtue independent of the desire for virtue, and hence virtue cannot 
be located in the desire for virtue without circularity. This problem 
will not arise if virtue is located in some aspect of the action, and 
not in the motive behind the action. 
Hume was acutely aware of the fact that if the goodness of an act 
is dependent on the nature of the desire which motivates it, then 
knowledge of morality cannot provide the motive for virtuous acts. 
In the "Treatise" he says that "no action can be virtuous or morally 
good, unless there be in human nature some motive to produce it, 
distinct from the sense of its morality. 113 For Hume, the problem of 
there being a desire to do an action because it is virtuous arises in 
two forms. Firstly, it arises in the case of natural virtues when the 
virtuous desire normally inherent in human nature is missing on a 
particular occasion, and the desire to do virtuous actions must take 
over. Secondly, it arises in the case of artificial virtues because 
3. Hume, Treatise, p. 479. 
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in the case of artificial virtues there never is an inherent virtuous 
desire to do the action; the desire to do the action because it is 
virtuous is the only non-self-interested desire involved. In the 
case of natural virtues, it is interesting to note that Hume solved 
the problem of how moral beliefs and the desire to do what is virtuous 
can lead to actions in a manner quite different from Hutcheson's. 
On the same page of the "Treatise", as the above quotation, Hume goes 
on to say: "When any virtuous motive or principle is corranon in human 
nature, a person, who feels his heart devoid of that motive, may hate 
himself upon that account, and may perform the action without the 
motive, from a certain sense of duty, in order to acquire by practice, 
that virtuous principle, or at least, to disguise to himself, as much 
as possible, his want of it. 114 The former of these two motives, to 
acquire it by practice, is one which seems not to have occurred to 
Hutcheson, although in his later writings he introduced the idea that 
the desire for perfection could lead one to try to acquire virtuous 
habits (e.g. Introduction, p. 96). The second of Hume's suggestions, 
"to disguise to himself" the want of the desire, has rather interesting 
implications for the notion of self-deception. But for Hutcheson, 
doing benevolent acts because one is afraid of the self-disapproval 
of the moral sense, may possibly motivate action, but could not 
motivate virtuous action, for the motive is not benevolence itself. 
Hume's general point is that virtuous motives must be motives which 
are generally conunon in mankind, but that in particular cases, if these 
motives are absent on that occasion, then the desire for virtue may 
take over. He is claiming that this desire for virtue presupposes that 
4. Hume, Treatise, p. 479. 
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at least sometimes the virtuous desire is the motive for actions. 
There is nothing in Hutcheson's theory which would exclude this 
approach, except the fact that in such a case, the acts done from 
the desire to do virtuous acts would not be virtuous. For Hutcheson, 
Hume's theory would be acceptable as an explanation of how moral 
knowledge can motivate actions, but not of how moral knowledge can 
motivate virtuous actions. 
These two suggestions of Hume's, (of trying to acquire virtuous 
motives by habit, and of deceiving oneself into thinking one has such 
motives), are concerned with the situation in which the virtuous 
motive is normally inherent in our nature, but happens to be absent in 
particular instances. Virtuous motives which are inherent in our 
nature, such as loving our children, Hume calls 'natural virtues.' 
But the largest part of the 'Treatise's' Book III, "Of Morals", is 
devoted to the artificial virtues. These are virtues, such as promise 
keeping, in which the motive for the virtuous act seems to presuppose 
the institution in society that such acts are virtuous. For example, 
if one keeps promises from a desire to be virtuous by being honest, 
this motive presupposes that keeping one's promises is virtuous. But 
if, as Hume assumes, the virtue of an act depends on the motive from 
which it is done, then in the case of promise keeping one encounters 
the paradox which Hume has so carefully outlined; to wit, that the 
only motive for keeping promises depends on the knowledge of its being 
virtuous, and its being virtuous depends on its bein9 done from such 
knowledge - which is circular. Hume believed that there are such 
artificial virtues, and he explained at length how he thought they are 
possible. But we need not consider his thoughts on this topic, for 
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the point in mentioning these artificial virtues is to show why this 
particular problem does not arise for Hutcheson. It will be 
remembered that for Hume, natural virtues are those virtuous motives 
which are inherent in human nature, and that the artificial virtues 
depend on social conventions and are not so inherent. But if this is 
the case, then all virtues are for Hutcheson natural; he acknowledges 
no virtues that are artificial in Hume's sense. This is obvious if 
one remembers that the only virtuous motive that Hutcheson recognizes 
is benevolence, and that benevolence is inherent in our nature. 
Although the form of particular acts of benevolence might be determined 
culturally, the motive itself is natural and does not depend on social 
convention. From this it follows that Hume's version of the problem 
I am dealing with, at least as it arises in the case of the artificial 
virtues, is different from Hutcheson's. Hume faces the problem of 
there being (artificial) virtues for which there seem to be no motive 
at all (except self-interest) inherent in human nature. Hutcheson 
does not have this problem, for benevolence is inherent in human 
nature, and all virtuous actions are motivated by benevolence, (at 
least in his early writings). It is a different problem than this that 
is common to Hume and Hutcheson; namely, the problem of how a desire 
to do virtuous actions can motivate if all virtuous actions must be 
motivated by some other desire, such as benevolence. 
This may explain the curious remarks Hume makes in a letter to 
Hutcheson. Hume had sent Hutcheson the manuscript of the third book 
of the "Treatise"; Hutcheson's reply is not extant, but Hume's return 
letter is. In a post script to this letter Hume says: 
II 
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if there be no other goods but virtue, 'tis 
impossible there can be any virtue; because the 
mind woud want all motives to begin its actions 
upon: and 'tis on the goodness or badness of the 
motives that the virtue of the action depends. 
This proves, that to every virtuous action there 
must be a motive or impelling passion distinct 
from the virtue, & that virtue can never be the 
sole motive to any action. You do not assent to 
this; tho' I think there is no proposition more 
certain or important. 11 5 
This suggestion that Hutcheson did not agree that knowledge of 
the virtue of an action could not be the motive to a virtuous action 
is curious in that this point is entailed by his theory, and in 
general Hutcheson seems aware of the point. In the absence of 
Hutcheson's reply one can only speculate, but it should be noted that 
Hutcheson thought that knowledge of virtue could influence our action 
in an indirect fashion as explained in the next section of this 
chapter, but that such knowledge could not directly motivate action. 
This manoeuvre would not have been acceptable to Hurne because it 
presupposes that the actual virtuous motive, benevolence, is inherent 
in human nature, and so does not solve Hume's problem of the artificial 
virtues. But this it was not meant to do; Hutcheson would have 
accepted that his theory was only applicable to natural virtues in 
Hume's sense. On Hutcheson's theory, all virtues are natural in this 
sense, since all virtuous actions are for him motivated by benevolence 
which is inherent in human nature. It should also be added that this 
exchange of letters took place in 1739; this was about the time that 
Hutcheson was writing the 'System' and his opinion on this point seems 
to have changed from his earlier writings. In the 'System', Hutcheson 
increases the function of the moral sense; it no longer approves only 
5. Grieg, vol. I, p. 35. 
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of benevolence as it does in his earlier writings, but also approves 
of the desire to be virtuous: 
"Another disposition inseparable from this (i.e. 
calm general benevolence) in men, and probably in 
all beings who are capable of such extensive 
affection, is the relish or approbation of this 
affection, and a naturally consequent desire of 
this moral excelence, and an esteem and good will 
of an higher kind to all in whom it is found. 
This love of moral excellence is also an high 
object of approbation, when we find it in ourselves 
by reflection, or observe it in another. It is a 
pretty different affection from benevolence or the 
desire of communicating happiness; and is as it 
were in another order of affection; ..• (System, 
p. 69-70) . 
It must be added to this quote, however, that the pursuit of virtue as 
envisaged in the 'System', though now approved of by the moral sense, 
is still the pursuit of internal mental characteristics in the fashion 
which I will describe in the rest of this chapter, and is not directly 
the motive for external actions. 
ii. Hutcheson's Theory of Moral Motivation 
Having made clear, I hope, the problem, I would like to reiterate 
an aspect of the interrelations between the moral sense, benevolence, 
and motivation which I have discussed in the previous chapters. I 
pointed out in chapter 4, section i, that in the first version of 
Hutcheson's theory (i.e. in the 'Inquiry') the moral sense is a kind 
of affection of love, or esteem, which one feels towards those who 
are benevolent. This love could then cause us to feel benevolence 
towards the esteemed person in return. If this were the case, the 
moral sense could give rise to, in the sense of causing, benevolent 
desires which could then motivate actions. Thus the moral sense 
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under this theory could generate, or cause, virtuous action in a not 
very indirect fashion. But this version of the theory only partially 
avoids the problem I am dealing with in this chapter. In the 'Inquiry', 
the moral sense can only generate benevolence if benevolent actions 
are perceived in others; it would also seem to suggest that the 
benevolence thus generated is only directed to those whom we see as 
being benevolent, but that is a debatable point both as an interpretation 
of Hutcheson and as a fact of human nature. This contention that the 
moral sense can only create benevolent desires if other people are 
actually perceived as being benevolent, still leaves us with the 
problem of how moral judgements about possible actions can cause us to 
feel benevolent. If a possible action of our own is contemplated, 
the moral sense will react with pleasure or pain as appropriate, but 
in this case there is no agent but ourselves to esteem. Thus if this 
affection generates benevolence towards the agent conceived of as 
doing the act, it can only generate benevolence towards ourselves, 
which is impossible. One can only conclude that under the first 
version of the theory, the moral sense can generate benevolence, and 
hence virtuous action, if the moral sense is reacting to the virtuous 
actions of others; it cannot generate benevolence if it is only 
reacting to the possibility of an action of our own. Thus the abstract 
realization that an action is good cannot cause a benevolent desire 
towards doing that action. In other words, it is only the perception 
of virtue in the world that can cause us to be virtuous; the possibility 
of being virtuous cannot generate a virtuous desire. The first version, 
of course, allows that we may pursue apparently virtuous action from 
other motives, such as a desire for honour, but Hutcheson is explicit 
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that actions thus performed are motivated by self-interest and are 
not virtuous. 
As I have explained in chapter 4, section ii, above, the second 
version of Hutcheson's theory of benevolence does not interpret the 
moral sense as an affection or feeling of love towards others, but as 
a sense which perceives moral goodness. On this version of the moral 
sense theory, it is harder to see how the moral sense can motivate 
virtuous action, and Hutcheson develops a complex theory to explain 
the point. The rest of this chapter deals with the problem of 
motivation in the later version of the moral sense theory. 
In order to establish how the moral sense can influence our 
behaviour, we must recall that for Hutcheson there are two possible 
causes of motivation in men: passions and desires. I have remarked 
that on the first version of Hutcheson's theory, the moral sense gives 
rise to an affection of benevolence which in some ways resembles a 
passion. But in his later theory, the suggestion that the moral 
sense might generate passions is unacceptable, for on this theory, 
the most virtuous actions are motivated by calm general benevolence, 
(which is a desire, not a passion). Therefore, if the moral sense 
is to influence virtuous actions, it must raise desires, not only 
passions. Let us examine the possible desires that the moral sense 
might create. These are four in number; namely, a desire for the 
pleasure of self-approbation, a desire for the good of others caused 
by anticipation of the pleasures of self-approbation, a desire to be 
motivated by benevolence, and a desire to have benevolent desires. 
Let us consider these in turn. 
1. For Hutcheson, desires are caused by beliefs about the possibility 
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of future pleasures or pains. Since the contemplation of moral acts 
gives us pleasure because of the moral sense, there is no question 
that the possibility of obtaining the pleasures of self-approbation 
can cause a desire for that pleasure. But this leads to a logical 
paradox; to wit, if I do an act out of the desire for self-approbation, 
then I have not done it from benevolence, my moral sense will not 
approve, and there will be no pleasure. Thus the desire for self-
approbation cannot motivate, for in doing so it removes the possibility 
of obtaining its own object. 
2. Earlier in this thesis,
6 
it was pointed out that Hutcheson 
distinguishes between the object of a desire, the pleasure accompanying 
the satisfaction of a desire, and the belief about possible pleasures 
which causes the desire. These distinctions raise the possibility 
that the possible pleasure of self-approbation raises a desire whose 
object is not this pleasure, but rather the good of others. In this 
case, one could be motivated by a desire to help others, but this 
would be caused by anticipating the pleasures provided by the moral 
sense. (This is distinct from the first case, for that was a desire 
directly for the pleasures of the moral sense.) The problem with a 
desire caused by the moral sense in this way is that it is not really 
a desire for the good of others, but rather a desire for us to act 
for their benefit. 
"The prospect of rewards from the deity, of future 
pleasures from the self-approbation of our moral 
sense, or of any pleasure attending an affection 
itself, are only motives to us to desire or wish 
to have the affection of benevolence in our hearts; 
and consequently, if our volition could raise 
6. Cf. above, chapter 2, sec. ii. 
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affections in us, these motives would make us will 
or choose to raise benevolent affections: But these 
prospects cannot be motives to us from self-love, to 
desire the happiness of others; for, from self-love 
we only desire what we apprehend to be the means of 
private good. Now the having those affections is the 
means of obtaining these private goods, and not the 
actual happiness of others; for the pleasure of self-
approbation, and divine rewards, are not obtained or 
lost according as others are happy or miserable, but 
according to the goodness of our affections." 
(Inquiry, p. 143, footnote.) 
It is not the good of others which gains us the pleasures of self-
approbation, but rather the act of promoting that good. The good of 
others becomes a means to the satisfaction of what is basically a 
self-interested desire. Thus this desire is not benevolence, and the 
moral sense cannot approve it, and one has a repetition of the paradox 
encountered under the first case. 
Hutcheson, however, does not seem to be aware of the logical 
problem involved in these two possible desires. He argues against 
desires caused by, or for, the pleasures of self-approbation motivating 
virtuous actions, but he does not use the logical problem this generates 
to do so. First it should be noted that Hutcheson's language makes 
it unclear whether he is arguing against the first or second of the 
possibilities I have just considered, but I do not think that this 
ambiguity is very significant because he probably would have said 
the same thing against both cases if he had distinguished them. His 
theory suggests that it should be the second one he would have to 
refute. 
Hutcheson's rejection of the possibility that the desire for 
self-approbation can be the motive for virtuous actions, does not use 
the logical paradox, for he admits that such a desire can and in fact 
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does motivate action: "The prospect of the pleasure of self-approbation 
is indeed often a motive to choose one action rather than another; " 
(Illustrations, p. 140, cf. also, Illustrations, p. 174). But he denies 
that actions done from such a motive are virtuous actions. That they 
are not virtuous follows from the fact that they are not motivated by 
benevolence and hence that the moral sense would not approve them. 
Hutcheson is quite explicit that although such desires can motivate, 
such motivation is from self-interest and hence not virtuous (cf. ibid. 
and Inquiry, p. 140 ff.). 
Perhaps it should be said in Hutcheson's favour that such desires 
are not illogical unless one sees the paradox involved. The desire 
for self-approbation is caused by a belief about the possible pleasures 
of the moral sense, not by those pleasures themselves. That the 
pleasures will not in fact result if the motive for the action is 
understood, does not necessarily prevent one from believing before hand 
that they will result. Such beliefs will only be destroyed by the 
paradox if one sees the paradox in advance. And since we do not all 
have the logical acumen of David Hume, there is the distinct possibility 
that some of us will have these beliefs and be motivated by the 
resulting desire. But this, of course, does not affect Hutcheson's 
point that actions so motivated are not virtuous. 
3. The third possibility is that the moral sense generates a desire 
to do virtuous acts; that is, it generates a desire to do actions 
motivated by benevolence. These actions would be approved by the 
moral sense, since they are motivated by benevolenceft But this 
possibility runs into the problem that it involves a desire not for 
an event or object, but a desire that a certain motive, benevolence, 
will result in action. Is such a desire possible on Hutcheson's 
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theory of human nature? And further, how can such a desire motivate 
or influence actions? The first and rather obvious point is that a 
desire to be motivated by benevolence presupposes that one has 
benevolent desires. Since for Hutcheson, desires cannot be created 
by acts of volition, these benevolent desires must be present in our 
natures before the desire that they should motivate arises. This, 
of course, does not pose any problem for Hutcheson, for he has argued 
at length to establish that benevolent desires are inherent in human 
nature. So the question becomes, how can a desire to act from a 
rrotive we already have influence our behaviour? And what is the point 
of this other desire if we already have the primary desire, and all 
desires can motivate? 
The answers to these questions lie in Hutcheson's theory of which 
desires motivate when we have competing desires which are incompatible. 
In such a case the strongest desire overcomes the other desires and 
1 . . 7 resu ts in action. This means that if, and only if, there is a 
desire stronger than and competing with our benevolent desires, will 
those benevolent desires not motivate actions. The desires which 
obviously pose such competition to benevolence are the various self-
interested desires. Thus the perplexing desire which we are discussing 
in this section, the desire that benevolence should rrotivate, becomes 
a desire to see that benevolence is stronger than self-interest. 
It is a desire to remove the competition to benevolence. There are 
several ways in which this can be done, all of them relying on the 
fact that the strength of a desire depends on the degree of pleasure 
7. For a discussion of the strength of desires, see above, chapter 2, 
sec. ii. 
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which is believed will result from the action. One can try to increase 
the force of one's benevolent desires by concentrating one's attention 
on the pleasures of others; this will bring to mind their pleasures 
and increase the benevolent desire to obtain those pleasures for them. 
One can try to decrease the competing self-interested desires by 
bringing to mind the transitory nature and unreliability of personal 
pleasures. These two procedures will be discussed further when I 
discuss the fourth way in which the moral sense can influence action. 
Here I want to discuss the possibility that a desire to be motivated 
by benevolence may lead us to try and remove altogether the competition 
which self-interest poses to benevolence. Self-interest can only 
prevent benevolence from motivating if a strong self-interested desire 
is tending to motivate an action which is inconsistent with the action 
that benevolence is tending to motivate. If self-interest and 
benevolence incline us towards doing the same action, then that action 
will probably ensue, for the strengths of desires for the same action 
can be added. The virtue of this action will not be greater than if 
benevolence alone motivated it, but the action is more likely to get 
done if self-interest and benevolence combine their motivational force. 
Thus a desire to behave from benevolence becomes a desire to see that 
one's self-interest lies in those actions which benevolence also 
dictates: 
"Some alledge that merit supposes, beside kind 
affection, that the agent has a moral sense, 
reflects upon his own virtue, delights in it, 
and chooses to adhere to it for the pleasure 
which attends it .••. This reflection shows 
to him a rrotive of self-love, the joint view 
to which does not increase our approbation . 
... But the reflection on virtue, the being 
once charmed with the lovely form, will discover 
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an interest on its side which, if well attended 
to, no other motive will overbalance. This 
reflection is a great security to the character, 
and must be supposed in such creatures as men are, 
before we can well depend upon a constancy in 
virtue. The same may be said of many other motives 
to virtue from interest which, though they do not 
immediately influence the kind affections of the 
agent, yet remove these obstacles to them, from 
false appearances of interest. Such are these from 
•.. the manifest advantages of virtue in this life, 
without reflection on which, a steady course of 
virtue is scarce to be expected amidst the present 
confusion of human affairs." (Illustrations, p. 174). 
The belief that our self-interest lies in doing benevolent acts 
cannot be generated at will. Beliefs are the responsibility of the 
faculty of reason, not of volition. But we can create beliefs in an 
indirect manner. In the case of creating the belief that our best 
self-interest lies in benevolence, we proceed by concentrating our 
attention on those pleasures which will result from such action, and 
by noting the unreliability and triviality of competing pleasures. 
By doing so, we will be able to convince ourselves that our self-
interest dictates the same actions as benevolence, (cf. above quotation). 
Hutcheson believes that this belief will result if sufficient attention 
is paid to the matter because he believes that the belief is in fact 
true. Our greatest self-interest actually does lie in being benevolent. 
Thus this is not an advocacy of self-deceit, as some of Hutcheson's 
suggestions are. It is a claim that the moral sense can provide a 
motive for examining in a particular fashion the question of what is 
in our interest, and that doing those acts which the moral sense 
approves will result from this. 
I do not think it is important to consider Hutcheson's arguments 
that our greatest self-interest lies in being benevolent (cf. Inquiry, 
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Ch. VI, p. 244-265; and Essay, Ch. V, p. 127-166). Rather it is more 
important to note the role that these proofs play in Hutcheson's 
overall theory. In proving that doing benevolent acts will lead to 
our greatest pleasure, Hutcheson is not trying to reduce benevolence 
to self-interest. He has argued at length that this cannot be done, 
and he is not contradicting himself on this point. His proofs are 
designed to show that self-interest is not a competition to benevolence, 
and that it will not motivate actions inconsistent with benevolence 
if we understand what is in our own best interests in the long run. 
Hutcheson makes the point quite plainly; in the preface to the 'Essay' 
he says: 
"It may perhaps seem strange, that when in this 
treatise virtue is supposed disinterested; yet 
so much pain is taken, by a comparison of our 
several pleasures, to prove the pleasures of 
virtue to be the greatest we are capable of, and 
that consequently it is our truest interest to 
be virtuous. But let it be remembered here, that 
though there can be no motives or arguments 
suggested which can directly raise any ultimate 
desire, such as that of our own happiness, or 
publick affections, •.. yet if both are natural 
dispositions of our minds, and nothing can stop 
the operation of publick affections but some 
selfish interest, the only way to give publick 
affections their full force, and to make them 
prevalent in our lives, must be to remove these 
opinions of opposite interests, and to shew a 
superior interest on their side." (Essay, p. viii-
ix; also cf. Inquiry, p. 270). 
The point is not to reduce benevolence to self-interest, but to remove 
the competition that self-interest is normally thought to provide to 
benevolence. The actions which result are not more virtuous for this, 
but they are more likely to result. 
One further point should be added to this section. Hutcheson's 
proof that our greatest self-interest lies in being benevolent involves 
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an appeal to the pleasure of self-approbation, and to the pleasures 
provided by our sense of honour. Thus he is using in this argument 
the conclusions I attributed to him in the previous section; to wit, 
that the desire for self-approbation can motivate actions even if this 
does not make the actions virtuous. But perhaps it is more pertinent 
to the central question of this chapter to note that the moral sense 
can influence our behaviour by adding a self-interested motive to the 
benevolent desires to help others. Thus this section has uncovered 
two methods by which the moral sense can influence our behaviour. 
Firstly, it creates a desire that we should act out of benevolence; 
this desire leads us to contemplate the pleasures of being virtuous. 
Secondly, the moral sense adds a pleasure to virue so that when we 
do so contemplate the pleasures of virtue, we discover that that is 
the source of our greatest possible happiness. 
4. The fourth and final way in which the moral sense could influence 
our actions is by generating a desire to be virtuous. This it in 
fact must do; since the contemplation of our own virtue gives us 
pleasure, there must be some desire for this pleasure. The desire to 
be virtuous, given Hutcheson's theory of the moral sense, is the 
desire to have benevolent affections. This is slightly different 
from the desire mentioned in the previous section, the desire to act 
from those benevolent affections which we already have, for the present 
possibility is the desire to actually create benevolent desires. It 
is the desire of desires, or we might say, a meta-desire. 
This approach, the desire for desires, seems to have the problem 
that the creation of desires is not an act of volition; so it would 
appear that we desire something that in fact is not within our power 
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to obtain. Hutcheson gets around this problem by claiming that 
although we cannot create desiresbymere acts of volition, we can 
create them by indirect means. As in the case of eliminating the 
competitors of benevolence discussed above, indirect means for creating 
desires rely on the fact that beliefs about possible future pleasures 
or pains, our own or others, automatically cause a desire to arise in 
us. Concentrating on and carefully attending to the pleasures that 
we can give to others will automatically create a desire to obtain 
those pleasures for other people. 
"If any one should ask, since none of these motives 
of self-interest excite our benevolence, but we are 
in virtuous actions intending solely the good of 
others, to what purpose serves our moral sense, our 
sense of pleasure from the happiness of others? ... 
The answer to (this) question was given partly already: 
all these motives may make us desire to have benevolent 
affections, and consequently turn our attention to 
those qualities in objects which excite them; " 
(Inquiry, p. 150; cf. also Essay, p. 25-26). 
This basic desire of creating benevolent feelings by concentrating 
our attention on the pleasures we can give to others is liable to a 
great deal of sophistication by taking into account how the other 
aspects of human nature influence the degree of our benevolent desires. 
We tend to feel benevolent towards those who have similar attitudes 
towards us, to those who bear us no harm, to those who are virtuous 
and give us pleasure in that way, etc. In other words, it is part of 
human nature that we tend to feel more benevolent towards those we 
believe are of a certain sort, and tend not to feel benevolent towards 
those whom we believe are unworthy of our benevolence .. This raises 
the possibility that we can increase or even create benevolent desires 
by convincing ourselves that others are worthy of our benevolence. 
Here again we can create benevolence by having the right beliefs, and 
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again we create those beliefs by attending to those aspects of the 
world which support those beliefs, and ignoring those aspects which 
tend to undermine them. In this case the desired belief is the 
belief that other people are good, kind, virtuous, and generally 
worthy of all our attempts to bring them happiness. This sort of 
belief will be supported by all the good we know to reside in others, 
and be contradicted by knowledge of the evil which lurks in the hearts 
of men. These beliefs can be encouraged, therefore, by attending to 
the good qualities of others and by not paying attention to their bad, 
by taking great pains to find out their good qualities and by not 
making similar efforts to find out their bad points, by believing the 
8 
good we hear of others and by suspending judgement on the bad we hear, 
and by reflecting that human nature is never intentlonally vicious. 
This almost amounts to a programme of intentional self-deceit, for 
doing what we can to encourage a good opinion of our fellow men, and 
for systematically ignoring their worser aspects. This attitude is 
created by the desire to have benevolent desires, plus the realization 
that we are more likely to feel benevolent towards those we have a 
high opinion of. 
It may be thought that this desire to be virtuous is a strong 
desire if it can have such an influence on our system of beliefs, but 
it should be remembered that the desire for virtue is created, for 
Hutcheson, by a belief about the possibilities of the pleasures of 
virtue. These pleasures he views as being very great indeed; in 
fact, he thinks them the greatest of which mankind is capable. So 
8. Hutcheson thinks we can always suspend our judgement in the face 
of evidence, provided that the evidence does not arrount to a 
conclusive proof (Essay, p. 33). 
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it is not very surprising that the desire they generate is a strong 
desire. 
Perhaps this is a good point to note the most curious feature of 
this theory of Hutcheson's. The desire for the pleasures of virtue 
is a self-interested desire; but it is a desire to have the entirely 
non-self-interested desire of benevolence. This means that though 
virtuous actions are not motivated by self-interest, self-interest 
leads us to create the benevolent desires which in turn motivate 
virtuous actions. Hutcheson is quite explicitly aware of this point: 
"Benevolence is our greatest happiness; and thence we may 
resolve to cultivate, as much as possible, this sweet 
disposition, and to despise every opposite interest. 
Not that we can be truly virtuous, if we intend only to 
obtain the pleasure which arises from benevolence, 
without the love of others: nay, this very pleasure is 
founded on our being conscious of disinterested love to 
others, as the spring of our actions. But self-interest 
may be our motive in studying to raise these kind 
affections, and to continue in this agreeable state; 
tho' it cannot be the sole or principle motive of any 
action, which to our moral sense appears virtuous." 
(Inquiry, p. 197). 
The above sections of this chapter are perhaps in need of summary. 
It was originally suggested that Hutcheson had a problem in explaining 
how the moral sense could influence us towards being virtuous. Any 
desire created by our sense of what was virtuous would be a self-
interested desire for,or caused by, the pleasures of self-approbation. 
But since these would be self-interested desires, any action which 
they motivated would not be approved by the moral sense; thus the object 
of the desire, self-approbation, is inconsistent with the nature of 
the desire itself. Despite this, Hutcheson thinks that such desire 
can motivate actions; but they cannot for him motivate virtuous actions. 
Hutcheson's solution to this problem was then explained. The 
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moral sense creates desires, not for objects in the world, but for 
objects within us. We desire that benevolence should result in 
actions, and we desire that we should have benevolent desires. These 
desires for the control of our desires lead us to try to control our 
beliefs about possible pleasures and pains, for desires cannot be 
controlled by direct volition. There are three fundamental ways in 
which we can cause or encourage benevolent desires. Firstly, we 
can remove the competition from self-interest by realizing that our 
greatest self-interest actually lies in being virtuous. Secondly, we 
can encourage our benevolent feelings by concentrating on or attending 
to the pleasure we can give others. Finally, we can create as good 
an opinion of our fellow men as possible by attending to their better 
aspects and ignoring their faults. By these methods, benevolent 
desires and actions, and thus virtue, is encouraged. The motive for 
this encouragement is provided by the pleasures of the rroral sense. 
Thus the moral sense greatly influences us towards being virtuous, 
but one is not involved in the paradox of pursuing the good of others 
from a motive of self-interest. 
The ingenuity of this solution may strike some as being rather ad 
hoc, and as having little relation to reality. I now wish to 
establish that this is not the case, and that the theory cashed out 
of its philosophical terms makes eminent good sense as a moral theory 
for human beings. 
If one removes Hutcheson's claims from his terminology of 
'pleasure and pain', 'desires', and the 'moral sense', I think the 
essence of his theory of how the moral sense influences our behaviour 
is as follows: Our knowledge of the virtue of benevolent actions 
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causes us to wish that we had more generous feelings towards our 
fellow men. Such kind feelings cannot be called up at will, but will 
be enhanced if we take an optimistic view of the virtues of others, 
and if we attend carefully to the good we can actually do for others. 
We can attempt to be more virtuous by encouraging the generous 
affections we have towards other people. 
"But virtue itself, or good dispositions of mind, 
are not directly taught, or produc'd by instruction; 
they must be originally implanted in our nature 
by its great Author, and afterwards strengthen'd 
and confirm'd by our own cultivation." (Inquiry, 
p. 271). 
Central to this theory is the claim that on particular occasions 
our feelings are more likely to influence our behaviour than rational 
considerations. This means that the desire for virtue is not so much 
a motive to particular good acts, but rather is a motive to try and 
develop within oneself the sort of personality in which generous 
feelings will more or less automatically lead one to do the good. 
" ... in moral philosophy, which is the art of living well, the 
importance of the matter requires habit and continual exercise 
this in our present degenerate state must require almost continual 
attention and internal discipline ..• " (Introduction, p. 96). Here we 
can see the importance of preaching to Hutcheson's concept of a moral 
philosopher; it is a vital part of the philosopher's job to bring to 
the attention of others those considerations which are likely to lead 
to a more generous personality. We will not always have time when 
confronted by particular moral dilemmas for these complicated 
reasonings to generate benevolent feelings, but reflecting on the 
desire for virtue in our spare time will hopefully instil in our 
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nature the generosity and benevolence which are the immediate motives 
for morally good acts. If one accepts that the morality of 
particular acts lies in the motive for which they are done, then 
interpreting the desire for virtue as the desire to see that morally 
good motives are a prominent part of our character makes perfectly 
good sense. I think Hutcheson has successfully solved the problem 
with which this chapter began. 
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6. Hutcheson vs. the Rationalists 
i. The Structure of Hutcheson's Argument 
In writing his first book, the 'Inquiry', Hutcheson was primarily 
interested in presenting a view of morality which was an alternative 
to the egoistical theories of Hobbes and Mandeville. But within 
three or four months of the publication of the 'Inquiry' in January 
1 
or February of 1725, Hutcheson's theory was criticized from the 
viewpoint of a school of moral philosophers who had an alternative 
reply to the egoists. With the publication of a letter from Gilbert 
Burnet in the April 1725 issue of the London Journal, Hutcheson found 
that he needed to defend his theory from the criticisms of the 
rationalists, as well as replying to the egoists. There ensued a 
public correspondence between Hutcheson and Burnet on the role of 
reason in morality. Hutcheson replied to Burnet in the London Journal 
in June and October, 1725, but then discontinued the debate because he 
felt that his reply to the rationalists required a more lengthy 
development. The result was a treatise, the 'Illustrations', which 
he added to his next book which he published in 1728. In the 
'Illustrations', Hutcheson criticizes the rationalists' position 
primarily as it is presented by Wollaston and Samuel Clarke. 
But the 'Illustrations' was not the end of the debate, for 
Richard Price was later to criticize Hutcheson from a better developed 
rationalist's position. However, a word of caution must be added 
here. To call Clarke, Wollaston, and Price all rationalists tends to 
obscure an important fact; the issue between Hutcheson and the 
1. On the question of the month of publication, cf. Scott, p. 31. 
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rationalists as Hutcheson interprets it in the 'Illustrations', is 
quite different from the issue between Hutcheson and Price. The other 
sections of this chapter deal with Hutcheson's criticism of rationalism, 
and Price's criticisms of Hutcheson, but comment must be made first on 
the issues involved, for the nature of the issues determines the nature 
of the criticisms. 
Hutcheson interprets the rationalists as making two separate 
claims; firstly, that moral concepts are reducible to, or definable in 
terms of, non-moral concepts which originate in the faculty of reason; 
and secondly, that reason provides the motivation for good acts. It 
is in the context of separating these two assertions that Hutcheson 
draws the distinction between justifying and exciting reasons. A 
justifying reason is a reason for approving morally of an act; an 
exciting reason is the consideration or desire which motivates the 
act. The argument of the 'Illustrations' is designed primarily to 
show that "all exciting reasons presuppose instincts and affections 
and the justifying presuppose a moral sense." (Illustrations, p. 121, 
also p. 130). Hutcheson assumes throughout that if he can prove that 
exciting reasons presuppose affections, (i.e. that there is a desire 
which is the motivating cause of every human action), then he has 
proved that reason cannot provide the motive for virtuous acts. This 
is probably an uncontentious assmnption, for few would assign desires 
to the faculty of reason. But Hutcheson makes a similar assumption 
in the case of moral approval, and this assumption has been questioned. 
He assumes that if he can show that moral concepts are not reducible 
to the non-moral concepts usually associated with the faculty of 
reason, then he has shown that justifying reasons, and hence moral 
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approval, presupposes the moral sense. 
This last point is of vital importance, for it explains the 
nature of Hutcheson's argument with the rationalists. Hutcheson is 
not arguing against the claim that moral ideas, as moral ideas, 
originate or are intuited by the faculty of reason. This was the 
position which Price was to take much later, but it is not the 
position which Hutcheson attributed to the rationalists, 2 and hence 
was not the position he was criticizing. Hutcheson thought that 
the rationalists were trying to offer a reduction of moral concepts to 
such non-moral concepts as truth, reason, or "significancy of truth". 
It is this reduction that he is objecting to, for it contradicts his 
claim that there are moral ideas which are simple and unanalysable. 
Once the reduction of moral to non-moral ideas is refuted, and the 
claim that moral ideas are simple is defended from this criticism, 
Hutcheson assumes that he has defended successfully his moral sense 
theory. The rationalist attack as he sees it is on the simplicity of 
moral ideas, not on their origin in a sense. The possibility that 
moral ideas are simple and irreducible to non-moral ideas, but arise 
in the faculty of reason, not in a sense, does not seem to have 
occurred to him (except for the possibility of virtue being a relation, 
which I will consider in section iv of this chapter). He would 
probably have considered an argument over whether simple moral ideas 
arise in the faculty of reason, or in a moral sense, a mere verbal 
quibble; the merits of such a position will be considered below in the 
content of Price's criticism of the moral sense. 
2. Throughout this chapter, it is the position that Hutcheson 
attributed to the rationalist which is under discussion. Whether 
Clarke, Wollaston, or any one else actually held the position 
which Hutcheson is attacking is a question I will not attempt to 
answer. 
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The fact that Hutcheson is criticizing the reduction of moral to 
non-rcoral concepts, rather than arguing that simple moral ideas arise 
in a sense and not in the faculty of reason, explains the structure 
of his argument against the rationalists. He first spends a great 
deal of his time stating precisely the various possible rationalist's 
reductions as he sees them. This was made necessary by the fact that 
neither Wollaston nor Clarke, and certainly not Burnet, were very clear 
writers. There is also the possibility that these writers were not 
attempting the sort of reduction that Hutcheson was criticizing, but 
the accuracy of Hutcheson's interpretation is not the topic of this 
chapter. Hutcheson thought that the rationalists were proposing a 
number of different reductions, and in his attempts to clarify their 
arguments, he often himself proposes several possible reductions for 
a particular rationalist phrase or definition. This means that he 
has to reply to a multitude of possible reductions, and that he cannot 
rely on a single refutation of rationalism. The effect of this state 
of affairs is to make the structure of his arguments against the 
rationalists similar to the structure of his arguments against egoism; 
in both cases he must reply separately to the various possible 
reductions. The purpose of this chapter is not to follow all of 
Hutcheson's discussion of rationalism, but rather to make clear the 
sort of criticisms he makes of the rationalist's reductions. 
If the naturalistic fallacy be the fallacy of trying to define 
moral concepts in terms of non-moral concepts, then the above discussion 
makes it clear that Hutcheson is accusing the rationalists of committing 
the naturalistic fallacy. Which non-rroral concepts he thinks the 
rationalists are using will become clear in the next section. Here 
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I wish to point out that Hutcheson's comments on circular definitions, 
which he makes throughout the 'Illustrations', only make sense when 
seen in the light of the accusation that the naturalistic fallacy is 
central to the rationalists' position. On several occasions, 
Hutcheson points out that a proposed rationalist's definition 
presupposes some other moral concept; that is, that there is a moral 
term in the definiens. Having made this point, he usually drops the 
argument there, as though he thought that this was a conclusive 
refutation of the rationalist in this instance. This makes sense if 
one sees Hutcheson as arguing against the reduction of moral to non-
moral terms, for if there is a moral term in the definiens, then there 
is no such reduction. Since that is all that Hutcheson is trying to 
prove, he is right in thinking that he need say no more. For example, 
to some of Wollaston's attempts to reduce moral good to "significancy 
of truth", Hutcheson seems to think that the following is a conclusive 
refutation: 
"One may see that he has had some other idea of 
moral good previous to this signif icancy of truth 
by his introducing, in the very explication of it, 
words presupposing the ideas of morality previously 
known, such as 'right', 'obligation', 'lie', 'his' 
denoting 'property'." (Illustrations, p. 155) 
If one sees Wollaston as arguing that moral ideas can be reduced to 
non-moral ideas, and this is what Hutcheson thinks he is doing, then 
this does indeed show that he has failed in his task. 
In fact, this question of definitions provides Hutcheson with what 
is perhaps the only argument he applies to all of the rationalists. 
He invites us at one point to try to substitute the various definitions 
of 'obligation' which any philosopher offers, for the term 'obligation' 
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in the rest of that philosopher's works, and see if this makes sense. 
He obviously thinks, though he does not directly prove, that there is 
no definition of 'obligation' which will survive this test: 
"Many other confused definitions have been given 
of obligation by no obscure names in the learned 
world .••. To pursue them all would be endless; 
only let the definitions be substituted in the 
place of the word obligation, in other parts of 
each writer, and let it be observed whether it 
makes good sense or not." (Illustrations, p. 130-
131) 




that it is very questionable whether or not 
Hutcheson's own definition of obligation will survive this test. 4 
The possibility that Hutcheson himself has committed the naturalistic 
fallacy by reducing moral approval to pleasure is examined above in 
Chapter 3. 
The structure of Hutcheson's other line of criticism of the 
rationalists is in some ways similar to the structure of his attempts 
to refute their reduction of moral to non-moral concepts. The 
rationalists, according to Hutcheson, not only tried to reduce the 
concepts of moral approval to concepts which arose in the faculty of 
reason; they also committed the error of locating in the faculty of 
reason the motive for doing virtuous acts. Since for Hutcheson, 
desires cannot originate in the faculty of reason, this proposal was 
inconsistent with his theory that every action presupposes a desire as 
its motive, and further it was inconsistent with his view that a 
3. Raphael, The Moral Sense, p. 36. 
4. Hutcheson defines 'obligation' in Illustrations, p. 130. 
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specific desire, benevolence, is the motive for all virtuous acts. 
Thus Hutcheson could no more accept an attempt to locate the motive 
for virtuous actions in reason, than he could accept the egoists' 
attempts to locate the motive in self-interest. Hutcheson offers 
several critiques of various suggestions of how and why reason is the 
motive for virtuous actions. As in the case of the egoists' 
reductions and the rationalists' other reductions, Hutcheson finds 
that he has to reply separately to several proposals; hence his argument 
has a similar structure in this sense in all three cases. However, on 
the question of whether reason is the motive for virtuous actions, 
Hutcheson does have one argument which he can apply to all suggestions; 
that is, he can always argue that reason cannot motivate any sort of 
action, and hence there is no possjble way for it to motivate virtuous 
actions. These various arguments are the topic of section iii of 
this chapter. That section will also make comments on Hutcheson's 
explanation of why it seems plausjble to suggest that reason is the 
motive for virtuous actions. 
Price's criticism of Hutcheson, although from a rationalist's 
position, is not an attempt to defend the sort of rationalist position 
which Hutcheson was criticizing. The issue between Price and 
Hutcheson, and the issue between Hutcheson and the earlier rationalists, 
are quite distinct. Price accepted that some moral ideas are simple 
and unanalysable, but he disagreed with Hutcheson that this implied 
that they were the impressions of a moral sense. Price claimed that 
moral ideas are directly intuited by the faculty of reason. 
Hutcheson had failed to anticipate this possjbility, probably because 
he would have viewed it as a verbal quibble over whether the moral 
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faculty was to be called reason or sense. In section v of this 
chapter, I will try to show that Price's criticisms are more 
substantial than that. Hutcheson did consider, and reject, one 
possible theory of reason as the origin of moral ideas which was not 
explicitly an attempt to reduce moral to non-moral concepts. In the 
'Illustrations', he criticized the view that moral ideas are relations, 
and hence known by reason. His rejection of this view I will consider 
in section iv, but the following section will make it clear that this 
is not the position which Price held. 
In remaining clear on the different issues involved in Hutcheson's 
attack on the rationalists, and Price's attack on Hutcheson, it is, I 
have stressed, important to keep separate Price's position and the 
position of the earlier rationalists as Hutcheson saw it. Price is 
obviously an intuitionist of sorts; Hutcheson saw the earlier 
rationalists as reductionists. However, confusion can arise not only 
if one fails to see that the earlier rationalists and Price's position 
are different; it can also arise if one is not clear on the fact that 
two aspects of Hutcheson's theory are involved. As was discussed at 
length in Chapter 3 above, the moral sense has for Hutcheson two 
aspects which he fails adequately to separate or even ensure are 
mutually consistent. On the one hand, he maintains that moral ideas 
are simple and unanalysable, and that this is why there is the need 
to postulate the existence of the moral sense as their source. It 
is this intuitionist aspect of his theory which he opposes to the 
rationalist reductions. On the other hand, Hutcheson also tends to 
identify moral perception with feelings. Unless one accepts 
Hutcheson's view that feeling and perception are the same sort of 
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thing, then the identification of moral ideas with a type of feeling 
looks like a reduction of moral ideas to feelings. It was to this 
aspect of Hutcheson's theory that Price opposed his intuitionism; 
Price interpreted Hutcheson as a type of emotivist. In the context 
of the two debates with the rationalists, the emotivist and 
intuitionist aspects of Hutcheson's theory became confused with the 
question of a naturalistic reduction. Hutcheson opposes his 
intuitionism against the rationalists' reduction, but is in turn 
accused of reductionism from Price's intuitionist position. One 
must see the issues involved in Hutcheson's critique of rationalism 
from the intuitionist side of his theory, and see the later debate with 
Price from the emotivist side of his theory. 
ii. Arguments against the Rationalists 
In the 'Illustrations', sections i to iii, Hutcheson interprets 
several passages of the rationalists' writings as being attempts to 
reduce moral concepts to the non-moral concepts usually associated with 
reason. There are basically four such suggestions that he deals with; 
he considers the possibilities that the virtue of actions may consist 
in "conformity to truth", in conformity to "a truth showing an action 
to be fit to attain an end", in conformity to a truth that an end is 
reasonable, or in the "significancy of truth". Hutcheson replies to 
each of these separately, but the sort of replies he gives can be 
divided into three types. To some suggestions, he points out that 
all actions, virtuous or otherwise, fit the proposed criterion for 
virtue; this obviously eliminates the proposal as distinguishing 
virtuous from non-virtuous actions. Secondly, to some suggestions 
200 
he replies by pointing out that the proposed criterion for virtue 
presupposes another moral concept. Why Hutcheson thinks that this is 
a suitable reply I have discussed in the previous section above. 
Finally, to some suggestions he gives examples to show that the 
proposed criterion for virtue does not draw the line between virtue 
and vice in a place which is at all acceptable. Perhaps this procedure 
relies on our moral intuitions, but Hutcheson's examples are not 
always contentious ones. The following discussion of the four 
rationalists' proposals and Hutcheson's criticism of them, should 
clarify these three types of replies. 
1. Hutcheson first interprets the phrase "conformity to truth" as 
meaning that there are true propositions which can be stated about the 
action. This seems a curious suggestion, but it follows from 
Hutcheson's definition of reason and the rationalists' suggestion 
that the virtue of an action consists in its reasonableness. Hutcheson 
begins this chapter by saying: 
"Since reason is understood to denote our power of 
finding out true propositions, reasonableness must 
denote the same thing with conformity to true 
propositions or to truth." (Illustrations, p. 120) 
Hutcheson's reply to the suggestion that the virtue of an act consists 
in the fact that the act conforms to a true proposition is to point 
out that all actions, virtuous as well as vicious, conform to some 
true propositions; thus this cannot be the criterion for virtue. 
He sums up the argument thus: 
"If conforrni ty to truth, or reasonable, denot_e 
nothing else but that 'an action is the object 
of a true proposition', it is plain that all 
actions should be approved equally, since as 
many truths may be made about the worst, as can 
be made about the best." (Illustrations, p. 128) 
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2. The second possibility that Hutcheson considers is that the virtue 
of an action consists in its conformity to a truth showing it to be 
fit to attain an end. Since the relation of means to ends is in 
fact a relation for Hutcheson, and hence must be known by reason, 
there is, he admits, a sense in which an action is reasonable if it is 
the means to a desired end. However, he objects to this notion of 
reasonableness being the criterion for virtue on the same grounds as 
he rejected the first suggestion; namely, that all actions, virtuous 
or vicious, have this property. 
"Here it is plain, 'a truth showing an action 
to be fit to attain an end, ' does not justify 
it; nor do we approve a subordinate end for 
any truth which only shows it to be fit to 
promote the ultimate end; for the worst actions 
may be conducive to their ends, and reasonable 
in that sense." (Illustrations, p. 128-129) 
3. Hutcheson concludes from his discussion of the second suggestion 
above, that the issue must be one of judging ends and not means. So 
the question becomes: "Does a conformity to any truth make us approve 
of an ultimate end, previously to any moral sense?" (Illustrations, 
p. 129). Hutcheson then lists several truths that have been suggested 
as the criterion for virtuous ends. His procedure in objecting to 
these is different from the first two cases, for obviously not all 
actions conform to a given end. To each of four suggested ends he 
points out either that the end is approved for some other non-moral 
reason, such as self-love, or if it is approved of for itself, then 
there must be a faculty in us which so approves it. This, he 
exclaims with triumph, must be the moral sense. 
a. The first truth he considers is "It is the end proposed by 
the Deity". But he then asks; "But why do we approve concurring with 
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divine ends? This reason is given, 'He is our benefactor'. But 
then, for what reason do we approve concurring with a benefactor? 
Here we must recur to a sense." (Illustrations, p. 129). There are I 
think, two possible interpretations of this passage. The first, 
5 
suggested by Raphael, interprets Hutcheson as saying that the list 
of 'reasons for' approving of something cannot be infinite, and that 
since we must stop giving reasons somewhere, the last term must 
presuppose a (moral} sense. To this argument Raphael quite rightly 
objects that Hutcheson gives us no reason for thinking that the last 
term must be a sense perception. A similar impossibility of giving 
an infinite series of 'reasons for' applies in the case of believing 
things to be true, but even Hutcheson admits that the last term in 
that sort of sequence might be discernible by reason and not a 
sense. Raphael, very plausibly, if one accepts this first 
interpretation of Hutcheson's argument, suggests why Hutcheson might 
be confused on this point: 
"But Hutcheson just assumes that this final 
discernment must be made by sense. He never 
considers the possibility that reason may be 
a faculty of immediate apprehension. I suspect 
that his failure to consider this possibility 
lies in a confusion of two senses of the word 
'reason'. He thinks that to say something is 
perceived by 'reason' is the same as saying 
'a reason' can be given for it. This is clear 
from his language throughout this section. 11 6 
It is, of course, an error to think that a reason can be given for 
every truth perceived by reason; and presumably Hutcheson would have 
agreed if the point had been explicitly put to him. 
5. Raphael, The Moral Sense, p. 34. 
6. Raphael, The Moral Sense, p. 35. 
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The other interpretation of this passage in Hutcheson has the 
advantage over the first interpretation of being a better argument and 
perhaps not as open to criticism. However, it has the disadvantage of 
assuming that Hutcheson failed to express himself at all adequately on 
this occasion. Still, I think this second interpretation is consistent 
with this passage, and is perhaps supported by the context of the rest 
of this section in Hutcheson. Hutcheson is trying throughout this 
section to prove that moral approval cannot be reduced to discerning 
truths. His point in this passage may be that no matter what truth 
is offered as justifying approval, one can always ask 'But why should 
the fact that this is true make me approve?' Thus his argument may 
be that no statement of fact, no true proposition, can ever be offered 
as a reason for approving of an end because one can always ask 'But 
why should that truth be a reason for approving of this end?' This 
interpretation suggests that the problem is not that an infinite 
number of reasons cannot be given, but rather tha~ no reason can ever 
be given at all. Or, to be more precise, that a true proposition can 
never constitute a reason for approving. The context of the rest of 
this section suggests that what he ought to be trying to prove is that 
approval cannot be reduced to any particular true proposition, and I 
think he is right in pointing out that for any proposition which is a 
statement of fact, this is true. And I think his argument is a valid 
proof of this point. 
Part of the difficulty in interpreting this passage may lie in 
the examples that Hutcheson uses. To Hutcheson and the audience 
for which he was writing, that a certain end was "proposed by the 
Deity" and that "God is our benefactor", were statements of fact; 
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their truth would not be in doubt. The question is - given their 
truth, do we approve of ends because they are in conformity with 
them? The question of discerning truth is not what is at stake. 
Rather, on this interpretation, he is concerned with the role of true 
propositions in justifying approval. 
There is, I think, one possible objection to Hutcheson's argument 
as this second interpretation presents it. I agree that for any 
statement of fact one can always ask 'But why should that truth make 
me approve of a certain end?' But what if someone advances a 
proposition as true (and hence discerned by reason, Hutcheson must 
admit) which contains within it the claim that one ought to approve of 
some end? In this case it would not make sense to ask 'But why 
approve?'; the reason for approving is contained in the (true) 
proposition. An example might be: "We ought to approve of what the 
Deity wills". Hutcheson '·s reply to this would be to point out that 
such a proposition contains a moral term, and hence that one is not 
defining moral approval by conformity to some truth, for one is not 
explaining moral approval at all if the proposition contains a 
reference to approval. This point I will return to below in item c. 
b. The second truth Hutcheson considers is that the "study of the 
publick good tends to the advantage of the agent." This, he points 
out, is to approve because of self-interest, not because the principle 
is true, or conforms to reason. 
c. Hutcheson also considers the truth "that it is best all be 
happy. " He shows that either this presupposes a moral term (i.e. 
'morally best'), or that the moral sense approves of happiness. 
These examples are intended to show that if a truth, as known by 
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reason, is accepted as a moral criterion, then the moral approval of 
that truth, not the acceptance of the truth as true, presupposes a 
faculty or sense of moral approval. If the truth contains a moral 
term, then for Hutcheson the attempted reduction of moral terms to the 
non-moral notion of truth would have failed. Hutcheson considers one 
truth of this form; to the possible truth "that it is (morally) best 
all be happy", Hutcheson replies that by this "they explain one word 
by itself in a circle." (Illustrations, p. 129). His point is that 
if a truth contains a moral term (such as 'morally best') one cannot 
define morality as conformity to that truth, for the truth presupposes 
morality. 
4. In Section III of the 'Illustrations', Hutcheson considers 
Wollaston's theory that the morality of an action depends on whether 
the action signifies a truth or a falsehood. Since truth and 
falsehood are known by reason and not by sense, if Wollaston is correct, 
then Hutcheson's moral sense theory must be in error. But the nature 
of the theory that Hutcheson is refuting should be noted; Wollaston, 
as interpreted by Hutcheson, is not arguing that reason is the source 
of basic, irreducible moral ideas, but rather is arguing that moral 
ideas are reducible to the non-moral ideas of truth and falsity. In 
fairness to Wollaston, it should be mentioned that the sort of 
criticism that Hutcheson makes of his theory may refute a theory that 
Wollaston did not hold. Hume's critique of Wollaston is similar to 
Hutcheson's in that Hume also is criticizing the reduction of moral 
. . h . f h 7 qualities to t e notion o trut . But Hume's critique has been 
examined in meticulous detail and found wanting on the grounds that 
7. Hume, Treatise, p. 458. 
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Wollaston did not hold the theory that Hume is objecting to, and that 
Hume begs the question on the real points at issue between himself and 
8 
Wollaston. However, it is not within the design of this thesis to 
examine Hutcheson's interpretation of Wollaston for accuracy. Rather 
I will confine the discussion to Hutcheson's critique of Wollaston's 
theory as Hutcheson interpreted it; and Hutcheson clearly interpreted 
it as an attempt to reduce moral to non-moral qualities. 
As is usual with Hutcheson's comments on the rationalists, a great 
deal of this third section is devoted to proposing interpretations of 
what the rationalists said. Wollaston, according to Hutcheson, had 
claimed that virtue is the "significancy of truth in actions." 
(Illustrations, p. 146). Hutcheson then proceeds to analyse the 
notions of truth and significance as they might apply to actions; he 
suggests a multitude of possibilities, and for each he gives reasons 
why it is not a satisfactory analysis of moral concepts. Not all 
of these interpretations of "significancy of truth in actions" need 
to be examined, for the sort of argument which Hutcheson uses will be 
clear from a few examples. Hutcheson begins by distinguishing a 
number of aspects of "signifying"; e.g. what the agent intended to 
signify, what the observer understood as being signified, what a 
knowledgeable observer would have understood, what was suggested but 
not asserted, etc. No fewer than ten aspects of signifying are given 
9 for the act of saying a sentence, and similar distinctions are made 
8. Cf. '!'Weyman, chapter 5, sec. ii and chapter 4, sec. _iii. 
9. Illustrations, p. 147. Hutcheson, probably rightly, considers 
that the strongest case for Wollaston's theory can be made with 
respect to speech, but he concludes that even in speech morality 
does not consist only in signifying truth. Cf. Illustrations, 
p. 149. 
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throughout the rest of the chapter in other contexts. The most 
important idea lying behind most of these distinctions is that which 
is known today as the use-mention distinction. Hutcheson notes that 
mentioning a sentence to convey a meaning but not to assert anything, 
as in giving an example or in fiction, is quite distinct from using a 
sentence or act to assert the truth of a proposition. Significance 
in the sense of meaning is common to both of these, but it is obvious 
that this sort of significance is not the origin of morality, for 
merely mentioning a falsehood is not evil. "If it were, then every 
dramatic writer drawing evil characters, every history-painter, every 
writer of allegories or epics, every philosopher teaching the nature 
of contradictory propositions, would be thought criminal." 
(Illustrations, p. 151). 
Hutcheson has equally little trouble in showing that morality 
does not originate in what an observer takes to be signified by an 
action, for the morality of one person cannot depend on the powers of 
understanding in the observer: 
"Did virtue consist in this first sort of significancy 
of truth, it would depend not upon the agent but the 
sagacity of the observer. The acute penetration of 
one would constitute an action virtuous, and the 
rashness or stupidity of another would make it vicious. 
And the most barbarous actions would raise no false 
opinion of the sentiments of the agent in a judicious 
observer." (Illustrations, p. 151) 
This seems to leave only the possibility that the morality of . 
actions originates in some fashion or other in what the agent intends 
to signify. Hutcheson is quick to point out that this is to locate 
morality in intentions and not in significancy, but he also tries to 
show that an action which does not mislead, and which does not intend 
to, may still be vicious. For example, if a person were in fact 
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malicious, then a malicious act would mislead no-one about the truth, 
but would still be an evil action (cf. Illustrations, p. 154). He 
tries to show, mainly by example, that one can be entirely truthful 
and still commit evil acts. 
The opinion that morality is reducible to signifying truth may 
originate, Hutcheson suggests, in the application to lying of the 
theory known today as rule-utiliarianism (cf. Illustrations, p. 148-
149). Some authors have claimed that lying is never justified in 
particular cases, for even if greater good would appear to result in 
that instance, the resulting loss of mutual confidence is always 
greater: 
"Some stricter moralists assert that the public 
evils which would ensue from destroying mutual 
confidence by allowing to speak propositions known 
to be false on any occasion are so great that no 
particular advantage to be expected from speaking 
known logical falsehoods can ever over-balance 
them; that all use of speech supposes a tacit 
convention of sincerity, the violation of which is 
always evil." (Illustrations, p. 148-149) 
Hutcheson points out that this is not to make truth the ultimate 
moral quality, for truth has been justified in terms of the public 
good; it is only because lying has a "tendency to the public 
detriment of society" that it is censored. (It is interesting to 
note in passing that having recognized the act-rule utilitarian 
distinction in this context, Hutcheson never seems to take any further 
interest in the issue, and never applies it to his own theory). 
Hutcheson also uses against Wollaston the claim that the reduction 
of moral ideas to significancy of truth is unacceptable if reference 
is made to other moral ideas; 
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"One may see that he has had some other idea of 
moral good previous to this signif icancy of truth 
by his introducing, in the very explication of 
it, words presupposing the ideas of morality 
previously known, such as 'right', 'obligation', 
'lie', 'his' denoting 'property'." (Illustrations, 
p. 155) 
This argument makes it clear what Hutcheson is trying to argue 
against in this chapter. He is not arguing against the view that 
morality has its origins in conformity to a moral truth which is 
perceived by our faculty of reason; rather he is arguing that moral 
ideas are not reducible to the non-moral ideas of truth, signifying 
truth, etc. Hence he is not begging the question when he points 
out that Wollaston's definition of moral good presupposes some other 
moral term; pointing this out refutes Wollaston's approach as 
Hutcheson interprets it. 
iii. Reason not the Motive for Virtuous Acts 
The basic reason why the faculty of reason cannot be the origin 
of the motives to virtuous actions, is that for Hutcheson, reason 
cannot motivate any sort of actions, virtuous or otherwise. All 
intentional actions are motivated by desires, and desires do not 
10 arise in the faculty of reason. This, as I have pointed out 
11 elsewhere, is not to deny that some desires are reasonable in the 
sense that they are calm and general. 
For Hutcheson, reason's only role is to discover truth: in 
particular, to discover truths about relations, including means - ends 
10. Cf. above, 2-ii-d. 
11. Cf. above, 2-ii-c. 
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relations. Thus his claim that reason does not motivate is equivalent 
to the claim that knowledge of truth by itself cannot motivate actions. 
Something else (namely, a desire), must be present for there to be 
a motive. Hutcheson proves this by a procedure similar to that by 
which he proves that truth by itself is not sufficient to make us 
12 
approve an end. He argues (Illustrations, p. 123), that whatever 
truth may be offered as a reason or motive for pursuing an end, one 
can always ask, 'but why should that truth influence my actions?' 
No truth can ever motivate action, he concludes, and since reason's 
only role is to establish truth, reason cannot motivate. 
Hutcheson expresses this conclusion by saying that there are no 
exciting reasons which do not presuppose desires. Since by exciting 
reasons he means that which causes an action, he is claiming that all 
actions are caused by desires. From the conclusions reached above in 
Chapter 2 about the nature of desires, this present claim that the 
cause of any action must be a desire can be cashed out into the 
following propositions: 
Firstly, since desires are mental entities of which we have 
direct awareness, all intentional actions must be preceded by a certain 
type of mental entity of which we can be reflectively aware. Hutcheson 
would prove this by an appeal to introspection. 
Secondly, since desires are caused by beliefs about possible 
pleasures and pains, all intentional actions must be preceded by some 
. 1 d . 13 beliefs about possible p easures an pains. Such beliefs would be 
established by the faculty of reason; so Hutcheson must admit that 
12. Cf. above, 6-ii. 
13. Cf. above, 2-ii. 
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reason can indirectly motivate actions, for it establishes beliefs 
which cause desires which in turn cause actions. 
Taken together, these two claims suggest that the only difference 
between Hutcheson and a rationalist who claimed that reason, by its 
discovery of truth, can directly motivate actions, is that Hutcheson 
insists on inserting a middle term, desires, of which we are directly 
conscious. But why does Hutcheson think he needs this middle term? 
His argument that one can always ask why a truth should motivate, 
seems to suggest that Hutcheson thought he needed desires as an occult 
property, as the eighteenth century would have called it. By this I 
mean a property by which one explains how A (beliefs) can cause B 
(actions) by postulating a middle term c (desires), such that C is 
defined as 'that in virtue of which A causes B'. In other words, 
Hutcheson might be accused of postulating an unnecessary term, 'desires', 
for the purpose of relating two terms which can be related directly. 
That this accusation has an element of truth in it, is indicated by 
the fact that some modern discussions of desires, based as they are on 
more sophisticated post-Humean notions of cause, interpret desires not 
as entities but as dispositions which correlate beliefs and actions. 
(Nagel's approach is something like this.) I think this is an 
important criticism of Hutcheson, for in the end it is hard to see why 
he needs desires as an intermediary between beliefs and actions. 
But another reason why Hutcheson may have thought he needed 
desires is that desires act as a device to limit which beliefs can 
cause actions. The only beliefs which can cause desires are for 
Hutcheson beliefs about possible pleasures and pains, either our own 
or someone else's. On this theory, the notion of desires is a way 
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of saying that beliefs can only motivate actions if there is something 
in us already, (i.e. a disposition to form desires), in virtue of which 
some beliefs do, and some do not, influence actions. I think, in 
fact, that an argument of this sort, though nowhere expressed in 
Hutcheson's writings, is the reason behind his theory of desires, and 
his insistence that all exciting reasons presuppose desires. And this 
also makes clearer what is the real difference between Hutcheson and 
philosophers like Price who claim that reason by itself can motivate. 
For Price, actions can be motivated by beliefs about the rightness or 
wrongness of those actions. But even if Hutcheson accepted Price's 
definitions of right and wrong, he would have to deny that beliefs 
about which actions are right or wrong could motivate (even via desires), 
because such beliefs are not about possible pleasures or pains. 
To conclude this brief section, let me summarize these points. 
Reason cannot motivate virtuous actions for Hutcheson, because reason 
cannot motivate actions at all. Reason can indirectly cause actions, 
because some rational beliefs cause desires, which in turn can cause 
actions. However, only certain beliefs, (i.e. those about possible 
pleasures and pains), can cause actions in this fashion. Since this 
is not the sort of rational belief which rationalists like Price 
believe are the motives for virtuous actions, the difference between 
Hutcheson and Price on this issue lies in more than the fact that 
Hutcheson inserts desires in the causal chain between beliefs and 
actions. 
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iv. Moral Ideas not Relations 
In Section II of the 'Illustrations', Hutcheson argues against the 
opinion which he attributes to Samuel Clarke that the basic moral idea 
is a relation. Hutcheson's defence of his theory on this point has 
14 been summarized and criticized by Raphael, who sees in this point one 
of the central weaknesses in Hutcheson's case against the rationalists. 
The question of whether basic moral ideas are, or even could be, 
relations is important for Hutcheson's theory, because since relations 
are for him known by the faculty of reason, if moral ideas are 
relations, then there is no need for a moral sense; reason could 
perceive moral ideas. This section is an attempt to consider the 
merits of Hutcheson's case on this point. 
Hutcheson begins his discussion of the possibility that moral 
ideas may be relations by claiming that relations are not actually in 
external objects, but are only ideas which arise upon the mind's 
comparing two objects: " ... relations are not real qualities inherent 
in external natures but only ideas necessarily accompanying our 
perception of two objects at once and comparing them" (Illustrations, 
p. 142). Whether or not this is true, and whether or not it is a 
criticism of Clarke, it does not seem to be important for the question 
of whether moral ideas can be relations on Hutcheson's theory. This 
is because moral ideas do not for Hutcheson represent actual qualities 
in external objects, 15 so the fact that relations do not actually 
represent external qualities either, does not answer the question of 
14. Raphael, The Moral Sense, p. 38-41. 
15. Cf. above, chapter 3, sec. ii. 
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whether moral ideas are relations. 
Hutcheson then classifies relations into three types; to wit: 
i) relations between inanimate objects; ii) relations between 
inanimate objects and rational agents; iii) and relations between 
rational agents, (cf. Illustrations, p. 142). (Raphael points out 
that this ignores the possibility of a moral relation between a 
rational agent and a sensitive but non-rational creature, but he 
admits that this is a minor point which does not affect the present 
16 
argument.) Hutcheson maintains that moral relations must be of the 
third type, a point which I think can be accepted with Raphael's 
amendment. 
The rest of Hutcheson's discussion is conducted in terms of an 
analysis of the concept of 'fitting' as it might apply to actions. 
This is unfortunate for it leads him to ignore aspects of the question 
he is supposed to be considering in this section; namely, whether or 
not basic moral ideas are relations. 
The word 'fitting' can be applied to actions in one of three ways: 
1. It may mean that an action is fitting as the means to an end. 
Hutcheson has already argued that morality cannot originate in 
the means-ends relation itself, since all actions are the means 
17 to some end. Thus morality cannot originate in this category 
of relations. 
2. If fitting is applied to ends themselves, then it must be a basic 
moral attribute of the end; but this presupposes a moral sense for 
us to perceive that attribute. 
16. Raphael, The Moral Sense, p. 38-39. 
17. Cf. above, chapter 6, sec. ii. 
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3. Fitting could be used to denote an action fitting as the means 
to a morally good end. But this obviously presupposes use # 2 
above. So one can conclude that the second use is the basic one 
in morality. 
In claiming that use# 2 is basic for the use of the word 'fitting' 
in a moral context, and that this use presupposes the moral sense, 
Hutcheson has corrunitted two errors in his attempt to prove his 
. . 1 t t' h b . . . 18 origina con en ion t at asic moral ideas are not relations. 
Firstly, he assumes that a moral relation must be a means-ends 
relation. Since a means-ends relation cannot apply to an ultimate 
end, he assumes that the word 'fitting' as applied to ultimate ends 
must denote a quality or attribute of that end. This is his second 
error, for once he has established that fittingness must denote a 
quality, he uses his empiricist's assumption that all awareness of 
qualities must be by sense perception to conclude that fittingness 
as applied to ends must be known by a moral sense. But this ignores 
the possibility that the end itself is a relation, or that the basic 
moral relation is a relation of the ultimate end which is not a means-
ends relation. For example, suppose one suggested that the ultimate 
moral end was not benevolence, but moral harmony between all rational 
creatures; in this case, the ultimate moral idea is a relation - and 
all relations are for Hutcheson known by reason and not sense. In 
failing to consider such a possibility, he has begged the question as 
to whether basic moral ideas are relations. This is also the conclusion 
. h h 19 which Rap ael reac es. 
18. Raphael points out both these errors, The Moral Sense, p. 39-40. 
19. Raphael, The Moral Sense, p. 41. 
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But I do not think that this is all that there is to be said on 
this topic. Even if Hutcheson's argument that basic moral ideas 
cannot be relations is inconclusive, there still remains the question 
of whether there are elements inherent in Hutcheson's theory which 
would be inconsistent with moral ideas being relational. In fact, I 
wish to suggest that Hutcheson's theory contains elements which would 
make it impossible for him to accept that moral ideas are relational 
without restructuring his entire theory. 
There are two points which I wish to raise in this context. The 
first can best be seen by considering what sort of relations would be 
possible for Hutcheson, and what the nature of those relations must be. 
The relation would have to be between rational agents, and would have 
to contain a reference to benevolence. Thus the following could be 
taken as the most obvious possibility of a moral relation in the 
context of the rest of Hutcheson's thought: 'A is in a position to be 
benevolent to B'; where A is a rational being, and Bis a sentient 
being, rational or not. To ensure that a question of morality arises 
between A and B, and hence to eliminate irrelevant considerations, one 
can assume that A can do an obviously benevolent act for B at very 
little or no cost to himself, and with no detrimental effects to any 
third party or to society at large. Given this situation, there is no 
question that any act of A's to help B is a morally good act. The 
question I wish to raise is this: is it possible that the moral 
quality in the situation arises from the relationship between A and B, 
or must the basic moral idea be subsequent to and distinct from that 
relation? Samuel Clarke would have said the former, Hutcheson the 
latter. I do not wish to suggest that for Clarke, or any other 
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rationalist, moral ideas are reducible to non-rooral relations such as 
'A being in a position to help B'; rather, the suggestion is that 
moral ideas arise from this sort of relationship between people without 
reference to factors beyond this relationship. For Hutcheson, moral 
ideas must ref er to something beyond the relation, for moral ideas 
for him must take into account the motives for actions. Motives are 
not relations; especially not for Hutcheson who means by motives in 
this context desires, and for whom desires are some sort of entities. 20 
It is obvious that the desire of A to help B presupposes that A 
believes that he can help B; that is, it presupposes that A knows of 
the relationship between himself and B. But this does not alter the 
fact that the motive, or the desire to help B, is distinct from that 
relation. The desire is some sort of mental entity in A, of which A 
can have direct internal awareness. This is to say that for 
Hutcheson moral ideas cannot arise out of relations and still arise 
out of knowledge of the motives for acts. This does not, of course, 
prove that Hutcheson is right in locating morality in the motives for 
actions, it is merely to suggest that more is at stake between 
Hutcheson and the rationalists than whether moral ideas are perceived 
by reason or a sense. 
The significance of Hutcheson's location of morality in motives, 
and the violence which would be done to his theory by changing this 
to locating morality in the relationships between people, can best be 
seen from considering the question of whether the motive for virtuous 
acts can be a desire to do one's duty. This question was discussed 




ear ier, where it was decided that a desire to do one's duty was 
paradoxical for Hutcheson because of his location of morality in the 
motives for actions. If, to take Raphael's suggestion, 22 the 
fundamental moral relation is of the form "A is under an obligation to 
help B", then there is no paradox at all in A's doing acts which fulfil 
his obligations from a desire to fulfil those obligations. The 
paradox only arises if virtue is located in motives, not in relations. 
This has the further implication that if virtue arises out of relations, 
then the desire to do virtuous acts is not the desire to have desires 
which Hutcheson thinks it is. Thus if the rationalist is right, 
then Hutcheson's whole complicated procedure for showing how the moral 
sense encourages virtue in an indirect fashion, becomes totally 
unnecessary. 
This raises the second problem involved in locating morality in 
relations. Relations are perceived by our faculty of reason. How 
then can our knowledge of a moral relation influence our behaviour? 
The moral sense can indirectly influence behaviour because it is a 
source of pleasure and pain, and hence the source of desires. Reason 
cannot be the source of either pleasure or pain, and hence cannot be 
the source of desires, so how can it influence our actions? To sum 
up this whole problem concisely, how can the normative aspects of the 
moral sense, as outlined above in Chapter 3, section iii, iv, and v, 
be transferred from a sense to the faculty of reason? How can approval 
and the perception of relations be made compatible in the faculty of 
reason? 
21. Above, chapter 5. 
22. Raphael, The Moral Sense, p. 41. 
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It may be replied to this that Hutcheson has not been overly 
successful in making the normative aspects of morality compatible 
with the perceptive aspects of the moral sense, and that the problem 
would be no greater with respect to perceiving relations by reason 
than it is with respect to perceiving ideas with a sense. This brings 
out two points. Firstly, reason cannot be a source of pleasure and 
pain; sense can for Hutcheson. His location of both the intuitionist 
and normative aspects of morality in one faculty, relies on the fact 
that a sense can for him both perceive ideas and feel pleasure and 
pain. Secondly, this explains why {although it perhaps does not 
excuse him) Hutcheson "neglects the possibility that obligation may be 
. 1 23 th ultimate and unana ysable." He does not neglect the fact at 
moral goodness is unanalysable; that the idea of moral goodness is 
simple is one of his central claims. The reason he can claim that 
moral ideas as perceived by a sense are simple, but can simultaneously 
assume that those perceived by reason must be analysable, lies in the 
fact that his theory of sense perception appears to allow him to 
locate the nonnative aspects of morality in simple ideas perceived by 
a sense. His theory of the nature of reason means that any moral 
ideas perceived by reason must be analysable into normative and rational 
content. This is not to defend Hutcheson on this point, but rather 
to show how deeply one is criticizing his theory when one questions 
the compatibility of the intuitionist and normative roles of the moral 
24 
sense. 
23. Raphael, The Moral Sense, p. 37-38. 
24. Cf. above, chapter 3. 
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v. Price's Criticisms of Hutcheson 
a. Introduction 
In discussing Price's criticisms of Hutcheson, it is important 
first to establish those aspects of Hutcheson's moral theory with 
which Price agrees. Doing this will serve as an introduction to 
Price's theory, but more importantly, will also serve to bring out 
the differences between Price's debate with Hutcheson, and Hutcheson's 
debate with the earlier rationalists. 
The most important point of agreement between Price and Hutcheson 
is that both claimed that some moral ideas are simple. The simplicity 
of moral ideas in Hutcheson's theory has already been discussed in a 
number of contexts throughout this thesis. Price's agreement with 
Hutcheson on this issue is quite explicit: "Tis a very necessary 
previous observation, that our ideas of right and wrong are simple 
ideas, ... " (Review, p. 41). 
If Price and Hutcheson agree that moral ideas are simple, and by 
implication, unanalysable, then it follows that the debate between 
them is not over the naturalistic fallacy (i.e. the reduction of moral 
ideas to non-moral ideas). As I tried to establish in section ii 
above, it was this fallacy which Hutcheson had accused the earlier 
rationalists of connnitting; with Price, one has a rationalist opponent 
of Hutcheson who is careful to avoid the error which had caused 
Hutcheson to pref er the moral sense to moral reason. This fact 
reopens the debate between the two schools on a different level. 
But even if Price avoids the error of the earlier rationalists 
(as Hutcheson saw it), did Price agree that Hutcheson himself had 
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avoided it? In fact, Price is none too sure that Hutcheson had not 
committed this error by reducing moral ideas to pleasure and pain. 
This raises the question, which I discussed above in Chapter 3, of 
whether for Hutcheson moral ideas are a type of, or are accompanied 
by, pleasure and pain. On the first occasion in the 'Review' on 
which Price mentions Hutcheson, he interprets him as saying that moral 
ideas are forms of pleasure and pain. "Dr. Hutcheson, deduces our 
moral ideas from a moral sense; meaning by this sense, a power within 
us, different from reason, which renders certain actions pleasing and 
others displeasing to us" (Review, p. 13-14). But Price's considered 
opinion would seem to be not so much that Hutcheson reduces moral 
ideas to pleasure and pain, but that Hutcheson is confused over the 
matter. 'This is the same conclusion that I reached in the discussion 
above. The accusation of being confused on this point Price puts 
thus: 
"It was, probably, in consequence of •.. not 
carefully distinguishing between the discernment 
of the mind, and the sensations attending it in our 
moral perceptions; that the Author of the Enquiry 
into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, 
was led to derive all our ideas of virtue from an 
implanted sense. Moral good and evil, he everywhere 
describes, by the effects accompanying the perception 
of them." (Review, p. 62-63) 
There is a great deal of truth in this criticism of Hutcheson; I have 
already suggested that the reason Hutcheson prefers the sense to 
reason as the faculty of moral perception, is that his theory of 
sense perception allows him to locate both the perceptive and the 
normative aspects of morality in the moral sense. 
Price's own view on this question is that reason intuits, or 
perceives, moral ideas, and that these are always accompanied by, but 
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distinct from, feelings of pleasure and pain. He is explicit on 
this point: 
"It is true, some impressions of pleasure and 
pain, satisfaction or disgust, generally attend 
our perceptions of virtue and vice. But these 
are merely their effects and concomitants, and 
not the perceptions themselves, which ought no 
more to be confounded with them, than a particular 
truth .•• ought to be confounded with the pleasure 
that may attend the discovery of it. Some emotion 
or other accompanies, perhaps, all our perceptions; 
but more remarkably our perceptions of right and 
wrong." (Review, p. 44; cf. also p. 62)25 
To summarize this point, Price and Hutcheson both think that some 
moral ideas are simple, but Price thinks Hutcheson might have been 
guilty of committing the naturalistic fallacy by reducing moral ideas 
to types of pleasure and pain. Price himself is always clear on the 
distinction between the intuition of moral ideas and the accompanying 
feelings of pleasure and pain. 
Besides the simplicity of moral ideas, there are four other points 
of agreement between Hutcheson and Price which I think can be summarized 
briefly. 
Firstly, Price agrees with Hutcheson that our perceptions of moral 
ideas are forced upon us; that is, that moral approval and disapproval 
are independent of our free-will or choice: "Some actions we all feel 
ourselves irresistibly determined to approve, and others to disapprove" 
(Review, p. 13). 
25. Two points must be made about the passage in the 'Inquiry' (p. 131) 
in which Hutcheson explicitly says that the ideas of good and evil 
are accompanied by, but not identical with, pleasure and pain. 
Firstly, this passage was only added to later editions, and so it 
is quite possible that Price did not have the relevant edition, 
and even if he had, the passage so tends against the drift of the 
rest of the 'Inquiry', that it would not be surprising if it were 
overlooked or ignored. Secondly, if the adding of that passage to 
later editions indicates that Hutcheson was becoming less confused 
on this point, then it should be noted that the corrections to the 
later editions of Hutcheson's works were made in the late 1730's, 
and that Price's 'Review' was not published until 1758; thus there 
is no possibility that Hutcheson's later thought was influenced by 
Price. 
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Secondly, Price agrees that our perceptions of moral ideas are 
immediate. "He (Hutcheson) has indeed well shewn, that we have a 
faculty determining us immediately to approve or disapprove actions, 
abstracted from all views of private advantage" (Review, p. 14). It 
is a very important implication of this that Price is not claiming 
that deductive reasoning, which is not immediate, is the source of 
moral ideas; rather he is saying that reason, besides performing 
deductions, can be the source of immediately perceived intuited ideas 
(cf. Review, p. 40). 
Thirdly, although Price is not as explicit on this point as one 
might wish, he does not seem to want to claim that moral ideas are 
relations. I do not want to examine Price's text on this point in 
depth, I merely wish to assume that, even if Price is sometimes 
ambiguous, it is not unacceptable to view him as maintaining that the 
intuition of moral ideas is different from the perception of relations. 
This view has the support of Raphael, (cf. Review, p. xxxviii), although 
he also notes the questionable passages. Viewing Price in this 
manner has the effect of attributing to him a position different from 
that held by some of the earlier rationalists which Hutcheson had 
explicitly criticized (cf. above, ch. 6, sec. iv). 
Finally, Price and Hutcheson both claim that the perception of 
moral ideas itself is not the source of moral error. They both 
attribute moral error to false beliefs, and to the mis-application of 
moral ideas caused by bad education, association of ideas, bias, etc. 
(cf. Review, p. 169-172). Price, however, does not seem· to be aware 
of his agreement with Hutcheson on this point. He criticizes the 
moral sense philosophers for being unable to account for the unbiased 
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nature of correct moral judgements, and for being unable to explain 
moral error without throwing in doubt the veracity of the moral faculty 
itself (cf. Review, p. 211-212). But I have already examined how 
Hutcheson can explain moral error and the influence of the passions 
without attributing the error or the bias directly to the moral sense. 
He can do this because the perceptions of the moral sense presuppose 
non-moral judgements of the nature of the action, and it is these 
judgements which may be erroneous. For reasons which I will discuss 
below, Price does not take account of these prior non-moral judgements, 
and so maintains that for the moral sense philosophers, moral bias and 
error must be in the moral sense itself (cf. Review, p. 212). This 
criticism rests on a misunderstanding of Hutcheson; in fact, both 
Price and Hutcheson are in agreement that the source of moral error 
and bias is not in the perception of moral ideas. 
b. Ideas of the Understanding 
Having summarized the main points of agreement between Hutcheson 
and Price, I will now turn to Price's main criticism of the moral 
sense school. As Price sees it, the central fault of Hutcheson's 
theory is that it makes morality dependent on an arbitrary feature of 
human nature. Price wishes to maintain against Hutcheson that morality 
is objective and necessary; objective in the sense that the rightness 
of actions is a quality of the action itself independent of our 
perception of the action or its rightness; and necessary in the sense 
that the connexion between an action and its moral qualities is not 
dependent on human nature, nor, indeed, even on God's will. Price 
sees Hutcheson's failure to view morality as objective and necessary 
as being connected with the theory of the moral sense. In particular, 
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Price objects to Hutcheson's tendency to view the ideas perceived by 
the moral sense as analogous to the secondary qualities. All these 
points are brought out in the following passage: 
"It is evident, he (Hutcheson) considered it (the 
moral sense) as the effect of a positive constitution 
of our minds, or as an implanted and arbitrary 
principle by which a relish is given us for certain 
moral objects and forms and aversion to others, 
similar to the relishes and aversions created by any 
of our other senses. In other words; our ideas of 
morality, if this account is right, have the same 
origin with our ideas of the sensible qualities of 
bodies, the harmony of sounds, or the beauties of 
painting or sculpture; that is, the mere good 
pleasure of our Maker adapting the mind and its 
organs in a particular manner to certain objects. 
Virtue (as those who embrace this scheme say) is an 
affair of taste. Moral right and wrong, signify 
nothing in the objects themselves to which they are 
applied, any more than agreeable and harsh; sweet 
and bitter; pleasant and painful; but only certain 
effects in us .•.• 'Tis therefore, by this account, 
improper to say of an action, that it is right, in 
much the same sense that it is improper to say of 
an object of taste, that it is sweet; or of pain, 
that it is in fire." (Review, p. 14-15) 
This passage brings out the fact that Price is criticizing Hutcheson 
for making morality dependent on our faculties, and hence not objective, 
and making those faculties dependent on God's will, and hence not 
necessary. 
If one accepts Price's premise that morality is in fact objective 
and necessary, then this criticism is accurately applied to Hutcheson. 
• d ab 26 h I dm' • th d ld h I have discusse ove Hutc eson s a ission at Go cou ave 
created our moral sense differently; this is tantamount to admitting 
that morality is dependent on how human nature was made, and hence 
that it is neither objective nor necessary in Price's sense. Hutcheson's 
ploy of suggesting that God might have a moral sense similar to ours 
26. Cf. above, chapter 3. 
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will not do for Price because Price does not want to view morality as 
dependent on God's faculties. He specifically argues that morality 
is independent of God's will, and is only able to save his theological 
beliefs by making morality and all other absolute truth, not dependent 
on, but identical with, God's understanding. Thus for Price, morality 
is not dependent on God or any of his faculties in the way in which 
Hutcheson suggests that our moral sense might be dependent on a divine 
equivalent of our moral sense. The difference is that for Hutcheson, 
morality is dependent on something outside itself; for Price, morality 
is dependent only on itself, for absolute truth and God's understanding 
are the same thing. One can only conclude that Price's interpretation 
of Hutcheson is accurate on this point. 
But even if this interpretation is right, the criticism will be 
applicable, as we have seen, only if Price can prove that moral 
knowledge is objective and necessary. Since by objective and necessary 
Price means that we can know facts which are not dependent on human 
nature, Price must prove that we can have knowledge independently of 
our senses. But to claim this is to question the empiricist's 
assumption that all our ideas are first perceived by our senses, and 
that we can have knowledge of nothing which is not first perceived by 
our senses. Price realizes that he must refute this central tenet of 
empiricism, and so he attempts to establish in his first chapter 
that our senses are not the only source of new simple ideas. He 
attempts to show that the faculty of reason itself can intuit new 
simple ideas. It becomes apparent as his argument proceeds that he 
also wishes to prove, and in fact must prove, that reason can intuit 
not only new ideas, but truths concerning those ideas as well. But 
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since Price accepts the empiricist's analysis of knowledge into 
atomistic ideas, he conducts the discussion in terms of the source of 
ideas; knowledge of truths seems to follow automatically for him. 
Before attempting to prove that the faculty of reason, or the 
understanding, is the source of moral ideas, Price gives six arguments 
27 to prove that reason can be the source of ideas in general. I will 
not examine these arguments separately because I accept Raphael's 
judgement that the only simple idea which Price has managed to 
establish as arising in the understanding is the idea of necessity.
28 
Elsewhere Raphael suggests that the really contentious point between 
the empiricists and the rationalists is not so much the origin of 
simple ideas, but the problem of synthetic but necessary truths. 
With respect to the notion of cause, Raphael says: "He (Price) is 
concerned with the causal maxim, not with the idea of cause or power. 
In short, Price is really groping towards the problem of the synthetic 
a priori proposition. 1129 Accepting this conclusion, the question is 
not so much why Price thinks that the understanding is the source of 
new simple ideas; but rather, why and how does the understanding have 
knowledge of non-deductive but necessary truths? As I mentioned, 
Price sets out to answer not the latter, but the former question. 
But I think from his discussion of the origins of ideas, a general 
argument for our knowing necessary truths can be constructed, and it 
is this argument that lies at the core of his attack on the moral 
sense school. 
27. Cf. Review, p. 17-40; Raphael, The Moral Sense, p. 117-121. 
28. Raphael, The Moral Sense, p. 126-127. 
29. Review, p. xxi; Raphael's emphasis. 
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Price's account of how knowledge of necessary truth is possible 
is derived from Cudworth's theory of universals which he expounded in 
his Eternal and Immutable Morality. 30 Passmore goes so far as to say 
that Price's epistemology is simply a restatement of Cudworth's. 
Cudworth, it must be remembered, owes much to Plato; and Price 
acknowledges generously both of these sources. 31 However, Hudson 
claims that the Cartesian notion of clear and distinct ideas was as 
influential on Price as Cudworth's Platonism. I will not enter this 
debate, but I think that both the Platonic and Cartesian origins of 
Price's notion of ideas is a helpful background to bear in mind when 
discussing the following argument. 
Essential to Price's views is his use of the word 'idea'. He 
discusses the word in two places (i.e. Review, p. 39 fn. and Note C 
p. 280-281), where he identifies four ways it has been used: 
1) an idea is a mental image of something - this use is 
unwarrantable, he thinks. 
2) an idea may signify sensation itself - this he thinks is 
"very unwarrantable". 
3) an idea is "the immediate object of the mind in thinking." 
(Review, p. 39 fn.) This is the use he attributes to Hume, and he 
elsewhere adds "Mr. Hume makes the immediate object of the mind in 
perception to be the same with perception itself, and thus annihilates 
all external existence." (Review, p. 280, Note C). Price is, in fact, 
accusing Hume of thinking that ideas are entities or things which are 
in the mind when the mind perceives anything. If there is an external 
30. Hudson, Reason and Right, p. 12. 
31. Hudson, New Studies in Ethics, p. 254. 
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world, then these ideas may be representations of, or images of, 
things in that world; but we can never know the external world 
directly on this theory. So, viewing ideas as entities which may or 
may not represent, necessarily leads to scepticism. 
"It (the word 'idea') is further used to signify 
the immediate object of the mind in thinking. 
This sense of an idea is derived from the notion 
that when we think of any object, there is something 
immediately present to the mind which it perceives 
and contemplates. But what is this? - Shall we 
call it a representation or image of the object? 
This, I think, is improper language." (Review, p. 
39, fn.) 
In other words, Price accuses the empiricists of viewing ideas as 
entities; which, if they are images, raises the problem of what they 
are images of, and how we can know the original. It is the 
impossibility of answering this question that Price thinks leads to 
Humean scepticism: 
"It should be observed that I have all along 
endeavoured to avoid speaking of an idea as an 
image in the mind of the object we think of. 
It is difficult not to fall sometimes into language 
of this kind; but it may be misunderstood. A 
writer of deep reflexion (i.e. Thomas Reid) has 
charged it with laying the foundation of all modern 
scepticism." (Review, p. 39, fn. ) 
4) an idea is not an entity, but an action of the mind. 
The word 'idea' he says, "is also used to signify the mind's conception 
or apprehension of any object. This, I think, is its most just and 
proper sense" (Review, p. 39, fn.). In other words, the mind does not 
perceive ideas; they are not objects of thought; rather they are the 
act of perceiving something. 
This discussion of the uses of the word 'idea' requires some 
comment; in particular, it must be applied to Hutcheson's use of the 
word. Hutcheson fails to distinguish between particular acts of 
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perceiving, and what the perception is of, or the content of perceptions. 
In Price's list of the various uses of the word 'idea' as I have given 
it above, the distinction between uses 3) and 4) involves the 
distinction between the perception of ideas and the content of ideas. 
It would appear that Price is accusing the empiricists of using a 
concept of idea with which these two aspects of perception cannot be 
distinguished. For the empiricist, he says, and there is a great deal 
of truth in the accusation, ideas are entities, so that on each 
occurrence of an idea, the idea itself is present in the mind; in 
other words, the perception of the idea merely is the idea. Hence 
there is no distinction between the act of perceiving and the idea 
itself. This is the same as is normally the case with physical 
objects and the occurrence of those objects - there is no difference 
between this table and the occurrence of this table. If ideas are 
viewed in this manner, and Hutcheson seems so to view them, it means 
that although ideas may resemble one another, two different perceptions 
are in fact the occurrences of two different ideas. This is true if 
both the ideas are in the same mind, or in two different minds; and 
it implies that two people can never have the same idea. This is the 
result of viewing ideas as entities; consider again the analogy with 
physical objects; this table and that table may resemble one another, 
but they are, and always will be two different tables. This view of 
ideas leaves open the question of whether resembling ideas resemble 
one another because they are both images of the same thing, but it 
is precisely this question of whether ideas are images which Price 
thinks cannot be answered; hence this view must lead to scepticism. 
Price's alternative to viewing ideas as entities of the mind is 
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quite straightforward; he wishes to call the act of perceiving, or 
conceiving, 'the idea', and what is perceived 'the object of the 
idea'. On this scheme the idea is an action or event, not an entity. 
The distinction corresponds to, but is not the same as (for reasons I 
will give below), the distinction I have drawn between the perception 
of ideas (which correspond to Price's ideas), and the content of ideas 
(which correspond to Price's objects of ideas). The advantage of 
drawing this sort of distinction is that one can now account for the 
phenomenon of two people, or the same person at two different times, 
having two ideas which in common usage would be said to be the same 
idea. There is a sense in which two people have the same idea if 
they are both considering, for example, equilateral triangles. The 
empiricist can only account for this by saying that they are two 
different but resembling ideas. Price can say that although the 
idea (i.e. the act of perceiving), is different for they are in two 
different minds, the object of the idea (or, as I would say, the 
content of the idea), is the same in both cases. That this is the 
reason behind Price's distinction is brought out in the footnote, 
p. 39, when he says: "When millions of intellects contemplate the 
equality of every angle in a semicircle to a right angle, have they 
not all the same object in view?" 
Having thus proposed an alternative use of the word 'idea' to 
the empiricists', and having given a reason for it in the form of 
being able to describe better the phenomenon of various occurrences 
of what appear to be the same idea, Price tries to draw directly the 
conclusion which is his purpose in discussing this question. From his 
definition of ideas, Price concludes that an idea must be the mind's 
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perception of some-thing; that is, he assumes that the objects of 
ideas are entities which exist independently of the perception of 
them. And because on his theory different people, and God as well, 
can perceive, or have ideas of, the same objects, he concludes that 
the objects of ideas exist not only independently of the perception 
of them, but independently of all perceivers as well. Thus Price 
has arrived at the conclusion that the human mind has direct access 
to objectively existing entities. The next and final step in the 
argument relies on Price's concept of necessity being that anything 
which is not dependent on the contingent construction of the perceivers' 
faculties, must be necessary. Hence if the mind has direct access 
to objective entities, then it has access to non-contingent, or 
necessary entities, and hence to necessary truth. 
In reading the 'Review', one gets the impression that this last 
conclusion follows from a definition of ideas which appears quite 
arbitrary; hence the conclusion appears arbitrary. I have done my 
best to connect Price's use of the word 'idea' to his criticism of 
empiricism in an attempt to show that Price has at least some reason 
for his concept of ideas as the activity of perceiving independently 
existing entities. But now the question arises as to whether Price's 
argument is valid. Does drawing the distinction between perception 
and what is perceived imply that the object of perception is 
objective? I can see no reason to think that it does. The fact that 
two minds can both conceive of the same thing, for example unicorns, 
does not imply that unicorns exist independently of the conception of 
them. They certainly do not exist in the normal sense. Price was 
misled, I think, by talking in terms of the object of ideas; if he 
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had used a phrase like 'content of ideas' perhaps he would have 
realized his error. 
The difficulty with Price's conclusion can best be seen if one 
tries to establish what are the objects of perception. In the case 
of the physical world, he wants to claim that they are physical 
objects. This amounts to the sensible claim that physical objects 
can be the objects of perception. But in the case of ideas which are 
not of matter (and Price adds spirit) and their qualities, what are 
the objects of perception? A list of such objects can be abstracted 
from Price's text; they include concepts of material objectivity such 
as solidity and impenetrability, activity, substance, and accident; 
time and space; power and causation, number, proportion, diversity, 
and equality; and, of course, right, wrong, and obligation. The 
objects of these ideas are objective and necessary, and we have direct 
access to them. These objects I will henceforth refer to as 'Price-
onic' entities. That we can have knowledge of necessary truths about 
these entities, is stated in the passage where Price draws the 
distinction between the two types of ideas: 
"An idea would thus always imply something distinct 
from itself which is its object; and the proper 
division of our ideas would be, according to their 
different objects, into those whose objects are 
matter and spirit and their qualities, the general 
affections of all things, and necessary truth." 
(Review,p. 39, fn.) 
One of the central problems of Price's theory lies in the fact 
that ideas can be either of matter, or of Price-onic entities. 
Earlier in the 'Review' he had argued at length that the ideas which 
are perceived by the senses (i.e. matter and its qualities) are 
different from those perceived by the understanding (i.e. Price-onic 
234 
entities). The differences between the senses and the understanding 
he summarizes as follows: 
"In a word, it appears that sense and understanding 
are faculties of the soul totally different: The 
one being conversant only about particulars; the 
other about universals: The one not discerning, 
but suffering; the other not suffering, but discern-
ing; and signifying the soul's power of surveying 
and examining all things, in order to judge of them:" 
(Review, p. 21) 
This, I think, is an admirable analysis of several aspects of knowledge. 
From these differences between sensation and the understanding, Price 
concludes that the understanding has knowledge of necessary truths, and 
that the senses can provide knowledge of particular and contingent 
truths. But a problem arises, if I am right, in that the argument 
for the necessity of the knowledge provided by the understanding rests 
on Price's concept of ideas. If the objectivity of Price-onic ideas, 
and the necessity of the connexions between them is founded on the 
fact that ideas imply something objective which is perceived, then 
why does this argument not apply to the ideas of the senses? The 
objects of sensory ideas, i.e. material objects, are objective, for 
they exist independently of us, but why are their connexions not 
necessary? This problem arises because Price thinks he needs to 
establish that the understanding is the source of simple ideas and 
seems to think that our knowledge of necessary truths follows there-
from; whereas in fact what he ought to be establishing is that the 
understanding has knowledge of necessary truths. 
In summary, I think Price has made two errors. Firstly, he 
assumes that the objectivity of ideas follows from the distinction 
between a particular perception of an idea, and what the idea is of. 
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In fact, all that follows from this distinction is that the content 
of ideas is in some sense re-identifiable; that is, that two perceptions 
of an idea can be identified as being of the same thing. Positing 
the objective existence of the objects of ideas leads to a heaven 
full of Price-onic entities. (Actually, for Price it is not a heaven 
which is full of these entities, but rather God's understanding; but 
I do not think that Price's theological views will solve the problems 
I am raising.) 
Secondly, Price assumes that the connexions between Price-onic 
entities are necessary and that having direct access to these entities 
guarantees that the mind has access to necessary truths. The 
possibility that the mind connects the idea intuited by the under-
standing according to the mind's construction did not occur to him. 
He has not proved that the empiricist's favourite principle, the 
association of ideas, does not apply to the ideas of the understanding 
as well as to those of the senses. 
c. Moral Ideas 
So far I have dealt very little with the application of Price's 
views to morality. This application is, in fact, quite straightforward. 
It will be remembered that Price's main criticism of the moral sense 
was that it made morality contingent and dependent on human nature. 
He has now established, he thinks, that the mind has access to necessary 
truths. He has merely to prove that our ideas of moral right and 
wrong arise in the understanding and not in a sense, and he has 
provided for the necessity that he believes is inherent in morality. 
This project, of course, collapses if I am right in claiming that Price 
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has failed to show that the understanding has access to necessary 
truth. 
To prove that moral ideas arise first in the understanding, and 
hence can give necessary knowledge, Price gives the following five 
arguments. 
1) "First, observe, that it implies no absurdity, but evidently 
may be true. It is undeniable, that many of our ideas are derived 
from our intuition of truth, or the discernment of the nature of things 
by the understanding. This therefore may be the source of our 
moral ideas" (Review, p. 41). He goes on to point out that "nothing 
has been offered that has any tendency to prove the contrary", 
(Review, p. 42). Hutcheson, he notes, has merely assumed that all 
ideas are perceived first by the senses. This, of course, is not 
actually an argument, but merely a preparation for the following. 
However, he is right in claiming that Hutcheson never argued against 
the sort of rationalist position which Price is advocating; what 
Hutcheson was arguing against has been discussed earlier in this 
chapter. 
2) Secondly, Price appeals to common sense and introspection. 
I do not think this appeal helpful; firstly, because there seem to be 
differences in the conclusions arrived at by introspection, (Hume, 
after all, appealed to introspection to support the opposite conclusion); 
secondly, because moral emotions and moral judgements are so closely 
entwined that mere introspection is not likely to disentangle them. 
3) Price's third argument is that if moral ideas ar·e only 
sensations, then they can only be applicable to actions in the way 
that secondary qualities are applicable to bodies; since the secondary 
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qualities are by general consensus not in the body, (or, as Price 
phrases it, are not compatible with it), then moral qualities are 
not in, or compatible with, actions. But this, he thinks, is absurd. 
The argument is fair, I think, so long as the moral sense philosophers 
compare moral ideas to feelings, as I think Hutcheson tended to; but 
if the moral sense philosopher compares them with sense perception, 
especially with our perception of primary qualities, then I do not 
think that the argument is damaging. Hutcheson, however, had rejected 
the analogy with the primary qualities, so the argument is applicable 
to him. This argument also presupposes Price's notion that morality 
must inhere in, or be compatible with, actions, a premise which is 
discussed below. 
4) Fourthly, Price argues that if moral concepts are sensations, 
then we cannot make moral mistakes, since we cannot be in error about 
our own sensations. This is fair enough, but only against moral 
sense theories which do not specify that one has to be normal, in a 
normal state, and/or objective, or which do not describe an alternative 
source of moral error, which Hutcheson does. For Hutcheson, the moral 
sense does not err, so this objection does not apply to his theory. 
Another problem with this objection is that it is not clear how Price 
himself avoids a similar argument against his own theory. Although 
he gives a marvellous analysis of moral error in particular circumstances, 
he does maintain that necessary truth can be known with certainty. If 
there is a problem about not being able to err about sensations, then 
there is a similar problem about our not being able to err in our 
intuition of necessary moral truths. 
5) Finally, Price argues that feelings and sensations vary 
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according to the situation of the individual, but that morality is 
unchanging. Hutcheson, however, has been able to provide an account 
of the influence of the passions on our views of actions, without 
thereby suggesting that the moral sense is unreliable. As I have 
explained elsewhere, the passions can bias our non-moral beliefs 
about the action, but the moral sense always reacts correctly to the 
action as it is conceived. 
Of the five arguments, therefore, the only one which Hutcheson 
would not be able to answer on his moral sense theory is the third. 
And that argument assumes that rightness must inhere in actions in a 
fashion different from the fashion in which secondary qualities inhere 
in material objects. In the next section, I will argue that this 
assumption is questionable and that Price's theory can account for 
this inherence no better than Hutcheson's. From the separate 
consideration of the arguments, I conclude that Price cannot prove 
that right and wrong are ideas of the understanding and not of sense. 
d. Subsequent Ideas 
Price differs from Hutcheson in locating morality in the action 
and not in the motive from which the action was done; this point I 
will discuss in the next section. But he also disagrees with 
Hutcheson in that his view of the nature of the connexion between 
virtue and the action, is different from Hutcheson's view of the 
connexion between virtue and the motive. Price thinks that this 
connexion for Hutcheson is merely contingent; that the only connexion 
between motives and morality for Hutcheson lies in the fact that our 
faculty of the moral sense reacts in the way that it does; and that 
the fact that it reacts in this way and not another was an arbitrary 
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choice on God's part. Price, on the other hand, wishes to maintain 
that the connexion between the action and the action's moral qualities 
is a necessary one. That this connexion is not contingent for Price 
in the same way that it is for Hutcheson follows immediately from the 
fact that for Price moral qualities are objective and independent of 
the observer. However, Price's argument that moral qualities are 
objective~ does not in itself answer the question of how moral qualities 
inhere in the action; it merely proves that these qualities are not 
dependent on the observer. That Price wishes to maintain that moral 
qualities are somehow properties of actions, can be seen from numerous 
passages throughout the 'Review'; this, for example, is typical: 
"In the same manner (i.e. introspection) may we satisfy 
ourselves concerning the origin of the idea of right: 
For have we not a like consciousness, that we discern 
the one (i.e. right), as well as the other (i.e. 
equality), in certain objects? ... Would not a being 
purely intelligent, having happiness within his reach, 
approve of securing it for himself? Would not he 
think this right; and would it not be right? When 
we contemplate the happiness of a species, or of a 
world, and pronounce concerning the actions of 
reasonable beings which promote it, that they are 
right; is this judging erroneously? Are not such 
actions really right?" (Review, p. 44-45. View 
emphasis as added by present writer.) 
But Price is less clear on the question of how moral qualities 
inhere in actions than he is on the fact that they do. In fact, his 
suggestions on this question are confined to one or two passages. 
Particularly relevent is his discussion of subsequent ideas. This 
passage, in its entirety reads thus: 
"'Tis obvious, that the ideas (of the understanding) 
presuppose certain subjects of contemplation,· of 
whose natures, connexions, and qualities they are 
perceptions. And, therefore, the division of all 
our simple ideas into original and subsequent ones 
may not, perhaps, be improper. The former are 
conveyed to us immediately by our organs of sense, 
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and our reflection upon ourselves. The latter 
presuppose other ideas, and arise from the 
perception of their natures and relations." 
(Review, p. 38) 
Price then abruptly drops this line of thought and switches to another. 
He now divides ideas into "First, those implying nothing real 
without the mind;" and "Secondly, those which denote something 
distinct from sensation; and imply real and independent existence and 
truth." (Review, p. 38). This second group he now sub-divides into 
two further groups; those which "denote the real properties of external 
objects, and the actions and passions of the mind: And those, which 
I have described as derived inunediately from intelligence." (Review, 
p. 38). The former are our ideas of material and spiritual substances; 
the latter are our ideas of what I earlier called Price-onic entities. 
The next paragraph in the text, however, is important for it identifies 
these ideas of the understanding as subsequent ideas, although that 
phrase is not actually used: 
"After the mind, from whatever possible causes, has 
been furnished with ideas of any objects, they become 
themselves objects to our intellective faculty; from 
whence arises a new set of ideas, which are the 
perceptions of this faculty. Previously to this, 
whatever ideas we may be furnished with, nothing is 
understood. Whatever subjects of knowledge there 
may be in the mind, nothing is known." (Review, p. 39) 
Taking these two passages as a whole, one arrives at the following 
classification of ideas, best, I think, presented as a table: 
imply nothing objective 
ideas 
imply something objective 









The importance of this classification is that it implies, although 
Price does not explicitly draw out this implication, that subsequent 
ideas are a subgroup of those ideas which "imply real and independent 
truth and existence." 
The question which I was discussing before I gave this classification 
of ideas was the question of how moral qualities inhere in actions. 
It has been suggested that Price's notion of subsequent ideas is a 
possible type of answer to this question. In his introduction to the 
'Review', Raphael makes this comment, (Raphael's word 'consequential' 
corresponds to Price's word 'subsequent'): 
"I suggest that this is the position of the concept 
of good, when used non-naturalistically, and that if 
good, thus used, is a 'consequential' characteristic, 
it is misleading to add that it is simple. Of course 
it is still true that a consequential characteristic, 
i.e. one which only comes into existence if entailed 
by other characteristics, must be discerned by the 
understanding, for it is the understanding that 
discerns entailments. 11 32 
Earlier, Raphael had said: "If my comments on his critique of 
empiricism are sound, he would do better to show that moral ideas are 
either (a) relations, or (b) 'consequential' or 'subsequent' ideas. 1133 
The suggestion, in other words, is that moral ideas are connected 
with certain actions by the fact that they are entailed by the non-
moral characteristics of those actions. I do not wish to dispute 
Raphael's suggestion that this may in fact be the case; rather I want 
to draw out the implications of this theory for Price's view of 
Jl¥)rality. And the implications of subsequent ideas for Price are 
brought out by comparing the subsequent - original idea distinction 
with Price's other classification of ideas, (which for some reason 
32. Review, p. xxvii. 
33. Review, p. xxv. 
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R h 1 d . . . 34 ap ae 1sm1sses as not "particularly clear or helpful"). This 
second classification makes it clear that subsequent ideas are ideas 
of the understanding, and hence imply an objective Price-onic entity 
existing independently of the perceiver. The reason moral qualities 
are perceived as necessarily entailed by the action lies in the fact 
that these qualities exist objectively and are objectively related, 
somehowt to the action. And it is the nature of this objective 
relation of the objective Price-onic entity to the objective action 
which Price needs to establish. The notion of subsequent ideas cannot 
answer this question, because for Price the subsequent or entailed 
nature of moral ideas is dependent on the objective and necessary 
nature of the ideas of the understanding. (It is, by the way, at the 
point in the text where he is discussing subsequent ideas, that he has 
the long footnote and the reference to Note C which are crucial for 
his argument about the objective and necessary nature of the ideas 
of the understanding.) The conclusion, therefore, which I wish to 
draw is that Price's only suggestion as to the nature of the relation 
between moral qualities and actions does not, in fact, contribute 
anything to answering the question. 
This problem in Price's theory becomes apparent if one compares 
his thinking to that of Hutcheson. It will be remembered that Price's 
main criticism of Hutcheson was that the moral sense made morality 
depend on human nature. Price's alternative was to propose that 
moral qualities were objective and necessary, and somehow in the 
action, not just in the nature of our perception of the action. I 
have now argued that the suggestion of subsequent ideas is based on 
34. Review, p. xxiii. 
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this claim that morality is objective and necessary. If moral 
qualities did not inhere in the action, then the fact that they are 
entailed by the action might be an adequate answer to the question of 
the relation between actions and their moral attributes. This point 
will be clearer if I emphasize this very important fact: to wit, 
that for Hutcheson as well moral ideas are in a sense subsequent. 
I have argued at length above that for Hutcheson moral ideas only 
arise in the moral sense if one has a conception of the nature of the 
action first, and that this conception is established by the faculty 
of reason. This corresponds exactly to Price's criterion that 
subsequent ideas "presuppose other ideas, and arise from the perception 
of their natures and relations." (Review, p. 38). One can only 
conclude from this that it is not the question of moral ideas being 
subsequent about which Price and Hutcheson disagree. 
It could be replied to this that for Hutcheson moral ideas are 
psychologically subsequent, that is, that it is just a matter of 
psychological fact that they arise upon our considering an action; 
whereas for Price, moral ideas are logically subsequent, that they 
are logically entailed by the nature of the actions, and that hence 
reason alone is able to establish the connexion between actions and 
moral ideas. This, I think, is a more accurate way of stating the 
difference between Hutcheson and Price on this point. But to say 
that the connexion is logical for Price is either to say that the 
connexion is necessary in the sense of necessary which includes truths 
about Price-onic entities, or it is to say that the connexion is such 
that moral qualities can be deduced from non-moral ones. The first 
possibility is merely to conclude again that Price's notion of 
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subsequent ideas presupposes his claim that there is a necessary 
connexion between actions and their moral attributes. The second 
possibility, that is the claim that the notion of subsequent ideas 
is logical in a sense implying that they can be deduced from the 
prior ideas, suggests that one can derive an ought from an is, a 
procedure which Hume has argued persuasively against. But whatever 
the merits of Hume's argument, it is clear that Price does not want 
to claim that moral ideas are logically deducible from the non-:rroral 
characteristics of actions, for he is emphatic that reason's role 
in intuiting moral ideas is different from reason's role in performing 
deductions. He criticizes the empiricist for limiting the role of 
reason to deduction only. Therefore, it is clear that Price wants 
to claim that his notion of subsequent ideas is different from either 
psychological succession or logical deduction. Once again we return 
to the fact that Price's notion of necessity is prior to his notion 
of subsequence. The argument for his notion of necessity and its 
merits has already been discussed. The conclusion I wish to emphasize 
here is that the concept of subsequent ideas cannot be used to explain 
the notion of necessity, for subsequence in Price's sense presupposes 
Price's concept of necessity. 
e. The Motive for Virtuous Actions 
Price does not confine his criticism of Hutcheson to criticism 
of the moral sense as the source of moral ideas. He also attacks 
other aspects of Hutcheson's moral philosophy. One of the main 
claims with which Price disagrees is Hutcheson's claim that the 
morality of an action is dependent on the motive from which the action 
was done. Price wishes to claim that actions are themselves 
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inherently either right or wrong, and that the motive from which the 
action was done is irrelevent to the morality of that action. This 
does not, of course, mean that the motive is irrelevent in considering 
the moral worth of the agent; for Price, the virtue of the agent and 
the virtue of the action are two different concepts: 
"One of these may, perhaps, very properly be called 
the virtue of the action, in contradistinction from 
the other, which may be called the virtue of the 
agent. To the former, no particular intention is 
requisite; for what is objectively right, may be 
done from any motive good or bad; and, therefore, 
from hence alone, no merit is connnunicated to the 
agent; nay, it is consistent with the greatest 
guilt. On the contrary, to the other the particular 
intention is what is most essential." (Review, p. 184) 
Price explicitly recognizes Hutcheson's position on this point, 
although he does not mention him by name in this passage. The same 
passage also notes the connexion between the theory that the virtue 
of actions derives from the motive, and the theory of the moral sense. 
Furthermore, it notes the problem Hutcheson faces with respect to how 
the moral sense can motivate. Price thinks this problem insoluble, 
and that its insolubility is a reason for rejecting the moral sense. 
The pertinent passage reads as follows: 
"I know, indeed, that according to the account some 
have given of virtue, it presupposes an intention 
in the agent different from that to itself, because, 
according to this account, it denotes only the 
emotion arising in us upon observing actions flowing 
from certain motives and affections, and, in the 
original constitution of our natures, is applicable 
alike to actions flowing from any motives. Were 
this account true, it would be a gross fallacy to 
suppose that a sense of virtue and duty, or any 
regard to moral good, can ever influence to action. 
But this consequence cannot be regarded by one who 
believes not the opinion which implies it; nor is 
it with me a small objection to this opinion, that 
such a consequence arises from it." (Review, p. 189) 
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This passage clearly indicates that Price recognizes the paradox 
involved in a sense of duty being the motive for virtuous actions on 
a theory which locates the virtue of actions in the motive from which 
those actions are done. However, the claim advanced in this passage 
that it is impossible that "a sense of virtue and duty, or any regard 
to moral good, can ever influence to action," clearly indicates that 
Price has missed or ignored Hutcheson's complicated explanation of 
how the moral sense influences actions. In fact, Price elsewhere 
notes Hutcheson's theory of the desire of desires, but there he seems 
to suggest that the notion does not make much sense; he asks rhetorically: 
if moral excellence means "having and exercising an extensive and 
ardent benevolence; how can the desire of it be different from 
benevolence? How can it be, as Dr. Hutcheson says it is, in another 
order of affections?" (Review, p. 216, fn.). Hutcheson's explanation 
of desires of desires has been explained above in Chapter 5, and need 
not be re-examined here. Price has merely noted the problem; he 
has not criticized Hutcheson's solution of it. 
But aside from the problem of a sense of duty motivating, what 
are the merits of Price's contention that the motive of an action is 
irrelevant to that action's morality? The fact that in the above 
quoted long passage Price thinks that Hutcheson's position on this 
question follows from Hutcheson's theory of the moral sense, indicates 
that Price's argument for his position will probably derive from his 
theory that moral ideas are intuited by the understanding. And this 
is in fact the case; it is from the objective necessity of moral 
truth that Price argues that moral qualities are inherent in the action, 
not in the motive. In fact, Price does not so much argue as assume 
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that if virtue is an objective quality of actions which is independent 
of the observer, then this quality must inhere in the action itself, 
and not in some aspect of the action such as its motive. This is a 
fallacious assmnption, for the fact that the qualities of good and 
evil are independent of the observer does not imply that these 
qualities inhere in the action rather than the motive. 
Price's comments on the question of whether motives or actions 
are properly said to be good and evil, require another comment; namely, 
that his distinction between the virtue of the agent and the virtue of 
the action need not trouble Hutcheson. Hutcheson can draw this 
distinction if he wishes, but it is unimportant on his theory for 
both the virtue of the action and the virtue of the agent derive from 
the virtue of the motive from which the agent did the action. 
Hutcheson cannot in fact draw Price's other distinction; namely 
the distinction between actual and practical virtue. Actual virtue 
is the virtue which in fact inheres in the action; practical virtue 
is the virtue which would inhere in the action if the action were as 
the agent understood it, noting that the agent, through no fault of 
his own, may not understand the action as it actually is. Moral 
agents have an obligation to do the actions they see as best, providing 
that they have made adequate efforts to acquaint themselves with the 
actual nature of the actions as best they can. For Hutcheson, since 
when an agent is deciding on possible actions he has direct access to 
the motive from which he would do the various actions, then he has 
direct access to that aspect of the actions from which morality derives. 
Thus the agent is in a position to understand the actual virtue of the 
action, and hence there is no distinction between actual and practical 
248 
virtue for Hutcheson. This fact, of course, does not exempt the agent 
from making due effort to find out the consequences of his actions, 
or from carefully considering his motive before he acts. But I 
cannot see how the impossibility of drawing this distinction is in 
itself an objection to Hutcheson's theory. It is perhaps also 
interesting to note that this distinction could be drawn on Hutcheson's 
theory if, as is often now held to be the case, an agent does not have 
direct and accurate knowledge of his own motives. 
Price's theory clearly does not encounter the paradox of the 
knowledge of virtuous actions not being the motive for virtuous actions. 
Hutcheson and Hume had this problem only because they located the 
virtue of actions in the action's motives. Since, for Price, the 
action is virtuous or vicious independently of the motive from which 
it was done, there is no problem in virtuous actions being motivated 
by the desire to do virtuous actions. The desire to fulfil one's 
obligations, or to do one's duty, can be the motive for good acts. 
And this is in fact what Price wishes to claim, a point which he makes 
repeatedly. This sentence is typical: 
"In further explaining and proving what I have now 
in view, it will be proper to shew, 'that the 
perception of right and wrong does excite to 
action, and is alone a sufficient principle of 
action; ' " (Review, p. 185) 
Furthermore, Price not only wishes to claim that a regard to duty can 
motivate virtuous actions, he also wishes to claim that this is the 
only motive which reflects virtue on the agent: 
"What denominates an agent virtuous, and entitles him 
to praise, is his acting from a regard to goodness 
and right." (Review, p. 123) 
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But although Price has avoided the logical paradox that troubled 
Hutcheson, he is faced with another problem which he must solve if 
his criticism of Hutcheson on this point is to have any weight. 
Hutcheson had claimed that all actions must be motivated by a desire, 
and that all desires are caused by beliefs about possible pleasures and 
pain. This contention was at the centre of his theory of motivation 
from which he had drawn the conclusion that reason alone cannot 
motivate action. This conclusion he had used against the rationalists. 
Price has argued that we have a desire to do virtuous actions because 
they are virtuous. But it will be remembered that Price has also 
carefully separated moral ideas from all pleasure and pain that may 
accompany them. But if moral ideas themselves are not pleasant or 
painful, and if Hutcheson is right that all desires are caused by a 
belief about possible future pleasure and pain, how can knowledge of 
virtue and vice give rise to the desire to do virtuous actions? If 
Price is to claim that a desire to do virtuous actions because they 
are virtuous can motivate, he must refute Hutcheson's claim that all 
desires involve beliefs about possible pleasures and pains. If 
pleasure and pain are senations, as both Hutcheson and Price agree, 
Price can refute Hutcheson on this point if he can prove that reason 
itself can generate desires. This is a conclusion which Hutcheson 
had denied but it is the conclusion which Price thinks he can prove. 
He has, in fact, two arguments for this conclusion; both of them, I 
think, are fallacious. 
The first argument is that there is a necessary connexion between 
certain ideas, such as happiness, and the idea of desiring or pursuing 
that end. Since this is a necessary connexion, it can be perceived 
250 
by reason, and a purely rational being can conclude that certain ends 
are worth pursuing. Price assumes that once a purely rational being 
has reached this conclusion, he will be motivated into action to 
obtain that end. Price presents this argument first with respect to 
the agent pursuing his own happiness, (Review, p. 70), and then extends 
it to prove that it also applies to the happiness of others; that is, 
that there can be a purely rational benevolence (Review, p. 70-71, 
also p. 191). The first step in this argument reads thus: 
"The desire of happiness for ourselves, certainly 
arises not from instinct. The full and adequate 
account of it, is, the nature of happiness. It is 
impossible, but that creatures capable of pleasant 
and painful sensations, should love and chuse the 
one, and dislike and avoid the other. No being, 
who knows what happiness and misery are, can be 
supposed indifferent to them, without a plain 
contradiction. Pain is not a possible object of 
desire; nor happiness, of aversion ...•. 
From hence I infer, that it is by no means, in 
general, an absurd method of explaining our 
affections (i.e. desires), to derive them from 
the natures of things and of beings .... To the 
preference and desire of private happiness by all 
beings, nothing more is requisite than to know 
what it is." (Review, p. 70) 
This part of the argument is not, I think, fallacious, but it does not 
prove what Price thinks it proves. He should be proving that certain 
ends can be desired and that we can have a motive for pursuing them 
independently of all instinctive and non-rational desires. Since 
happiness is simply the name given to any state of an agent which that 
agent desires, what he has in fact proved is that there is a logical 
connexion between a desire and the end desired. This is no doubt 
true, but seeing this does not make the desire purely rational, for 
the connexion presupposes an end which is desired. And this is 
precisely what Hutcheson had claimed must be non-rational. 
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I do not think Price fares much better on the second stage of 
this argument. The relevant passage reads as follows: 
"Let us, again, put the case of a being purely 
reasonable. It is evident, that (though by 
supposition void of implanted byasses) he would 
not want all principles of action, and all 
inclinations. It has been shewn he would perceive 
virtue, and possess affection to it, in proportion 
to the degree of his knowledge. The nature of 
happiness also would engage him to chuse and 
desire it for himself. And is it credible that, 
at the same time, he would be necessarily indifferent 
about it for others? Can it be supposed to have 
that in it, which would determine him to seek it 
for himself; and yet to have nothing in it, which 
could engage him to approve of it for others? Would 
the nature of things, upon this supposition, be 
consistent? Would he not be capable of seeing, 
that the happiness of others is to them as important 
as his is to him; and that it is in itself equally valuable 
and desirable, whoever possesses it? (Review, p. 70-
71; cf. also p. 191) 
This argument, in summary, is that if the connexion between happiness 
and desire is necessary in one agent, then it is necessarily connected 
in all. Therefore, the pursuit of happiness is rational regardless 
of whose happiness is pursued by whom. Raphael remarks of this 
argument that it "seems to come dangerously near the fallacy of 
deducing 'desirable' from 'desired'". 35 More accurately, I think it 
is the fallacy of arguing that since everyone has a motive for 
pursuing the ends they desire, then I must have a motive for pursuing 
those ends as well. But this is fallacious, for I may not desire 
the same ends. I only have a motive for pursuing the ends someone 
desires if I desire those ends as well. 
Price's second argument to prove that desires can be purely 
rational is equally fallacious. Price draws the distinction between 
35. Review, p. xxxiv. 
252 
'affections' on the one hand, and 'passions' or 'appetites' on the 
other. His terminology on this point, however, is confusing in a 
thesis on Hutcheson, for the distinction is almost exactly the same 
as that which Hutcheson draws between 'desires' on the one hand, and 
'passions' and 'appetites' on the other. Hutcheson uses the word 
'affection' differently from Price. To keep this matter straight, 
I will call Price's 'affections' by Hutcheson's term 'desire'. The 
passions, or appetites, or instincts, are the same for both. For 
Price, desires involve the use of reason; from this he concludes that 
they are purely rational. Raphael sums up this argument thus: 
"Anything that involves reason is, for him, a part 
of necessary truth. Thus his distinction between 
affections (desires) and passions implies that the 
former are necessary and would be possessed by any 
rational being, while the latter are contingent. 11 36 
But desires for Hutcheson also involve reason, for they presuppose 
beliefs about possible future pleasures and pains, and these beliefs 
are necessarily the domain of reason. Price does not explain why 
desires involve reason, but if they involve it in the way that they 
do for Hutcheson, then Price has committed the fallacy of thinking 
that that which involves reason is totally rational. Hutcheson, in 
fact, would accept that desires involve reason, but he would deny 
that they are therefore necessary in a totally rational creature. 
If Price wishes to maintain that desires involve reason in a fashion 
more substantial than that which distinguishes them from the appetites, 
then I think the only thing he could have had in mind is the notion 
of rational desires I outlined in the previous argument; and that 
argument I have already found fallacious. 
36. Review, p. xxxiii. 
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Perhaps this second argument would not be important if it had 
not led Price into criticizing Hutcheson on a point in a way which 
Hutcheson did not deserve. Price notes that 
"Actions proceeding from universal, calm, and 
dispassionate benevolence, are by all esteemed 
more virtuous and amiable than actions producing 
equal or greater moments of good, directed to 
those to whom nature has more particularly linked 
us, and arising from kind determinations in our 
minds which are more confined and urgent." 
(Review, p. 192) 
Hutcheson would, of course, whole-heartedly agree with this. But 
Price then goes on to claim that this sentiment is inconsistent with 
locating virtue in non-rational desires, which Hutcheson does because 
for him all desires are non-rational. Price says: 
"These facts cannot be explained consistently with 
the notion, that virtue consists in acting from 
kind affections which cannot be derived from 
intelligence, and are incapable, in their 
immediate exercise, of being attended with any 
influence from it. For why then should not the 
virtue be greatest where the kind impulse is 
strongest?" (Review, p. 192) 
This seems again to make the error of supposing that that which has 
non-rational elements must be totally non-rational. In fact, for 
Hutcheson, calm, universal desires necessarily involve more rational 
consideration than more violent and particular desires; this is why 
he thinks it acceptable to call calm desires 'reasonable'. But this 
h 1 . d l' 
37 . h b . k . h. I ave exp aine ear ier. Price seems to ave een mista en in is 
criticism of Hutcheson on this point. 
37. Cf. above, chapter 2, section iii-e. 
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7. The Development of Hutcheson's Philosophy 
In his book on Hutcheson's life and philosophy, William Scott 
divides his discussion of the latter topic into four chapters, one 
dealing with each stage of Hutcheson's philosophical development as 
Scott interpreted it. The notion of development underlies the 
entirety of Scott's presentation, a point which is made obvious by 
the fact that the title of each chapter begins "Hutcheson's Philosophy. 
First form, ... ", "Hutcheson' s Philosophy, Second form, ... ", etc. 
In comparison, my presentation has not so much emphasized the 
development of Hutcheson's thought. Rather it has tried to present 
it as a coherent _and inter-related whole, although, of course, 
throughout this thesis I have repeatedly had occasion to ref er to 
changes which Hutcheson made in his ideas. There are, I think, two 
reasons for Scott's emphasizing Hutcheson's development more than I 
do. Firstly, I have concentrated my attention on the first two of 
Hutcheson's books; Scott has dealt in succession with all four. The 
present chapter will to some extent correct this bias in my thesis, 
for it deals in the main with the two later works of Hutcheson's. 
Secondly, and more importantly, there is a difference in emphasis 
between Scott's exposition of Hutcheson's thought, and my own. Scott 
tends to discuss Hutcheson's ideals; that is, he is interested in 
what, at each stage in his life, Hutcheson conceived as the nature 
of the virtuous man. 1 This ideal of the virtuous man changed 
remarkably in each of Hutcheson's four expositions of his views, 
and so any discussion of this aspect of Hutcheson's thought will 
1. This, of course, is not Scott's only interest in these 
chapters, but it is one of the main ones. 
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necessarily tend to emphasize development. I have, on the other 
hand, been concerned mainly with Hutcheson's analysis of human nature, 
and with the connexion between this analysis and his ideas on the 
nature of morality. I have concentrated on such topics as the moral 
sense, the nature of desires, including benevolence, and the problem 
of motivation. And although Hutcheson changed his mind on various 
aspects of these topics, the changes in these views are not as 
striking as the changes in his general concept of the virtuous man. 
Furthermore, as I will attempt to show in this chapter, his later 
views on these topics tend to be implied in his earlier views, thus 
making the changes more obvious and understandable. In fact, I will 
suggest that even Hutcheson's changing concept of the virtuous man, 
especially as he conceives him in the 'System', is largely the outcome 
of his realizing the implications of other aspects of his early 
philosophy, and not simply the outcome of the influence of other 
writers, as Scott tends to suggest. 
Hutcheson's various ideas of the virtuous man need to be 
summarized as I have not emphasized this aspect of his thought so far. 
In the 'Inquiry', Hutcheson saw the virtue of the virtuous man as 
consisting in sociable and kindly impulses directed towards the good 
of those people irmnediately around the agent. Thus, such impulses 
as the love of one's children, compassion, gratitude towards 
benefactors, etc. were viewed as the essence of moral goodness; the 
virtuous man was he whose behaviour was motivated by such impulses. 
The word 'impulse' is not a misnomer for these feelings·; as I 
discussed in Chapter 4 above, on this early view it is not clear 
whether these virtuous aspects of a man's personality are thought of 
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as passions or desires. In the 'Inquiry', it is the possessing of 
the sort of benevolence I characterized in Chapter 4 as the 'first 
version' of benevolence which typified the virtuous man. This type 
of benevolence is characterized as being particular and directed 
towards people around the agent, and by being a type of, or possibly 
closely connected with, feelings. 
In his second book, the 'Essay' and 'Illustrations', Hutcheson 
conceived of the virtuous man not as being motivated by specific 
benevolent impulses, but as being motivated by a calm, general, and 
well considered benevolent desire towards mankind at large. In other 
words, the virtuous man is no longer a man of generous feelings, but 
a man who calmly and rationally considers the needs of others and 
who then, perhaps without much emotion at all, proceeds to try and 
achieve the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers. I have 
discussed this second version of benevolence at greater length in 
Chapter 4, section ii. There I mentioned the influence of Bishop 
Butler on Hutcheson at this period of his life, but I would like to 
suggest that it is improbable that Hutcheson would have been so 
readily susceptible to Butler's influence unless he had at least 
some realization of the weaknesses of his first version of benevolence. 
In the 'System', Hutcheson's ideal of the virtuous man again 
changes. He retains as part of his new ideal the notion of calm 
rational benevolence which was central to the concept of the virtuous 
man in his second book, but he now adds to it another dimension. 
Calm benevolence now takes second place to the striving· for perfection. 
To some extent, perfection of one's character consists in getting 
calm benevolence to dominate one's personality and to motivate most 
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of one's actions; but this does not change the fact that the ideal 
to be striven for is personal perfection, not (or at least not 
directly) the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers. I will 
argue in this chapter that this change in the nature of the idea of 
the virtuous man was caused by considerations which are internal to 
and implied by Hutcheson's earlier theory. In fact, the notion of 
the virtuous man in the 'System' is the result of Hutcheson's 
realizing certain implications of his earlier theory. 
But before proceeding to expand on these points, I will here 
complete the survey of Hutcheson's various notions of the virtuous 
2 
man by mentioning how the concept appears in Hutcheson's last book. 
The notion of the virtuous man presented in the 'Introduction' can 
only be described as Stoical. This Stoicism, especially the desire 
for perfection, was already present in the 'System', but the 
'Introduction' greatly expands on the other tenet of Stoicism, the 
desire for "life according to nature". In some of the details, 
Hutcheson may have changed the Stoical ideal slightly; in particular 
he tends to depart from the more austere versions of Stoicism by 
giving physical pleasure a place in the good life, but he does at 
least relegate such pleasure to the lowest position. So in spirit, 
if not in detail, the concept of the virtuous life in the 'Introduction' 
is Stoical. 
Stoicism as an ethical theory has, I think, two central tenets, 
and Hutcheson agrees with both. I also think it easy to see why, 
given Hutcheson's earlier philosophy, he would be inclined to accept 
these tenets. The first tenet is that the field of all human 
2. I accept Scott's contention that the 'Introduction' was 
probably written after the 'System'; cf. Scott, p. 244-248. 
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endeavours to gain happiness, perfection, or virtue ought to be the 
person's own personality and character. The nature of human beings, 
and the nature of the world, is such that the only possibility of 
achieving happiness is to direct one's activity inwards, and to 
strive to control one's wants, desires, feelings, and pleasures. It 
is easy, I think to see that his acceptance of this doctrine is the 
culmination of Hutcheson's growing awareness of the implications of 
his earlier doctrine that the desire for virtue is the desire to have 
certain desires and to control our other desires. But how far 
Hutcheson has moved from the position of his earlier writings can be 
seen by comparing this notion that virtue consists in acting so as 
to perfect one's personality and his earlier theory that virtue 
consists in promoting the greatest happiness of others. 
But Hutcheson has not completely abandoned the notion of 
benevolence as a virtue; he has only demoted it from its all-important 
position as the whole of virtue. To see how it remains in his new 
ideal, one must examine the second central tenet of Hutcheson's new 
Stoical ideal, and introduce the notion of "life according to nature". 
Trying to mould one's personality to nature consists in perfecting 
all of one's abilities and powers as far as is possible without 
upsetting the natural balance and harmony that is inherent in the 
various aspects of the human character. This notion that each aspect 
of the human character has a proper or natural position with respect 
to the other aspects of the human character, must, of course, be 
explained further if this position is to be philosophically respectable. 
Hutcheson's discussion of this point reverts back to his earlier 
attempts to prove that one's greatest self-interest lies in the 
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pursuit of the greatest happiness of others. And herein lies the 
connexion between this new notion of the 'natural' personality and 
Hutcheson's earlier philosophy. He now wants to argue that structuring 
one's personality so as to obtain the greatest possible happiness 
for oneself will necessarily make one an ethical and politically 
useful member of society. This, of course, is because benevolence, 
the desire for the esteem of others, and other social impulses are 
not only inherent in human nature, but are our greatest possible 
sources of pleasure. And so benevolence has not disappeared from 
Hutcheson's ideal; it has merely become one of the central components 
of his new ideal of life according to nature. His earlier proof 
that self-interest and benevolence would lead to identical action 
has now become a proof that benevolence is an important part of the 
natural (and happy) life. The relation between happiness, virtue, 
and nature Hutcheson sums up in this passage: 
"the same therefore is the sununary notion of 
happiness and virtue: to wit, "that we should 
love and reverence the Deity with all our soul, 
and have a steadfast good-will toward mankind, 
and carefully improve all our powers of body and 
mind by which we can promote the common interest 
of all;" which is the life according to nature." 
(Introduction, p. 64) 
This completes the summary of the development of Hutcheson's 
ideal of the virtuous man. I have shown how he moved from locating 
virtue in social impulses, through seeing virtue in calm general 
benevolence, and then in the perfecting of one's personality, to 
seeing virtue finally in life according to nature. 
But before returning to discussing the moral sense as it appears 
in the 'System', it is, perhaps, convenient to complete here the 
discussion of the 'Introduction' by mentioning one final point, namely -
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what has become of the moral sense? It has, in fact, become 
'conscience'. In the 'System', as I will explain, the moral sense 
becomes a moral faculty which can generate the desire for moral 
perfection; thus in the 'System', the two central motivational 
impulses in Hutcheson's philosophy are joined by a third, the desire 
for perfection. In the 'Introduction', the moral faculty (i.e. 
conscience) does not so much generate a new desire, but rather is 
directly active in controlling and balancing all of our desires. 
Conscience is the highest faculty in our natures, and as such it 
should be the strongest and hence control and regulate all our other 
desires. 
"But to regulate the highest powers of our nature, 
our affections and deliberate designs of action 
in important affairs, there's implanted by nature 
the noblest and most divine of all our senses, 
that conscience by which we discern what is 
graceful, becoming, beautiful and honourable in 
the affections of the soul, in our conduct of 
life, our words and actions." (Introduction, p. 18) 
It is interesting to note that although this regulating faculty is 
far from the moral sense of his earlier philosophy, Hutcheson still 
calls it a sense, and talks of it 'discerning' what is honourable, 
etc. I do not see that he has made any effort to explain how these 
regulating and discerning roles are compatible. In this,his later 
writings, however forceful an image of the virtuous life they create, 
are less interesting philosophically. 
To return to the 'System', the first thing that must be noted 
is that this is not a very well written book. Any thoughts one might 
have of finding in the 'System' a coherent and consistent ethical 
theory, or a theory of the standard of Hutcheson's first two books, 
are, I think, doomed to failure. Hutcheson was himself aware of this 
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fact. In a letter, he once said of writing the 'System': "but, as 
to composing in order, I am quite bewildered, and am adding confusedly 
to a confused book all valuable remarks in a farrago, to refresh my 
memory in my class lectures on several subjects. 113 But even if some 
confusion is to be expected in a book the author did not prepare for 
publication, and even if one allows for Hutcheson's self-admitted 
inability to systematize his later thinking, one still cannot but be 
surprised at some of the mistakes in this book. There are passages 
where Hutcheson seems to confuse concepts which he had gone to great 
lengths to distinguish in his earlier writings. For example, he 
manages to confuse the moral sense with benevolent desires, (System, 
p. 51-52), and throughout the book he is unclear on whether the moral 
sense is some sort of intuition, or feeling, or indeed desire. 
This is unfortunate for there can be little doubt that Hutcheson's 
notion of the moral sense had changed by the time he wrote the 'System', 
but there must remain great doubt as to just what his new concept 
of the moral sense is. And it is the concept of the moral sense in 
the 'System' which needs discussing. 
Underlying the changes in the conception of the moral sense is 
Hutcheson's growing realization of the implications of the fact that 
the objects of moral approval and disapproval (i.e. intentions or 
motives) are an internal or 'inward' aspect of one's personality; 
3. Scott, p. 114. 
4. In fairness to Hutcheson, it must be added to this paragraph that 
two thirds of the 'System' deals with political philosophy and 
political economy, and that the merits of the book lie largely in 
those fields. I will be dealing only with Book I, p. 1-226. 
.-1 , ' I 
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they are not something external to one, such as the happiness of others. 
5 
I have argued above that Hutcheson had come to 
realize that if being 
motivated by benevolence is the characteristic whereby a virtuous 
action is virtuous, then the desire to do virtuous actions would be 
the desire to have benevolent desires. I also explained how 
Hutcheson thought we could encourage and increase the benevolent 
desires which are inherently in our make-up. Thus I have established 
that the criterion for the virtuousness of actions, and the scope of 
our endeavours to be virtuous, are internal to our personalities. 
In the 'System', Hutcheson is grappling with the implications of this 
position on the moral sense and on morality in general. However, it 
is not clear that he is entirely successful in these endeavours. 
The first point to be made is that this explains how Hutcheson's 
new concept of the virtuous man, as one who strives for the perfection 
of himself, grows out of the implications of his earlier theory. 
If the scope of the desire to be virtuous (i.e. the desire to have 
benevolent desires) is internal, or, to use Hutcheson's phrase, 
concerns one's 'inward temper' (System, p. 46), then one who achieves 
virtue is one who attains a virtuous personality or temper. That is, 
the virtuous man is one who has perfected his character so that calm 
general benevolence is always his chief motivating desire. Thus one 
can easily see how Hutcheson's own theory has led from an ideal of 
benevolent impulses, to the ideal of the perfection of one's character. 
But the problem now arises - what are the implications for the 
moral sense? If the virtuous man is one who perfects his nature, 
then surely the moral sense will approve of all attempts to achieve 
5. Cf. above, chapter 5. 
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such perfection. But so far in Hutcheson's philosophy, the moral 
sense has approved only of actions motivated by benevolence; it has 
never been conceived of as approving of attempts at personal perfection. 
This, of course, is what lies behind Hutcheson's extension of 
moral approval in the 'System'. In his earlier writings, Hutcheson 
had conceived of the moral sense as conferring moral approval only on 
actions which were motivated by a desire to give pleasure to others. 
In the 'System', Hutcheson conceives of the moral sense as approving 
of three things: 
Firstly, the moral sense approves of all actions motivated by 
benevolence. Thus this aspect of the moral sense remains unchanged. 
Secondly, the moral sense approves of certain aspects of a man's 
nature which, though not actually benevolence or particular kind 
affections, "are naturally connected with such affections, natural 
evidences of them, and plainly inconsistent with the highest sorts of 
selfishness and sensuality." (System, p. 66). He gives as examples 
fortitude, candour, openness of mind, and sincerity, (System, p. 66). 
This extension of the moral sense is of little interest for our 
purposes, but it does indicate that Hutcheson had a richer conception 
of virtue than his earlier writings perhaps indicate, and that he was 
trying to adapt the moral sense to allow for this richness. 
Thirdly, the moral sense now approves of a person having "an 
acute moral sense itself, a strong desire of moral excellence, with 
an high relish of it wherever it is observed." (System, p. 67). In 
other words, the moral sense now not only approves of benevolence, but 
also approves of the desire to have benevolent desires. That this 
meta-desire is the result of the moral sense itself, there can be no 
doubt: 
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"W~ do not call the power or (moral) sense itself 
virtuous; but the having this sense in an high 
degree naturally raises a strong desire of having 
all generous affections; it surmounts all the little 
obstacles to them, and determines the mind to use 
all the natural means of raising them .... And the 
consequent desire of moral excellence, the consequent 
strong.lo~e, esteem, and good-will to the persons 
where i~ is found, are immediately approved, as 
most amiable affections, and the highest virtues." 
(System, p. 67-68) 
Thus the desire of desires which I discussed above at length in the 
chapter on moral motivation, has now become the desire of moral 
perfection, and is not only approved of by the moral sense, but is 
now the "highest virtue". This desire, however, continues to 
function as I described in Chapter 5 above. 
This new notion of the moral sense approving of the desire for 
moral perfection requires comment. It will be remembered that 
Hutcheson in his earlier writings had viewed the desire to have 
benevolent desires as being a self-interested desire generated by the 
prospects of the pleasures of self-approbation. In the 'System', 
the self-interested nature of the desire of moral desires has vanished 
completely; in fact, Hutcheson now explicitly denies that the desire 
of moral perfection has anything to do with self-approbation, (System, 
p. 77). No reason is given for now believing his former opinion to 
be wrong, but Hutcheson does say something about how the moral sense 
can generate desires without using the mechanism of desiring the 
pleasure of self-approbation. He now suggests that the moral sense can 
encourage desires simply because it has the power and authority to do 
so; "And thus, where the moral sense is in its full vigour, it makes 
the generous determination to publick happiness the supreme one in 
the soul, with that commanding power which it is naturally destined 
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to exercise." (System, p. 77). 
This notion that the moral sense can 'command' or generate desires 
whose object is to encourage or discourage other desires leads us to 
the second major change Hutcheson made in his philosophy while writing 
the 'System'. He now introduces the idea that the various aspects 
of one's personality are ordered in a hierarchy, and that some of our 
desires are 'superior' to others. Hutcheson is not very clear on 
how this hierarchy or structure arises, nor is he very explicit on 
why he thinks he has to introduce it. I have suggested in the 
previous paragraph that the reason why he needs this concept, is to 
explain how the moral sense can generate desires which are not self-
interested; he needs these desires to be non-self-interested so that 
the moral sense can morally approve of them. Thus the two major 
changes in the 'System', the introduction of the notion of a hierarchy 
of desires, and the extension of the moral sense to include approval 
of the desire for moral perfection, are connected, though it is not 
clear just how aware Hutcheson was of this. 
This notion of hierarchy is difficult to make clear, for Hutcheson 
himself is not at all clear on the issue. What he wants to do is to 
abandon the mechanical way in which the strength of desires is 
relative to the degree of pleasure and pain which will result from 
their satisfaction, 6 and to introduce the notion of the authority of 
desires. That is, he wants to make the authority (and motivational 
force?) of desires independent of their strength as previously 
conceived. He then, of course, wants to argue that the desires of 
the moral sense have greater authority than other desires. This 
6. Cf. above, chapter 2. 
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abandoning of his previous notion of the strength of desires looks 
like a nnve away from the hedonistic element in his early philosophy, 
but let us look at his arguments for this new notion of the authority 
of the moral sense. 
His first argument, if it can be called an argument, is that 
the superiority of the moral sense is immediately apparent: 
"This moral sense from its very nature appears to 
be designed for regulating and controlling all 
our powers. This dignity and commanding nature 
we are immediately conscious of, as we are 
conscious of the power itself. Nor can such 
matters of immediate feeling be otherways proved 
but by appeals to our hearts." (System, p. 61) 
His second argument is more interesting, but re-introduces the 
hedonistic method of arguing which characterizes so much of Hutcheson's 
earlier writings on desires, and which he seems now to be trying to 
get away from. He argues that the pleasures of the moral sense are 
superior to other pleasures because the degree of other pleasures is 
diminished by the knowledge that sacrifices have been made to obtain 
them, whereas the pleasures of being virtuous are increased the more 
h 'f. d . 
7 we ave sacri ice to virtue. This may or may not be true, (one can 
think of examples indicating either), but whether the argument is 
valid or not, it should be noted that Hutcheson is arguing that the 
pleasures of the moral sense are superior because they can lead to 
greater overall pleasure. 
These two related changes in the moral sense, its authority and 
commanding position, and its approval of actions motivated by the 
desires which its new authority generates, still leaves one central 
question unanswered. If my interpretation of the connexion between 
7. Cf. System, p. 61-62. 
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these changes is correct, then there is a major gap in Hutcheson's 
overall argument. He has argued that the pleasures of the moral sense 
are superior, and that the moral sense has an inherent authority as 
the result of that; and he has argued that the moral sense approves of 
the actions it motivates; what he has still not established is how a 
'sense', which the moral 'sense' is supposed to be, can motivate 
actions or generate desires. This large gap in the argument, which 
seems to threaten the coherence of the whole presentation in the 
'System', is hidden behind a change of terminology. The 'moral sense' 
has now become the 'moral faculty'. This use of the word 'faculty' 
allows Hutcheson to conflate the perceptive-cum-feeling aspects of 
the old moral sense, with the authoritative, commanding, and 
motivational aspects he now wants to add. But arbitrarily dumping 
all these functions into one faculty will not solve the problem of 
their relation to each other, or the problem of their compatibility. 
Nor have I any suggestions to make on this topic in the context of 
Hutcheson's earlier analysis of human nature; I do not see how this 
new faculty is compatible with his earlier separation of desires, 
sensations, beliefs, etc., as described above in Chapter 2. It is 
this gap which makes the new extended and authoritative moral faculty 
difficult to view coherently. 
268 
Concluding Assessment 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a critical 
examination of Hutcheson's moral theory using criteria external to 
that theory. I hope that I have been able to highlight the 
weaknesses which are internal to his theory, but perhaps I should 
end by standing back and reflecting on how successful Hutcheson's 
overall project has been. 
The central point of Hutcheson's endeavours was to try and trace 
the origins of moral approval, and of virtuous actions, to some aspect 
of human nature. To fulfil this task, he began by analysing human 
nature, claiming that we have direct internal awareness of our own 
natures. For this purpose, he uses three categories: sensation, 
desires, and beliefs. Although Huthceson is immensely ingenious at 
using this framework to describe the vagaries of human nature, I 
think in the end one must admit that human nature is too complex to 
fit into these simple categories. Can we really do justice to our 
natures by viewing sense perception, reflection, feelings, pleasures 
and pains, emotions, hopes, fears, joys, and sorrows all as the same 
sort of thing? Surely that is a superficial analysis of human nature. 
But over-simplicity is not the only accusation that the twentieth 
century is wont to throw at an eighteenth century account of human 
nature; the nature of Hutcheson's project itself must be questioned. 
Hutcheson has attempted in his study of human nature, to answer his 
questions by introspection and reflection; he repeatedly refers to 
these methods as proving his points. How satisfactory is introspection 
as a method of investigating these questions? We must, I think, reply 
that it is not very satisfactory in itself. To mention only one fatal 
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criticism, we cannot establish by introspection whether an attitude 
is inherent in our nature, or culturally determined. And, of course, 
many thinkers now question how much direct awareness of our natures 
we have. But in Hutcheson's defence, one might note that reflection 
is not totally useless in understanding ourselves; indeed it would 
seem that some reflective knowledge must be contained in any account 
of human nature. 
In answer to his quest for the origins of moral evaluation, 
Hutcheson discovered that he possessed a nnral sense. Is an adequate 
account of morality in terms of a moral sense possible? Hutcheson's 
main failure when attempting this project derives from his over-
simplified account of human nature. The fact that he lumps together 
sense perception and feeling as the same sort of thinq, allows him 
to include in the notion of the moral sense both nnral judgements and 
moral emotions. But simply combining these two aspects of morality 
into one faculty {and Hutcheson later adds to this faculty the power 
of controlling our personality), does not solve the problem of the 
relation between moral judgements and moral feelings. In fact, it 
confuses the issue, for it obscures the differences between these 
two obviously different aspects of nnrality. The intuitionists have 
suggested an analysis of morality in terms of one of these aspects, 
and the emotivists have offered an analysis in terms of the other, 
but Hutcheson has merely befuddled the issue. This is probably the 
weakest point of his theory. 
Hutcheson thought he had found not only the origin .of moral 
approval; he also thought he knew which aspect of human nature 
motivated virtuous actions; namely benevolence. Whether or not the 
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virtue of actions lies in the motives from which they are done, is 
today still a debated point, though few would deny that the motive 
is relevant at least for the assessment of the agent. But Hutcheson 
himself came to realize that all the various complexities of human 
virtue could not be analysed in terms of the single motive of 
benevolence. His concept of human virtue developed during his life, 
but at no point could benevolence alone do justice to its richness. 
And so for this reason, and for other reasons inherent in his thought, 
in his later works he extended the motives for virtuous actions to 
include, amongst other things, a desire for personal perfection. 
The contention that benevolence could motivate human action 
involved Hutcheson in an attempt to refute the psychological egoists 
(i.e. those who claimed that self-interest was the motive for all 
actions). The fact that the arguments he used in this attempt are 
very familar today, should not lead one to ignore the merits of 
Hutcheson's presentation. After all, he is one of the eighteenth 
century writers who familiarized philosophers with these arguments. 
For example, he used the point which is often attributed to Butler, 
that the pleasure of satisfying a desire cannot be the object of that 
desire, because the pleasures of satisfaction must presuppose the 
desire. I think his refutation of the egoists is one of the stronger 
points of Hutcheson's writings, but is perhaps of less interest to 
philosophers at the moment. 
The aspect of his philosophy which both has the most merit and 
is of the most interest today, is his solution to the problem of how 
moral knowledge can motivate virtuous actions. I suggested that this 
problem will arise in any theory which locates the criterion for 
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virtue in the motive from which the action was done, so Hutcheson's 
solution to the problem is of interest outside both his theory of 
benevolence and his theory of the moral sense, and should be of 
interest to contemporary philosophers. However, it may be difficult 
to get a proper hearing for a theory which values the striving for 
human perfection in an age that locates the origins of all human 
imperfection in the imperfections of society, and wants to discuss 
only social solutions to all problems. 
Besides criticizing the egoists, Hutcheson also attempted to 
criticize the rationalists. But in this he was, I think, much less 
successful, largely because his interpretation of the rationalists 
was rather narrow. He interpreted them as trying to reduce moral 
ideas to other, non-moral ideas, such as truth, which are usually 
associated with the faculty of reason. His refutation of this sort 
of reductionism is able. A related topic is not without consideration 
in recent philosophical literature, for the general question of the 
reduction of moral to non-moral ideas is often discussed today, 
although seldom with reference to the particular reductions which 
Hutcheson considered. 
But the question of reductionism is not the only issue between 
Hutcheson and the rationalists. The debate was reopened by Price's 
criticisms of Hutcheson. Price maintained that moral ideas are 
simple and unanalysable, (a proposition which Hutcheson also held and 
was perhaps the first to do so), but that these ideas are perceived 
by reason and not by a ~ense. There is more at stake in.this debate 
than a quibble about the name of the faculty which perceives moral 
ideas. Price wished to maintain, in opposition to Hutcheson, that 
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moral truths are necessary and independent of human nature, and 
that morality inheres in the actions themselves. The best defence 
of Hutcheson against this sort of criticism is to criticize Price, 
for the success of Price's project is highly questionable. However, 
Price does put his finger on a number of weak points in Hutcheson's 
theory. For example, what is the relation for Hutcheson between 
the ideas of good and benevolence? On the other hand, some of 
Price's criticisms are wide of their mark; Price misses, for example, 
Hutcheson's explanation of the influence of the moral sense on our 
actions. 
All in all, I think that Hutcheson's theory of the moral sense 
is unacceptable without such extensive revision that it would be 
unrecognizable. However, I think that Hutcheson's philosophical 
abilities are such that his presentation of these theories makes it 
easier to see why this is so. 
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